



Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant 
explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conlicts 
inside the US state. This book rectiies this weakness in commentary on Afghani-
stan by exploring the signiicant role of these divisions in the US’s dificulties 
in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The 
main objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact of 
bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the 
Bush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which the 
US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within 
the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal 
tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book 
also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in 
nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.
Dr Conor Keane has degrees in law and politics, and a doctorate on nation-
building in Afghanistan from Macquarie University. His research interests include 
counter terrorism, state building, bureaucratic politics and US foreign policy. He 
has published several articles on these topics in journals such as Armed Forces & 
Society and International Peacekeeping.
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On 11 September 2001 an event occurred that impacted signiicantly on the shape 
and nature of US foreign policy. The destruction of the World Trade Center, dam-
age to the Pentagon, and the deaths of almost 3,000 US citizens, could not go 
unanswered. An overwhelming majority of a stunned US population looked to the 
government and military for retribution. In this heated political climate, President 
George W. Bush declared a ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT), a protracted conlict 
against an insubstantial enemy. Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs 
of Staff, described it as ‘a different kind of conlict . . . unlike any other in recent 
American history’.1 This would be a conlict without temporal and spatial hori-
zons, where non-state, terrorist actors were as much a target of US military action 
as the states that harboured them.
Barely a month after 9/11, the irst battleground in the GWOT became Afghani-
stan. Here the Taliban government was sheltering Al Qaeda, the fundamentalist, 
Islamic terrorist group responsible for the attacks. Bush called for the Taliban 
to hand over Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Laden, and their refusal to do so 
precipitated a US invasion. Rallying under the banner of national self-defence, 
the organs of the US government swiftly mobilized for a military strike aimed at 
regime change. Following a resounding military victory, however, the ties that 
bound the foreign policy machine together began to fray, as the realities of the 
political and military situation unfolded over the coming months and years.
As the Taliban regime crumbled in the face of American military might, some 
educated Afghans and many more Americans hoped that a stable and repre-
sentative government could replace it. But a smooth transition to Western-style 
democracy was always an unlikely, if not altogether utopian, challenge, given 
Afghanistan’s economic underdevelopment, ethno-sectarian issures, and institu-
tional fragility born of decades of military conlict and authoritarian rule. From 
2001 to 2003, the scale and complexity of this challenge was not something the 
Bush Administration seriously considered. On the one hand, the abstracted rheto-
ric of long-term political goals and ambitions envisaged the cultivation of a stable, 
pluralistic and representative Afghan government. On the other hand, the human 
1 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 220.
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and material resources on which such an outcome would be premised were never 
forthcoming. Consequently, US insouciance in the years immediately after the 
invasion, thinly disguised beneath the euphemistic language of having a ‘light 
footprint’, contributed to the rise of a ferocious and destabilizing insurgency. This 
heralded the return of the Taliban as a signiicant political force. As the insurgency 
intensiied, policymakers reappraised the situation and emphasized the need for a 
comprehensive, whole-of-government approach.
Despite some limited progress, a refurbished, ‘whole-of-government’ approach 
to Afghanistan’s problems fell far short of its objectives. By 2008, a quarter of 
Afghanistan’s population still did not have access to clean water, and 50 per cent 
of Afghan children were malnourished. Over six million people required food aid, 
including approximately 172,000 teachers who were not able to support them-
selves.2 There was also rampant unemployment due to a lack of industrial or farm-
ing opportunities. It has been estimated that 60–70 per cent of those who joined 
the Taliban between 2001 and 2008 did so because of a lack of income.3 By 2010, 
Afghanistan remained bereft of a national road network, and the highways that the 
US had constructed were used for drug traficking and extortion. Schools lacked 
equipment and sometimes even a schoolroom, and there was little sewerage or 
electricity infrastructure outside of Kabul.4 Recorded acts of violence increased 
exponentially, from an average of 900 a year between 2002 and 2004, to 8,950 a 
year by 2008.5 This violence at least partly relected the regrouping and growth of 
the Taliban after their earlier dispersal. As a consequence of the Taliban’s intimi-
dating presence, only a third of schoolchildren in Afghanistan’s southern prov-
inces entered schools for food aid.6 When the majority of US oficials and soldiers 
withdrew from the country in 2014, they left a volatile and fragmented political 
environment in their wake, much as the British and Soviets had done before them. 
This was despite more than a decade of US nation-building efforts in Afghanistan.
Nation-building in Afghanistan reached its zenith, in terms of funding and 
attention, toward the end of the Bush Administration’s second term in ofice, but 
it was a stated objective much earlier than this. Bush himself, who had derided the 
concept during his Presidential campaign, came to accept it as a part of the mis-
sion in Afghanistan from April 2002 onward. Nation-building, both as a concept 
2 Carlotta Gall, “Hunger and Food Prices Push Afghanistan to the Brink”, New York Times, May 16, 
2008.
3 Robert Crews and Amin Tarzi (eds), The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2008), 345.
4 Michael O’Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Toughing it Out in Afghanistan (Washington DC: Brook-
ings University Press, 2010).
5 Committee on Armed Services, Assessment of Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Develop-
ment in US Strategy and Operations (House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, 
January 23 2008); Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 342.
6 Alastair Scrutton, “Attacks on Aid Challenge Afghan Reconstruction”, Reuters, September 18, 
2008.
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and a practice, is mired in controversy and ambiguity. Some scholars regard its 
contemporary uses in places such as Afghanistan as little more than an ideological 
veil for US imperial ambitions.7 For others who subscribe to the alleged beneits 
of nation-building, it is a normative concept that refers to ‘the use of armed force 
in the aftermath of a conlict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy’.8 
For many it is simply a synonym for a cluster of related concepts such as ‘nation-
building’, ‘peace-building’, and ‘post-conlict operations’, yet others consider 
each of these activities to be distinct. The pros and cons of these various uses 
of nation-building and cognate terms will be explored in Chapter 1. For now, 
nation-building will simply be deined as a set of processes through which a for-
eign power or powers, by direct intervention and in collaboration with favoured 
domestic political elites, seek to erect or re-erect a country-wide institutional 
and material infrastructure that can become the enduring foundation of political 
stability after a period of armed conlict and civil strife. Hence, nation-building 
involves a complex of issues including security and paciication, infrastructure 
development and humanitarian relief, and governance and law and order. Cru-
cially, it can also involve, as it did in Afghanistan, an ideological project to win the 
active support or tacit consent of the local population for the new or restructured 
state – what has often been euphemistically labelled as the ‘winning of hearts and 
minds’. Understood as such, nation-building is always confronted with a unique 
set of problems and obstacles, arising from the historical speciicity of the country 
in which such projects are pursued.
But the complex requirements of nation-building were neglected and the 
responsibilities of each US agency, and indeed oficial, remained undeined or 
ambiguous. The way in which the activity was approach by the US government 
also revealed a deep ambivalence at the heart of the foreign policy bureaucracy. 
With this in mind, the main objective of the current study is to contribute to deep-
ening our understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building 
in Afghanistan, which clearly has implications for similar interventions else-
where. The central research question is: Why, and how, did bureaucratic politics 
contribute to the failings of US nation-building efforts in Afghanistan? However, 
the subject must irst be contextualized.
Current Literature on Nation-Building in Afghanistan
Disorder within the US foreign policy bureaucracy was certainly not the cause of 
nation-building failure; it was one factor among many. Bureaucratic conlict was 
7 Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (New York: Metropolitan 
books, 2010); Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the 
Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004).
8 James Dobbins et al., The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
2007).
complicated, exacerbated and sometimes even caused by a raft of other issues. 
These issues include the Bush Administration’s approach toward the War on Ter-
ror; the invasion of Iraq; a failure to consider the regional consequences of inter-
vention in Afghanistan; fractures within the international nation-building effort; 
an imbalance of power between the US military and civilian realms; strategic 
ambiguity; the controversial relationship between nation-building and counter-
insurgency, and Afghanistan’s historical and cultural nuances.
Scholars such as Daalder and Lindsay argue that the ‘Bush revolution in for-
eign policy’ was cloaked in a doctrine of preemption, which required an ‘America 
unbound’ to forcefully reshape the international system by aggressively searching 
for monsters to destroy.9 Although this attitude prevailed within the Bush Admin-
istration before 9/11, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) invigorated and legiti-
mized foreign policy based on the unilateral projection of military power. For the 
remainder of Bush’s time in ofice, the GWOT superseded all other foreign policy 
matters. The attitude of the White House during this period has been described as 
a combination of arrogance and ignorance.10 President Bush has been derided for 
lacking suficient knowledge of international relations and an understanding of 
the nuances of global politics. Some observers considered the Bush Administra-
tion to be no more than a ‘callow instrument of neoconservative ideologies’, but 
this is disputable. ‘Assertive nationalists’, such as Vice President Dick Cheney 
and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, (at least initially) dismissed the 
neoconservative camp’s conviction that it was in the national interest to aggres-
sively encourage authoritarian states to become US-style democracies. However, 
as Epstein notes, what both factions had in common was faith that military force 
should unequivocally be used to destroy the enemies of the United States.11 But-
tressed by this common belief, and with the help of a compliant President, Bush’s 
inner circle constructed an overarching strategy that convinced, some would say 
exploited, the US public to support their foreign policy ideology.12 This came 
to be known as the Bush Doctrine, which was evoked to justify regime change 
through armed conquest. During the Bush epoch, more than any other period in 
history, the United States was characterized as an imperialist power.13 The ambi-
tions of the Bush Administration left no room for a White House role in instigat-
ing a whole-of-government response to the mission in Afghanistan. This allowed 
the US bureaucracy to run its own race and little effort was made by the White 
House to mitigate bureaucratic conlict until near the end of Bush’s second term 
 9 Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (New 
Jersey: Wiley, 2005).
10 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation-Building in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Penguin, 2008), xlii.
11 Jason Epstein, “Leviathan”, New York Review of Books, May 1, 2003, 12. Joshua Marshal, 
“Remaking the World: Bush and the Neoconservatives”, Foreign Affairs, 82:6 (2003).
12 Scott A. Bonn, Mass Deception: Moral Panic and the US War on Iraq (Piscataway: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, 2010).
13 Rodrigue Tremblay, The New American Empire: Causes and Consequences for the United States 
and for the World (Haverford: Ininity, 2004).
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as the conlict with the Taliban-led insurgency intensiied.14 Strachan claims that 
militarizing nation-building should be attributed to the vague policy mandate that 
emanated from the White House. The Bush Administration failed to establish ‘a 
tangible link between the policy of its administration and the operational designs 
of its armed forces’.15 Without effective guidance counter-insurgency increased 
policy incoherence, which stoked the lames of bureaucratic conlict.
The US Congress and public’s hunger for retribution enabled the Bush Admin-
istration to broaden the GWOT from a ight against Al Qaeda to incorporate an 
‘axis of evil’ consisting of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Creating this troika has 
been argued as representing a veil that allowed the White House to pursue particu-
lar commercial interests; increase US prestige and power in the Middle-East; and 
reinforce its alliance with Israel.16 These goals would be realized only through an 
invasion of Iraq, an undertaking that eclipsed nation-building in Afghanistan. For 
White House oficials such as Paul Wolfowitz, the Undersecretary of Defence, the 
GWOT’s irst battleground was simply a side-show to be disregarded in favour 
of the moral and material rewards that the removal of Saddam Hussein promised. 
This resulted in a lack of resources, attention or direction toward the US mission 
in Afghanistan in the irst few years after the fall of the Taliban. Nation-building in 
Afghanistan, Jones observes, was ‘hamstrung by the US focus on Iraq’.17 Neglect 
in the early stages of the nation-building project, if it could even be deined as such 
in the irst few years, also resulted in unclear goals and responsibilities between 
the US agencies and oficials involved.
Another factor that impacted on the scope and shape of the mission in Afghani-
stan was the way in which the US approached Pakistan. Before and after the 
invasion, the Taliban and Al Qaeda were able to travel between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan with relative impunity, via the notorious Pashtun tribal belt. According 
to Rashid ‘the region had to be seen as a single entity’, as the countries within 
were plagued by many of the same problems. But conducting nation-building in 
Afghanistan alone, he maintains, simply pushed these problems into neighbour-
ing states.18 The US failed to pressure the autocratic regimes that littered Central 
Asia to instigate reforms. In particular, embracing and legitimizing Pervez 
Musharraf, Pakistan’s General-Dictator, only sowed seeds of animosity toward 
US intervention in the country’s affairs among the populace. This, in turn, pre-
vented Pakistani citizens from resisting the Taliban and other extremists as they 
14 Douglas Porch, Counter-Insurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
15 Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 47:3, 
33–54.
16 Bruce Cummings, Ervand Abrahamian and Moshe Maoz, Inventing the Axis of Evil; The Truth 
about Iran, North Korea and Syria (New York: New Press: 2004); Stephen Sniegoski, Transparent 
Cabal: The Neo-Conservative Agenda, War in the Middle East and the National Interest of Israel 
(Virginia: Enigma, 2008).
17 Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W. Nor-
ton & Company, 2010), xxii.
18 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, xliv.
forcefully iniltrated society. In the absence of any nation-building or democra-
tization framework for the region, therefore, Pakistan remained ‘an open back 
door’ that functioned as a safe haven for the Taliban.19
Priest and Feith have exposed the way in which the Bush Administration’s con-
duct of the War on Terror precipitated a greater power imbalance between the 
military and the civilian branches of the US government. The Pentagon domi-
nated foreign policy while the State Department, USAID and others were mar-
ginalized. Relationships with authoritarian states came to be deined by how they 
could accommodate US military interests, which undermined the State Depart-
ment’s diplomatic mandate.20 Yet the one element of the military that had experi-
ence with nation-building, Army Civil Affairs Units, were neglected and even 
downgraded. Their capacity to drive development in Afghanistan, therefore, was 
never realized.21
An emphasis on unilateral military power also trumped any adherence to inter-
national law or respect for international institutions. US allies, meanwhile, were 
often perceived by the Bush Administration to be impediments that hamstrung 
the capacity of the US to act decisively. Cooperation with NATO and the United 
Nations toward nation-building objectives was neglected in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq. In the case of the latter a ‘coalition of the willing’ was created that marched 
to the drumbeat of US interests, rather than a truly collaborative partnership.22 
Although there was a more genuine multilateral component to the mission in 
Afghanistan, the US still refused to seriously consider the opinions of its allies. 
Cleavages within the international alliance circumscribed many nation- building 
goals and projects.23 While some NATO countries criticized the US for an unwill-
ingness to spearhead a multilateral effort, conversely the United States was 
angered by the failure of many of their allies to effectively combat the Taliban-led 
insurgency. As the violence escalated in Afghanistan from 2005 onwards, many 
European troops remained locked within Forward Operating Bases, due to their 
governments’ reluctance to risk casualties that would be unpopular domestically. 
The US, British and Canadian military described soldiers from other NATO coun-
tries ‘as pot plants . . . of ornamental use only’.24
19 David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 7.
20 Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2003); Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the 
War on Terrorism (New York: Harper, 2008).
21 Mark Benjamin and Barbara Slavin, “Ghost Soldiers: The Pentagon’s Decade-Long Struggle to 
Win Hearts and Minds through Civil Affairs”, The Center for Public Integrity, February 6, 2011.
22 Ewen Macaskill, “US Claims 45 Nations in ‘Coalition of Willing’ ”, The Guardian, Wednesday, 
March 19, 2003.
23 Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2012); David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, 
Fighting Alone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
24 Loyn, In Afghanistan, 8; Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, xxiv.
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The ambiguous nature of the nation-building enterprise was representative of 
a lack of commitment, poor policy decisions and an inappropriate allocation of 
resources. There was also a broad failure to recognize the realities of Afghani-
stan and to translate rhetoric into action.25 This had far-reaching consequences 
and previous studies have acknowledged, to varying degrees, the US’s incapacity 
to mobilize its vast resources to promote good governance, provide security or 
develop infrastructure.26 ‘Good governance’ was a policy that was never truly 
manifested in practice, and instead toxic corruption spread throughout the Afghan 
State. Empowering a centralized government proved to be ‘highly corrosive’ as it 
nurtured a crooked and impotent regime, led by Hamid Karzai, which neglected 
representative governance at a regional and local level, and contributed to, rather 
than deterred, civil unrest. All levels of government, however, failed to correctly 
manage resources or effectively implement policies. Consequently, politics was 
dominated by individuals who were willing to rent themselves out to the highest 
bidder.27
Efforts to promote security fared no better. Disarmament was not prioritized, 
which determined that militias emerged through the country to ill the vacuum of 
security left by the removal of the Taliban regime. Afghanistan’s security forces 
were unable to protect rural villagers. Insecurity was endemic to rural areas, which 
explains, to some extent, why the Taliban was often greeted as a force of order and 
stability, rather than with hostility.28 Meanwhile, on the development front, corpo-
rate contractors were foolishly employed over experienced international and local 
NGOs.29 These contractors, in turn, hired mercenaries to protect their projects, a 
militarization of development that was not well received by the local population 
or the international aid community.30 In particular, when a deluge of aid was trig-
gered by the emergence of a violent insurgency, quantity trumped quality.
The Taliban were misrepresented and misunderstood by the United States and 
its allies. After the invasion, the Taliban was not defeated, it had merely delated. 
As late as 2005, the US military estimated there were less than 1,000 Taliban 
ighters left in Afghanistan. US military commander Major General Eric Olson, 
25 Edward Girardet, Killing the Cranes: A Reporter’s Journey Through Three Decades of War in 
Afghanistan (Chelsea Green, 2011), 382.
26 Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan (New York: Random 
House, 2011); David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a 
Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan Declassi-
ied, A Guide to America’s Longest War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).
27 Girardet, Killing the Cranes, 384–388; Nick Mills, Karzai: The Failing US Intervention and the 
Struggle for Afghanistan (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2011).
28 Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (New York: Houghton 
Miflin, 2014).
29 Jacob E. Jankowski, Corruption, Contractors and Warlords in Afghanistan (New York: Nova, 
2011).
30 Antonio Giustozzi, “Privatizing War and Security in Afghanistan: Future or Dead End?”, Econom-
ics of Peace and Security Journal, 1:2 (2007).
described them as ‘a force in decline’.31 The Taliban, however, had reorganized 
and rebranded itself to ignite a protracted insurgency from late 2002 onwards.32 
Furthermore, the idea that the Taliban was simply a ruthless terrorist organization, 
bereft of a tangible purpose besides suppressing the populace, was a misconcep-
tion that was perpetuated by the Bush Administration’s conception of the GWOT. 
The fact that the Taliban was essentially a domestic movement and many Afghans 
saw them as ‘the cleansers of a social and political system gone wrong in Afghani-
stan, and an Islamic way of life that had been compromised by corruption and 
inidelity’, was not recognized.33
Underpinning many of these issues was Afghanistan’s history and culture. 
A rich body of literature exposes the dificulties this presented for nation- building 
and that the country’s environmental nuances was something that the United 
States failed to adequately consider. The Afghani people’s notorious animosity 
toward foreigners; the fragility and ambiguity of the state structure; an absence of 
the human capital required for effective governance; and complex ethnic divisions 
posed a myriad of problems for any would-be nation-builder.34 Yet there seemed 
to be little acknowledgement or understanding from the US and its allies that they 
were attempting to impose democracy on a country that has been described as the 
graveyard of empires.35
Nation-Building and Bureaucratic Politics in Afghanistan
The role of and divisions within the US foreign policy bureaucracy have been 
relatively understudied compared with the other issues outlined above. The cur-
rent study addresses this deicit by illuminating the role that distinctive elements 
within the US bureaucracy played in producing policy preferences and decisions, 
and in determining how they were or were not implemented. Assessing US nation-
building in Afghanistan on this basis provides an ‘alternative pair of spectacles’ 
that ‘highlights features that might otherwise be overlooked’.36 In particular, it 
highlights what Max Weber’s famous study of bureaucracy had highlighted for an 
earlier generation of social scientists, and which still has contemporary relevance: 
that the hierarchical distribution of power, authority and specialized knowl-
edge within modern, large-scale bureaucratic organizations frequently comes at 
31 Eric Olson, quoted in Tim McGirk, “The Taliban on the Run”, Time, March 28, 2005.
32 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 
(New York: Columbia University, 2008), 1–8.
33 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, xxix.
34 Ivan Arreguin-Tofy, “The Meaning of ‘State Failure’: Public Service, Public Servants, and the 
Contemporary Afghan State”, International Area Studies Review, 15:3 (2012), 263–278.
35 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Paul Fitzgerald 
and Elizabeth Gould, Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (San Francisco: City Light 
Books, 2009).
36 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(New York: Longman, 1999), 255.
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a price.37 That price includes the inlexibility of bureaucratic rationality and the 
congealing of bureaucratic interests within subsections of a larger organizational 
whole. This can and frequently does have unintended consequences that impede 
or preclude the bureaucracy from eficiently fulilling the functions for which it 
was developed in the irst place.
Classic studies on foreign policy bureaucracy are agreed that bureaucratic 
forces are diverse and extremely resilient.38 The US foreign policy system ‘is one 
in which power is disbursed among a wide variety of organisations and individu-
als’. As the agencies that make up the US foreign policy apparatus are large, rela-
tively autonomous creatures, it is dificult for them to achieve policy coherence 
on any given issue. Consequently, US foreign policy has ‘become increasingly 
political and cumbersome with the growth of bureaucracy’.39 These characteris-
tics are all the more problematic when the US engages in nation-building. Oye 
has convincingly argued that a complex endeavour that involves multiple parties 
‘militates against identiication and realisation of common interests’.40 In refer-
ence to nation-building in Afghanistan this was certainly true, as we will see, and 
a coherent whole-of-government response proved to be elusive.
Effective nation-building lay well beyond the comfort zone of the US foreign 
policy bureaucracy. None of the three key agencies that were involved – the 
Department of State, USAID and the Department of Defence – proved themselves 
capable of taking on an effective leadership role that could overcome bureau-
cratic divisions. Thus competing and conlicting spheres of inluence arose and 
consolidated so that a variety of factions jockeyed for power. In particular, during 
the implementation stage US oficials tended to act in accordance with beliefs 
about their own agency’s interests and expectations, rather than the necessities 
of nation-building. In other words, the requirements of nation-building, and how 
these requirements were to be understood, were very much shaped by an agency’s 
position within the bureaucratic structure. This was further complicated by rifts 
within the agencies themselves and the gulf of understanding between actors in 
Washington and those in the ield.41
With this in mind, the collective behaviour of US foreign policy agencies, and 
the individuals who sit within them, can be best understood through the lens of 
four distinctive but interconnected variables: interests, perception, culture and 
37 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1964).
38 I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, with Arnold 
Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 
2006); James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New 
York: Basic Books, 1989).
39 Garry Clifford, “Bureaucratic politics”, in Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson, Explaining the 
History of American Foreign Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 92
40 Kenneth Oye, “Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies”, in Oye (ed), Coopera-
tion Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 19.
41 ‘The ield’ refers to Afghanistan.
power. Firstly, interests refer to what is, or what is believed to be, beneicial or 
detrimental to an agency as a discrete organization. This encompasses tangible, 
material considerations such as human resourcing, government funding and the 
agency’s expenditure, but also more nebulous considerations such as an agency’s 
prestige and status relative to other agencies. Secondly, and closely bound up 
with interests, is an organization’s perception of a given set of problems, and its 
perception of the merits and demerits of possible solutions to those problems. 
Perception is inluenced by both the form and function of a given organization. To 
paraphrase the old adage, ‘where you stand on particular issues depends on where 
you sit at the decision-making table’.
Thirdly, perception is shaped by and is an aspect of an agency’s relatively dis-
tinctive culture. Culture here is understood in the dominant anthropological sense 
of the word, as a shared set of beliefs and practices within a given human group, 
that predispose members of that group to think and act in ways that conform to 
dominant group patterns. This does not mean that thinking and acting are deter-
mined with mechanical necessity, or that individuals within an organization are 
unable to apply their own logic and rationality in arriving at positions that differ 
from those of the organization as a whole. But it does mean that such individual 
rationality is constrained by the broader, organizational culture in which they are 
socialized over time, and which sanctions particular beliefs, routines and proce-
dures. Much of this operates at the level of unconscious cognition, and is therefore 
very resilient over time. Finally, interests, perception and culture all evolve and 
operate within a broader matrix of power. Power is here understood in the tradi-
tional Weberian sense as, ‘the probability that one actor within a social relation-
ship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless 
of the basis on which this probability rests’.42 The ‘actor’ can be an individual 
or a collective such as a bureaucratic agency, and the successful deployment of 
power can be based on either compulsion or persuasion, hard or soft power. Taken 
together, these four variables provide a powerful lens with which to examine the 
divisions both between and within US foreign policy agencies, which were so 
important in shaping nation-building outcomes in Afghanistan.
While bureaucratic division and conlict sit at the centre of this study, there are 
additional themes. Connected to bureaucratic problems are the broader political 
mistakes made by the United States government in its approach to Afghanistan, 
and a profound inconsistency between its expressed rhetorical ambitions on the 
one hand, and a failure to understand the practical realities of nation-building on 
the other. At a more general level, the study also makes a contribution to the vexed 
question of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if 
so under what conditions.
But there are also limits and it is important to clearly state them from the out-
set. The regional and global dimensions of US foreign policy, for example, are 
42 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978), 53.
10 Introduction
Introduction 11
not central considerations. They are only dealt with in so far as is necessary to 
illuminate some key points about the US intervention into Afghanistan. In addi-
tion, although there are obvious parallels between the case of Afghanistan and 
US nation-building activities in Iraq, these are not systematically addressed due 
to space limitations. The important role played by non-government organizations 
(NGOs) are also largely absent, as are some issues that, prima facie, might also 
seem to warrant inclusion in a discussion of nation-building in Afghanistan. These 
include such important issues as refugees, disarmament and US military opera-
tions. Finally, many individuals and government factions are involved in Afghani-
stan. Due to the sheer scale of the task, a totalising account of the machinations of 
the US foreign policy bureaucracy in Afghanistan, to say nothing of the Afghani 
government, is impossible. The study instead concentrates on the most relevant 
issues and examples.
Method and Structure
In terms of primary research, the author conducted a number of comprehensive 
interviews with high-ranking US oficials both in Washington and via correspond-
ence. The interviews revealed interests, loyalties, frustrations and many unique 
events and experiences not yet in the public realm. Experiencing bureaucratic 
problems was common, as was the acknowledgement that parochial bounda-
ries existed between and within agencies. Depending on where the interview-
ees ‘stood and sat’, opinions were often dramatically different. Primary sources 
also included congressional hearings, which comprised a variety of testimonies 
from agencies and individuals in Afghanistan. Contemporary media coverage that 
involved the opinions of high-ranking oficials, soldiers and civilians, was also 
an important source of information, as were government reports that addressed 
agency behaviour and capacity. In terms of the secondary literature, the study 
utilizes many irst-hand accounts of nation-building in Afghanistan published as 
books, biographies and memoirs of high-ranking oficials, as well as the more 
analytical political science literature on nation-building, bureaucratic politics and 
foreign policy.
The remainder of the book is divided into three parts and a conclusion. Part 
I reviews the relevant literature, connects bureaucratic politics to nation-building, 
and provides a summary of the history of the Afghan State. Part II focuses on the 
bureaucratic dimensions of US nation-building in Afghanistan. Part III examines 
efforts to promote intragovernmental cooperation toward that end. The conclusion 
draws the threads of my argument together and discusses the broader analytical 
and political implications of the study.
Part I is composed of two chapters. Chapter 2 begins by discussing the ambi-
guity that surrounds ‘nation-building’ and its cognate terms, and justiies my 
own position on this analytical and political vocabulary. It also assesses how 
the United States has interpreted and approached nation-building in the past and 
into the present. It continues by providing something of a brief history of the 
Afghan State, in order to illuminate previous attempts at nation-building in that 
country and the resistance that such attempts elicited. Chapter 3 continues the 
review of the relevant literature, but focuses more speciically on the link between 
bureaucratic politics and US foreign policy. It includes a review and critique of 
the rational actor model, according to which states have relatively homogeneous 
and identiiable interests. In this view, states are rational actors as much as the 
particular personalities who do their bidding – a proposition that is, in the case of 
nation-building in Afghanistan, clearly erroneous. On the back of that critique the 
chapter creates a new bureaucratic politics model, centred around the proposition 
that agency interests, perceptions, culture and power shape and constrain inter-
and intra-agency behaviour, often rendering it irrational in terms of effectively 
achieving stated goals such as those bound up with nation-building.
Chapter 4 is the irst of four chapters that make up Part II. The chapter 
argues that nation-building in Afghanistan was particularly vulnerable to inter-
governmental conlict. It illustrates this by exploring the interaction between 
the Department of Defence, the Department of State, USAID and the Counter-
Bureaucracy.43 This reveals broad currents of discord, but also that a more detailed 
examination of intragovernmental conlict in Afghanistan is necessary. With this 
in mind, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 form something of a trio. Each deals with a speciic 
nation-building issue to assess how contrasting interests, perceptions, cultures, 
and power, between and within agencies, impacted upon policy decisions and 
implementation. A diverse selection of policies, projects and initiatives is subject 
to examination, in order to discern the part played by each agency, and to identify 
the circumstances under which relations within and between agencies changed 
from one issue to another.
Chapter 5 focuses on security. It provides a detailed account of the compet-
ing policies between the State Department and the Military Establishment. It 
is particularly concerned with how this division played out with respect to the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the CIA’s interest in supporting 
Afghanistan warlords, and US involvement with Afghanistan’s security forces. 
Chapter 6 shifts to infrastructure development. The approach of the Pentagon, 
State Department, USAID and the Counter Bureaucracy are compared and con-
trasted, and speciic road-building, agriculture and education projects are exam-
ined. This again reveals deep divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy 
overall. Chapter 7 concentrates on law and governance. The US counter-narcotics 
strategy, the US relationship with the Karzai government and US efforts to con-
struct Afghanistan’s legal system are explored.
Part III addresses mechanisms that may have produced a whole-of-government 
approach. Chapter 8 reviews the instruments that were created by the US govern-
ment to promote cooperation, and compares them with those advocated by think 
tanks and academics. It is argued that it was extremely dificult for any of these 
43 The Military Establishment and Counter-Bureaucracy are used as umbrella terms. The military 
establishment includes the Defence Department and the United States Armed Forces whilst the 
Counter-Bureaucracy encompasses Washington’s regulatory and oversight bodies.
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initiatives to surmount embedded bureaucratic hurdles or to overcome entrenched 
agency interests. Chapter 9 conducts a detailed analysis of the Provincial Recon-
struction Teams that operated in Afghanistan. These can be understood as micro-
cosms of the greater US nation-building effort.
Chapter 10 draws together the principal indings from the research. It reempha-
sizes the discovery that bureaucratic divisions were not only extremely important 
in Afghanistan, but that they provide one of the principal keys to unlocking the 






The US’s military occupation of Afghanistan, and its subsequent efforts to stabi-
lize the country and promote its political and economic development in a direc-
tion satisfactory to the US, came in the immediate wake of similar operations in 
Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.1 Although the scale and the nature of 
these operations had major differences, they shared a pattern of family resem-
blance that led many commentators to discuss them under the common mantle 
of ‘nation-building’. Indeed, through the 1990s and into the 2000s a ierce debate 
raged within US foreign policy and academic circles about just what constituted 
nation-building, and whether or not the US should engage in such activities.2
Political conservatives typically derided these projects as international social 
work, condemning the use of the US military to do things other than ‘kill people 
and smash things’, as Colonel Fred Peck colourfully put it.3 At the other end of the 
political spectrum, scholars more critical of US foreign policy motives similarly 
condemned nation-building, but for very different reasons. They suggested that 
US nation-building efforts masqueraded under false pretences, serving as rhe-
torical cover for what were in fact US imperial ambitions.4 On the continuum 
1 James Dobbins, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq”, Survival, 45:4 
(2003), 87–110; Paul Miller, Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure 1898–2012 (Cornell: 
Cornell University Press, 2013); Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo 
and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003).
2 Karin von Hippel, “Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation-Building”, The Wash-
ington Quarterly, 23:1 (2000), 95–112, Marina Ottaway, “Building”, Foreign Policy, 132 (2002), 
16–24; Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101”, The Atlantic Monthly, January– February (2004), 
159–162; Gary Dempsey, “Old Folly in a New Disguise: Nation-building to Combat Terrorism”, 
Policy Analysis, Report 429, (2002), 1–22; Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and Ethics of 
Nation-Building (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Mark Berger, “From Nation-Build-
ing to State-Building: The Geo-Politics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing 
Global Order”, Third World Quarterly, 27:1 (2006), 5–25.
3 Carolyn Stephenson, “Nation-Building”, Beyond Intractability, January 2005. http://www.beyond 
intractability.org/essay/nation-building (accessed 13/1/2011).
4 Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: 
Times Books, 2010); Tariq Ali, Bush in Babylon: The Recolonization of Iraq (London: Verso, 2004); 
Chalmers Johnson, Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Best Hope (New York: Metropolitan 
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between these two poles emerged a variety of positions with differing perspec-
tives on the meaning of nation-building, whether or not it could succeed through 
external intervention and, if it could, would this be best served by unilateral or 
multilateral intervention.5 What role the military would or should play in all of 
this was perhaps the most vexing question of all. It is not the purpose of this chap-
ter to canvass all of these positions or to provide comprehensive answers to the 
many questions they raise. This would take us too far aield from our main focus, 
which is Afghanistan. It is necessary, however, to directly address some of the 
conceptual ambiguities that have plagued the ield, and to deine the way in which 
this study intends to use the term ‘nation-building’.
With this in mind, the chapter begins with a consideration of some of the concep-
tual confusion that has bedevilled the literature on nation-building and its cognate 
terms – discussing the historical milieu out of which such confusion emerged – 
before arriving at a deinition. It continues with a more concrete discussion of the 
types of activities and goals that are typically associated with nation-building, 
examining these in the context of US nation-building efforts since the Second 
World War. This provides the necessary background for a brief historical over-
view of the history of the Afghan State, from its inception in 1747 until the US-
led invasion in 2001. This overview highlights key elements that have shaped 
Afghanistan’s political environment, examines the British and Soviet occupa-
tions, and discusses developments in areas such as governance, economic devel-
opment and security.
What is Nation-Building?
Paradoxically, a degree of consensus in regard to what nation-building requires 
stands in stark contrast to the ambiguity surrounding the term itself. Chesterman 
correctly notes that ‘the term “nation-building” . . . is a broad, vague, and often 
pejorative one’. It is frequently used interchangeably with other phrases such as 
‘state-building’, ‘peace-building’ and ‘stabilization and reconstruction opera-
tions’. In particular, nation-building is often conlated with state-building, and 
simply means the enhancement of a state’s capacities, with or without external 
intervention. For this reason, Chesterman prefers ‘state-building’ as the more accu-
rate term for those activities usually brought under the rubric of nation- building: 
‘The focus here is on the state (that is, the highest institutions of governance in 
Books, 2010); Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplo-
macy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Andrew Bacevich (ed.), The Imperial Tense: 
Prospects and Problems of American Empire (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003).
5 James Dobbins et al., America’s Role In Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (New York: 
RAND, 2003); Francis Fukuyama (ed.), Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Bal-
timore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006); Kate Jenkins and William Plowden, Governance 
and Nation-building: The Failure of International Intervention (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006); 
Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building” 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
a territory) rather than the nation (a people who share common customs, origins, 
history, and frequently language)’.6 It is thus helpful to reconsider the origins of 
‘nation-building’ and the historical milieu out of which it emerged, in order to 
untangle these various strands of its usage.
The contemporary notion of nation-building can be traced back to the decades 
after the Second World War. Although there had been earlier iterations of the term – 
to describe, for example, the political projects of elites in nineteenth- century 
Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States, which sought to make political 
boundaries congruent with cultural identity while modernizing and integrating the 
political-economy of these new national states7 – it was global political develop-
ments after the Second World War that brought ‘nation-building’ into the lexicon 
of both academics and popular audiences. The immediate source of this develop-
ment had two key aspects.
The irst of these was the decolonization of vast areas of Africa and Asia, which 
presented newly independent states with a number of key problems to which 
nation-building was thought to be a solution. Among other things, these problems 
included the lack of a unifying national identity, economic under-development, 
the fragility of political and social institutions, and the questionable legitimacy of 
state power. Needless to say, the speciic solutions pursued for each of these prob-
lems in different national states were highly variable. But irrespective of this vari-
ability, such solutions were often understood under the rubric of nation- building, 
which became largely synonymous with development and modernization.8 Impor-
tantly, nation-building was here understood as largely an endogenous process, 
even if external powers could assist in its promotion.
The second post-war development to which the vocabulary of nation-building 
was a response was the US military occupation of Japan and Germany.9 The 
defeated axis powers had suffered tremendous physical destruction, while the 
political regimes that had led them into war had been decapitated. In a context of 
rapidly escalating bi-polar competition with the Soviet Union, the United States 
sought to rebuild the shattered economies of the axis powers, and to establish 
liberal-democratic constitutional orders that would be bulwarks against Soviet-
style communism. This was accomplished through both direct military occupa-
tion and political intervention, in addition to a massive injection of restorative 
inancial aid under the auspices (in Europe) of the Marshal Plan.10 The subsequent 
 6 Simon Chesterman, You, The People; The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-
Building (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4.
 7 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1973); Ernest 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
 8 Karl Deutsch, “Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research”, 
in Karl Deutsch and William Foltz (eds), Nation-building (New York: Atherton, 1963), 7–8; Rein-
hard Bendix, Nation-building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1964).
 9 Dobbins et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 3–51.
10 Julian Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security – from World War II to the 
War on Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 74–75; Warren Cohen, The Cambridge History 
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economic recovery and relative political stability of the old axis powers, now 
irmly in the US Cold War camp, would later be presented as exemplary instances 
of nation-building, and models for what could be accomplished through external 
intervention into post-conlict zones such as Afghanistan.11 Such views typically 
ignore the obvious differences between these cases: namely, that Germany, Japan 
and Italy – despite massive physical damage and loss of life during the war – had 
highly educated and literate populations, histories of modern political institutions 
with sophisticated bureaucracies, and technologically advanced, industrialized 
economies that could be readily rebuilt given the capital and political will. They 
also had populations with shared language and national identities, despite regional 
differences. This stood in stark contrast to countries like Afghanistan, with its 
many ethnic and linguistic divisions, which could and frequently did become the 
basis for political mobilization and division.
These two sources out of which emerged a theory and practice of nation- 
building – the post-colonial state on the one hand and post-war occupation and 
reconstruction on the other – are important because they contain within them the 
seeds of difference, or at least difference of emphases, that would be elided by 
later theorists and commentators. The difference is two-fold. On the one hand, 
nation-building arising from the post-colonial experience is, in essence, an endog-
enous process. External actors, including other states, may assist and/or encourage 
nation-building in various ways, but it is understood to be a project pursued by the 
local population and state. Nation-building in the post-war axis states, by contrast, 
was exogenous because it represented projects in which US military occupation, 
political intervention and massive economic aid was absolutely essential. On the 
other hand, while nation-building arising from both sources involved the building 
of state capacities (perhaps more accurately labelled ‘state-building’, as Ches-
terman would insist), post-colonial nation-building was also concerned with the 
forging of a common identity and hence loyalty to the new state. This typically 
involved programmes of mass education in a common language, as well as the 
propagation of a nationalist spirit through state media, lags, anthems, national 
holidays, memorials and the like. As well as state capacities, what was being 
‘built’ here was very much a ‘nation’ in the strict sociological sense – a named 
population sharing a contiguous territory and a common language and identity.12
Subsequent US nation-building efforts in Vietnam, Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, have involved 
varying degrees of both state and nation-building, although nation-building has 
of American Foreign Relations, Volume IV: America in the Age of Soviet Power 1945–1991 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 35–44.
11 James Surowiecki, “The Marshall Plan Myth”, The New Yorker, December, 2001, http://www.
newyorker.com/archive/2001/12/10/011210ta_talk_surowiecki (accessed 3/9/2009).
12 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Relections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991), 1–9; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 1–5; Anthony Smith. Nationalism: 
Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 5–9.
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been the more common vernacular used to describe these projects.13 With respect 
to South Vietnam, James Carter describes how the US was involved in a compre-
hensive effort to create a functioning state and a common anti-communist national 
identity from 1954.14 This involved propping up the Diem regime with massive 
inancial, political and ultimately military support, in a quest to extend the reach 
of his regime over every square inch of territory south of the 17th parallel. The 
 military coup against the Diem government in November 1963, and the full- 
scale US military intervention from March 1965, did not mean the end of  nation- 
building in South Vietnam; it simply changed its form. The US Marine Corp’s 
‘Combined Action Program’ (CAP), for example, sent teams into South Vietnam-
ese villages to undertake development projects and train local militias. The Civil 
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program (CORDS) simi-
larly combined military and civilian personnel and resources to launch a number 
of projects that can be understood as part of its nation-building efforts.15 Even the 
much maligned Strategic Hamlets Program –which sought to physically separate 
the rural population from Viet Cong inluence – was, in a perverse way, an aspect 
of US nation-building in South Vietnam.16 But there was a disconnected strategy 
between ‘military’ and ‘nation-building’ elements and an inharmonious division 
of labour. For the most part the US military focused on the war-ighting mission, 
while other agencies, such as USAID and the State Department, were largely shut 
out. Signiicantly, the strengths and weaknesses of nation-building in Vietnam 
were, until the protracted occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, seldom examined 
by US oficials. Indeed, Andrew Bacevich suggests that Vietnam demonstrates 
that the US system provides no institutional basis from which to learn from past 
mistakes. This was exacerbated by the post-Vietnam attitude of US military ofic-
ers who perceived nation-building ‘as anathema’.17
Almost three decades later, Bosnia and Kosovo emerged as new theatres of 
nation-building. After the Dayton Accords in 1995 effectively brought the military 
aspects of the Bosnia conlict to a conclusion, Presidential Directive 56 (PDD56) 
called for a whole-of-government approach to nation-building. This could be 
achieved through inter-agency training, planning and the institutionalization of 
lessons learned. Moreover, debate among inluential policy-making and academic 
circles highlighted the need for speciic inter-agency teams. The Civil-Military 
Operations Center was created to achieve these aims. Under the title of Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), the US military also adopted principles 
that bridged combat operations and development. These acknowledged, and were 
a response to, the coordination challenges that needed to be addressed between 
13 Miller, Armed State Building, 117–175.
14 James Carter, Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State-building, 1954–1968 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1–20.
15 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 30, 2012.
16 Michael Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation-building” in 
the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 151–209.
17 Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rules (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 156.
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the US military and other US agencies. The US Army Peacekeeping Institute was 
employed to ‘reine interagency coordination’.18 Considering these developments, 
it was believed that ‘peace enforcement and nation-building’ would become not 
just ‘staples of senior military leadership diet’, but a whole-of-government com-
mitment.19 Critics such as Hosmer, however, argued that without constant atten-
tion these ‘insurgency assets’ would atrophy.20 But his warning went unheeded. 
Mirroring Vietnam, the US experience of nation-building in Bosnia, and later 
Kosovo, had severe limitations.
There were also problems associated with military planning, force structure 
and doctrine. In a post-Vietnam era, these were all centred on the Soviet threat 
with a commitment to not ‘do’ counter-insurgency. But the US military’s stance 
on nation-building was more opaque. On one side were those who wished to turn 
their back on a concept that they believed to be outside of the parameters of mili-
tary doctrine, and on the other were those who wished to embrace nation-building 
as a key component of military planning. Between these two competing poles 
were those who believed it to be simply one part of the military’s broader interest 
in ‘warighting’. The very same debate resonates within the corridors of the Pen-
tagon today between various components of the military apparatus.
It is notable that by the time of the Bosnia and Kosovo conlicts in the 1990s, 
a variety of terms in addition to nation-building were being used to describe what 
the US and the broader international community were undertaking, including 
peace-keeping, peace enforcement and peace-building. Former UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali referred to the latter as, ‘comprehensive efforts to 
identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance 
a sense of conidence and well-being among the people’. More recently, the Bra-
himi Panel re-deined peace-building as ‘activities undertaken on the far side of 
conlict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building 
on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war’.21 As 
with nation-building it includes issues such as humanitarian aid, security, law, and 
development. Peace-building was also a term used by the US army to describe 
the mission in Bosnia. But US military nomenclature at that time revealed def-
initional fragmentation. Most oficial correspondence referred to US efforts as 
peace-building, while the US army command hub at the Pentagon used the terms 
18 Michael Hardesty and Jason Ellis, Training for Peace Operations: The US Army Adapts to the 
Post-Cold War World (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), 22.
19 Howard Olsen and John Davis, Training US Army Oficers for Peace Operations: Lessons from 
Bosnia (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 3.
20 Stephen Hosmer, The Army’s Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency (Santa Monica: RAND, 
1990), 28–35.
21 Boutrous Boutrous Ghali, “An Agenda For Peace”, Report of the Secretary General, A/47/277-
s/24111, June 17 1992, www.un-documents.net/a47–277.htm (accessed on 22/7/2010); United 
Nations General Assembly Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
 Operations (the Brahimi Report), August 21, 2000.
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‘peacekeeping’ or ‘peace enforcement’. The United States European Command, 
meanwhile, preferred the term ‘stability operations’.22
More recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, nation-building has often been rebadged 
under the label ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations’ (SROs). Criticism 
towards nation-building was so severe towards the end of the second term of 
the Bush Administration that the US government decided to rebrand its ongoing 
activities in Afghanistan and Iraq as SROs. The United States Institute of Peace 
asserts that the goal of SROs was the creation of a safe and secure environment 
through the rule of law, stable governance and sustainable development. The US 
military, especially, became enamoured with the term, using it in conjunction with 
counter-insurgency. The change in classiication was considered by some to sig-
nify ‘a dramatic shift in thinking . . . from an exclusively humanitarian to a more 
complicated humanitarian/security perspective’, thus presenting ‘a more realistic 
conception of what was required’.23 More realistically the change in language was 
due to the perceived failures of ‘nation-building’ in the two countries. Beneath the 
rhetoric of a ‘dramatic shift in thinking’, SROs remained a synonym for nation-
building. One member of a War Crimes Commission Hearing observed that the 
use of the phrase SRO ‘strikes me as nation-building’ and was utilized because 
‘we don’t want to deal with the reality that we’re into nation-building . . . We don’t 
describe it that way, but that’s what we’re doing’.24 With this in mind, it seems 
that in the public realm the only concrete differences between the terms nation-
building, state-building, peace-building and SROs are who applies the term and 
who has the power to make their deinition stick.
So where does this discussion leave us in terms of how nation-building is to 
be understood in this thesis? First, although what is often referred to as nation-
building is simply the enhancement of state capacities, it is not only that. It also 
involves efforts to forge more cohesive national identities and loyalty to the new 
state, most frequently through mass education and state-sponsored propaganda 
campaigns, which may or may not have external support. Thus, contra Chester-
man, this study employs the more encompassing ‘nation-building’ instead of 
‘state-building’. Second, whether it is principally promoted by internal or external 
actors, nation-building involves efforts to build country-wide material and institu-
tional infrastructure, such that the administrative reach and political authority of 
the state is enhanced. Third, such projects are often pursued in the wake of armed 
conlict and civil strife that have severed the nexus between society and state. 
Finally, we can distinguish between endogenous and exogenous nation-building. 
The latter is principally driven by external actors who intervene directly in a state 
or failed state, and then embark on those state- and nation-building activities. 
22 Michael Hardesty and Jason Ellis, Training for Peace Operations: The US Army.
23 Pauline Baker, “Forging a US Policy Toward Fragile States”, PRISM, 1:2, 74.
24 Commission on Wartime Contracting, “An Urgent Need: Coordinating Reconstruction and Stabi-
lization in Contingency Operations”, Commission on Wartime Contracting Hearing, Washington 
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It is this exogenous or externally sponsored nation-building that is our principal 
focus here.
As such, the following deinition of (externally sponsored) nation-building 
is used: nation-building is a set of processes through which a foreign power or 
powers, by direct intervention and in collaboration with favoured domestic politi-
cal elites, seeks to promote a particular political identity and erect or re-erect a 
 country-wide institutional and material infrastructure that can become the endur-
ing foundation of political stability after a period of armed conlict and civil 
strife. But if this is what nation-building means, what concrete activities should it 
involve? On this there has been more agreement in the literature than there typi-
cally has been with respect to terminology.
Nation-Building Practice
Among scholars, there is some agreement on what nation-building requires and 
what it involves. Firstly, it requires a lengthy commitment in terms of time, typi-
cally years or even decades rather than months.25 Secondly, with this long-term 
temporal commitment also comes a signiicant commitment of human, inancial 
and other resources.26 Thirdly, each nation-building situation is unique. There are 
no strict criteria that can be abstractly applied to each case. Policy, therefore, must 
be shaped and adjusted to suit the concrete situation. That said, there are some 
general areas of agreement as to what effective nation-building demands.
In post-conlict situations nation-builders must navigate a complex and volatile 
environment that includes displaced persons, ethnic, tribal and religious rivalry, 
crime, corruption, disease, malnutrition, and humanitarian abuses. Humanitar-
ian assistance is the most pressing initial concern. The provision of shelter, food, 
clothing and medical services saves lives, assists refugees and relieves suffering. 
Once the humanitarian situation is under control, the more dificult issues of gov-
ernance, security, law and development can be prioritized.27 Here the promotion 
of effective governance is essential. A transitional authority is the irst step, but in 
the longer term international actors must facilitate the creation of an effective and 
viable system of governance. Perhaps the most dificult problem here concerns 
representation – who will be represented at the helm of the refurbished ship of 
state, and how will that representation be determined? Some scholars contend 
that, as far as is feasible, all political factions in society should be represented in 
25 Roderic Alley, International Conlict and the International Community: Wars Without End? (Lon-
don: Ashgate, 2004, 166); Chesterman, You, The People; The United Nations, Transitional Admin-
istration and State-Building, 235; Albert Somit and Steven Peterson, The Failure of Democratic 
Nation-Building: Ideology Meets Evolution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 46.
26 Somit and Peterson, The Failure of Democratic Nation-Building, 40; James Dobbins, Seth Jones, 
Keith Crane and Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2007), 17; Marina Ottaway, “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States”, Develop-
ment and Change, 33:5 (2002), 1017.
27 Dobbins et al., The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building, 111.
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the new governing institutions. In this view, international agents must avoid cre-
ating ‘closed societies and structures of power’, through the exclusion of certain 
groups from the political process.28 The dificulty is, however, that the empower-
ment of some persons and factions can have a longer-term destabilizing impact on 
governance. As Francis Fukuyama warns, the nascent political apparatus may be 
born with a ‘birth defect’.29
In US nation-building efforts since the Second World War, there has been a 
simple, some would say simplistic, answer to complex questions about representa-
tion and governance: nation-building should be tethered to democracy promotion, 
with democracy being rather narrowly construed to mean the emulation of US 
democracy and the holding of periodic elections. Indeed, some prominent voices 
in the debate about nation-building deine it as being a project with democracy 
as its main objective. James Dobbins, for example, deined US nation- building 
as ‘the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conlict to promote a transition 
to democracy’.30 Similarly, former Secretary of State George Shultz attached the 
need for US involvement in Kosovo to democracy and the goal of ‘liberating a 
people’ by supporting their ‘yearning for freedom’. In Bosnia, Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright demanded that the Commander of the Armed Forces, Colin 
Powell, actively use the ‘superb military’ of the United States in the service of 
democracy, a call enthusiastically supported by right-wing hawks and jingoists.31
The tying of nation-building to democracy promotion raises two key prob-
lems. First, despite the lofty rhetoric, the history of US democracy promotion 
is replete with examples of democratic governance being suffocated by the US 
when actual or potential democratic outcomes were seen to threaten US interests. 
Second, democracy has usually been understood in very narrow electoral terms, 
with elections being viewed as a gauge of nation-building progress. Karl astutely 
labels this as the ‘fallacy of electoralism’, a misguided assumption that holding 
elections ‘will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites, the 
winners of which are accorded public legitimacy’.32 Yet the reality has usually 
been very different, with the legitimacy of new governments in Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq being questioned from the outset by signiicant sections of 
the population over whom they ruled. For the US, then, advocating an overarching 
electoral democratic template represents an elegant solution to a complex set of 
problems that are not so easily solved. Indeed, as Paris argues, efforts to transform 
28 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 90.
29 Francis Fukuyama, “Guidelines for Future Nation-builders”, in Francis Fukuyama (ed). Nation-
Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 2006), 237.
30 Harry Kreisler, Interview with James Dobbins, Conversations with History, Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, UC Berkeley, May 5, 2005.
31 Hardesty and Ellis, Training for Peace Operations: The US Army Adapts to the Post-Cold War 
World, 2; Michael Dobbs, “With Albright, Clinton Accepts New US Role”, Washington Post, 
December 8th, 1996, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/govt/admin/stories/albright 
120896.htm (accessed on 22/11/2010).
32 Lynn Terry, “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America”, Journal of Democracy, 6:5 (1995), 73.
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war-shattered states into US-style democracies risk exacerbating, not moderating, 
societal conlicts.33
Culture is also an important consideration for the establishment of a new political 
order. Nation-builders must account for the traditions, or a plurality of traditions, 
that have shaped the culture of the target country. According to Somit and Peterson, 
there should be an ‘appreciation of the culture of the target country, and avoidance 
of arrogance, or seeming to denigrate the institutions and values of the people’. But 
conversely, would-be nation-builders also need to be sensitive to the ways in which 
local culture can impede their efforts. In much the same way that agency culture can 
form a barrier to coherent US foreign policy, the cultural traditions of a country can 
prevent the introduction of what from the standpoint of the nation-builders seem 
like rational changes.34 Effective means need to be identiied and developed that 
can help overcome these impediments without offending local cultural sensibilities.
In order for governance to be effective, there must be a stable security envi-
ronment. Nation-building aims, therefore, to facilitate a transition from a ‘state 
of internal convulsion to a settled civic order’, and to achieve ‘a self-sustaining 
peace’. For those who advocate the virtues of nation-building, the general con-
sensus is that a vigorous security commitment is required within the irst 6–12 
months. In the absence of security, domestic spoilers are able to exploit a context 
that is ripe for violence, corruption and disorder. Allowing a security vacuum to 
develop, Chesterman contends, ‘may irreparably undermine the larger project of 
consolidating a lasting peace’.35
For these reasons, US nation-building has been characterized, some would say 
deined, by a strong and active military presence. Notwithstanding the rhetoric 
about inter-agency collaboration, the US military has predominated in recent US 
nation-building efforts. Dempsey asserts that the strong military lavour of US 
nation-building makes it, ‘the most intrusive form of foreign intervention there 
is’.36As a result, some would argue that US nation-building is always distorted, in 
that it relies on a set of war-making institutions to achieve peace outcomes that 
would more readily be achieved by civilian agencies. Moreover, improvements in 
the security situation within a country may be hampered by the very presence of 
33 Roland Paris, “Peace Building and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism”, International Security, 
22:2 (1997), 57.
34 John Pulparampil, Models of Nation-building: A Critical Appraisal (New Delhi: NV Publica-
tions, 1975), 24; Somit and Peterson, The Failure of Democratic Nation-building, 40; Jenkins and 
Plowden, Governance and Nation-Building: The Failure of International Intervention, 153.
35 Harry Eckstein, Internal War: Problems and Approaches (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964), 28; Paris, 
“Peace Building and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism”, 57; Anthony Cordesman, The War 
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2003), 48; Jenkins and Plowden, Governance and Nation-building: The Failure of International 
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112.
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US forces, who become targets of local resentment and resistance, as they did in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. And yet over time they also may become a substitute for 
an indigenous security apparatus, leaving a security vacuum if and when they 
depart. In Kosovo and Bosnia, for example, the US accepted a premature power 
transition back to domestic forces, which was highly destabilizing. There were 
no substantial efforts to train a police force, army, or civil service, with negative 
repercussions that are still being felt in those countries.37
An element connected to security and governance is the rule of law. The new 
legal system must account for the unique social and cultural nuances of the tar-
get country. If this occurs, an effective judiciary and police force may enhance 
the credibility of the state and facilitate a peaceful transition to independence. 
Nation-builders must therefore facilitate legal reform and create institutions 
that can outlast the international presence. This can be achieved through legal 
planning, international mentoring, oversight to prevent bias and corruption, vet-
ting and training judges and lawyers, building legal infrastructure and providing 
equipment and expertise.38 Without such mechanisms, individuals or groups may 
take matters into their own hands, which can result in torture and extrajudicial 
execution.
Finally, the success of nation-building can stand or fall on what is often 
described as ‘development’. This incorporates economics, health, education, 
agriculture, electricity, transport and other infrastructure projects. Economic 
assistance, for example, seeks to expedite economic recovery to produce a self-
sustaining economic system. The key issues in economic development are, in the 
irst instance, currency stabilization, realigning revenue and expenditure, control-
ling inlation, capacity building and establishing accountability and combating 
corruption.39 Education, meanwhile, provides a means to forge greater national 
unity and instil faith in the principles of law, governance and human rights. It 
also facilitates the production of skilled graduates, and can help ease ethnic and 
religious tensions. In respect of all development projects, Fukuyama argues that 
domestic actors must be empowered. ‘We should be arriving with resources to 
motivate the natives [sic] to design their own factory and to help them igure out 
how to build and operate it themselves’. Thus development projects should utilize 
techniques that persuade the domestic populace to embrace the nation-building 
process.40
Each aspect of nation-building is interconnected and interdependent. Economic 
and political growth is mutually reinforcing and a functioning government will 
37 Chesterman, You, The People; The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building, 
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help to ensure the eficacy of development projects. Development projects, in turn, 
may promote a higher standard of living and create economic opportunities. Yet 
all of these efforts rely on a secure and stable environment. An ad hoc approach 
that neglects any of these dimensions encourages fragmentation, duplication and, 
ultimately, failure. Paris argues that the inability of would-be nation-builders to 
reach common objectives is a complex, multifarious problem. Different concep-
tions, goals and interests manifest within countries; between civilian and military 
factions; between governments and NGOs; and also within the UN system ‘where 
bureaucratic rivalries and turf battles are legion’.41 To more fully appreciate how 
such challenges were met or not met in Afghanistan after 2001, it is necessary to 
briely outline something of the history of that war-torn country.
A History of the Afghan State
Afghanistan has frequently been described as a highway of conquest and the 
graveyard of empires.42 This fearful reputation is deserved, as the following over-
view attests.
Ahmand Shah, a Durrani chieftain, established the Afghan State in 1747. He 
instilled a semblance of order over a territory previously divided among autono-
mous provinces and regions. This was achieved by managing and manipulating 
a web of powerful tribal factions, through diplomacy, violence and distributing 
the spoils of war. Justice was dispensed through the pulwar; and Ahmand Shah’s 
tribal army enforced the will of their chieftain. He was, in essence, a totalitarian 
ruler fashioned from the same mould as Genghis Khan and Ibn Saud. But the 
system of governance that he had created ‘lacked the capacity to be institutionally 
self-generating and self-propelling’.43
Following the death of Ahmand Shah and his son, Timur Shar, a period of tur-
moil ensued, in which competing tribal factions fought for power. Corruption and 
opportunism were the hallmarks of politics during this era of what Miller describes 
as an ‘ever-shifting kaleidoscope of betrayal’.44 By 1826, Dost Mohammad Khan 
41 Roland Paris, “Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in Postwar Statebuilding”, in Roland 
Paris and Timothy Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Post-
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“Lessons from Post-Conlict Aid Experience”, in Montgomery and Rondinelli, Beyond Recon-
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had restored a semblance of order to the Afghan political landscape. Yet luctuat-
ing tribal and ethnic divisions continued to dominate Afghan politics. The limited 
reforms he undertook were restricted to Kabul and its surrounding areas.
Intervention by Britain in 1839 resulted in the end of Dost Mohammad Khan’s 
reign, and Britain’s army easily overcame Afghan opposition. The British installed 
Shah Shuja as the new ruler of Afghanistan. But to most Afghans he was merely a 
puppet, ‘propped up by British bayonets, supported by British gold, sustained by 
British and Indian blood’.45 The Mullahs, who were exempt from the governance 
system, portrayed the British as immoral inidels, and the tribal authorities were 
angered by the fact that colonial rule had disrupted the country’s clan hierarchy.
The British were the irst to experience the ferocious guerrilla tactics employed 
by Afghans in resistance to foreign occupation. After the slaughter of its soldiers, 
Britain retaliated with an ‘Army of Retribution’, which sacked Kabul in Octo-
ber 1842. It then abruptly departed to avoid being embroiled in a protracted con-
lict in a country that resented its imperialistic presence. Dupree summarized the 
frivolity of Britain’s irst occupation: ‘after four years of disaster, both in honor, 
material and personnel, the British left Afghanistan as they found it, in tribal chaos 
and with Dost Mohammad Khan returned to the throne of Kabul’.46
Dost Mohammad placed the reuniication of Afghanistan as his top prior-
ity, focusing almost exclusively on cultivating his military power. His death in 
1863 resulted in fratricidal conlict, which continued for six years. Sher Ali Khan 
emerged as ruler in January 1869. Like the Afghan leaders that had come before 
him, he prioritized the consolidation of an army to amplify his authority. But 
Sher Ali also improved Afghanistan’s communications framework and initiated a 
number of infrastructure projects. He endeavoured to enforce national laws, and 
implement a taxation system. Yet the tribal and religious authorities rejected these 
efforts. Saikal asserts that ‘despite his vision and craving for reforms, the Amir 
remained hostage to traditional forces present in the country’.47
Sher Ali Khan’s period in ofice came to an abrupt end as a result of the sec-
ond Anglo-Afghan war in 1879. Following the election of Benjamin Disraeli, 
Britain’s pursuit of the ‘Forward Defence Policy’ triggered its second occupa-
tion of Afghanistan. Britain provided more robust inancial and material aid to 
Afghanistan than it did during the 1840s, but its imperialistic attitude remained 
the same. Yaqub Khan, the new ruler, was once again perceived to be a British 
puppet by tribal and religious authorities. As tensions reached boiling point, the 
British envoy to Afghanistan was assassinated. A British Army again marched 
on Kabul, this time taking direct control of governance and employing martial 
law. The period was characterized by brutal punishments and arbitrary reprisals. 
While Britain had superior military experience, training, and equipment, how-
ever, it could not subdue the tenacious Afghan uprisings indeinitely. The Brit-
ish soon realized that they could not subject Afghanistan to a colonial model of 
45 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University, 1973), 369–378.
46 Dupree, Afghanistan, 399.
47 Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, 33.
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governance, and withdrew their forces in 1881. Gregorian writes that the wars 
‘unleashed a potent force in Afghan nationalism’, which used Islam as ‘a spiritual 
weapon’.48 It was a force with which future occupations would also struggle to 
contend.
Abdur Rahman Khan, ‘The Iron Amir’, illed the vacuum left by the depar-
ture of the British. His success was manufactured by intimidation and repres-
sion, secured through the use of an intricate spy network and an effective and 
dependable army. Rahman transformed the Afghan army from an amalgam of 
tribal militias into a permanent ighting force, embracing comprehensive reforms 
in weaponry, tactics and logistics. The army served primarily as a mechanism to 
enhance internal control, rather than as a shield against external threats. Abdur 
Rahman also established a basic communication network, civil service, police 
force, education system, rudimentary welfare services and a single currency.
The death of the Iron Amir generated yet another fratricidal conlict, from 
which Amanullah Khan emerged to rule Afghanistan in 1919. His ambition was 
to turn Afghanistan into a modern nation state, and he engaged in a series of 
major reforms that encompassed a wide range of issues. A network of roads was 
built along with communications infrastructure and a postal service. Amanullah 
placed education as a top priority. He hired French, Egyptians and Turkish teach-
ers in an attempt to engender a European-style education. These programmes only 
resulted in the enrolment of 40,000 children in 1928, but this was still a step 
forward for Afghanistan’s education system. Amanullah also engaged in iscal 
and taxation reforms. Afghanistan adopted a new unit of currency and separated 
the public treasury from the private wealth of the Monarch, instigating the irst 
national budget in 1922. Changes were applied to prevent corruption in the civil 
service, through training courses and programmes that were intended to facilitate 
a modern bureaucratic system. A formal judicial system was created, alongside 
a constitution, and Amanullah made a number of decrees in respect to women’s 
rights, and the abolition of slavery and child labour. For the irst time since the 
creation of the Afghan State, a ruler attempted to enact dynamic, revolutionary 
and far-reaching reforms, ‘intended eventually to cut deep through the fabrics of 
Afghan micro societies and change their traditional values and practices’.49
Many Afghans coveted the beneits and trappings a modern nation state could 
provide. It was in the interests of tribal and religious forces, however, to maintain 
the traditional status quo. Afghanistan’s tribal and religious authorities still domi-
nated the political landscape and they banded together to oppose Amanullah’s 
reforms. On 14 January, 1929, faced with increasingly volatile opposition to his 
rule, Amanullah abdicated. Although the resistance of traditional forces was a 
principal reason for the failure of his reforms, there were other factors involved. 
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Firstly, there was an absence of capital investment from outside sources, which 
meant that the inances available for the reforms were very limited. Secondly, 
Amanullah’s government had neither the organizational skill nor the experience 
required to implement such dynamic changes. Thirdly, unlike previous Afghan 
rulers, he did not develop and consolidate the position of the army, which impacted 
upon his ability to ensure order and stability.50
The Tajik warlord, Bacha Saqqao, replaced Amanullah. His brutal and repres-
sive rule lasted nine months, after which a Pushtun tribal force removed him. 
Nadir Shah obtained the throne, but he was left with no army, bureaucracy or 
treasury, all of which had disintegrated during Bacha Saqqao’s brief reign. Never-
theless, Nadir Shah managed over time to build roads, a nation-wide police force 
and communications networks, while also instigating education and commercial 
reforms. But religious and tribal forces remained the ‘foundations of power’.51 
A new constitution was crafted in 1931, through which authority was reinvested 
in the ulama. Additionally, the traditional social standing of women was imposed, 
and the teaching of western languages was banned.
Nadir Shah was assassinated on November 8, 1933, and Mohammad Zahir Shah 
replaced him as king. His position, however, was only ever ceremonial. Authority 
was vested in the ofice of Prime Minster, which was held consecutively by his 
uncles, each of whom balanced the need to appease tribal and religious authorities 
with cautious reforms. A national banking system was established and joint stock 
companies were created. There were also attempts to implement a national trans-
port road network and enforce universal primary education. The second Prime 
Minister, Shah Mahmud, was inluenced by a growing body of liberal-minded 
intellectuals and western-educated state oficials. Popular elections in 1949 cre-
ated a ‘Liberal Parliament’, which proposed a number of dynamic laws, the irst 
of which was the establishment of a free press. But when the newly independent 
media stridently criticized the ruling clique, Shah Mahmud closed private news-
papers and banned independent political organizations.
Mohammed Daoud supplanted Mahmud as ruler on 20 September, 1953. 
Daoud’s goals were the consolidation of centralized authority, and he relied on 
the army to uphold the legitimacy of his regime. Yet he also attempted to modern-
ize Afghanistan, and some historians have admired his reforms.52 He implemented 
radical social and economic changes and successfully appealed for economic 
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support internationally. But his promotion of a nationalistic Pashtun creed pro-
voked tensions with Pakistan, which resulted in his resignation.
With the removal of Daoud, King Nadir Shah was inally in control of the 
country. In the realm of education there was signiicant growth, with the num-
ber of primary school students doubling. Inluenced by an emerging educated 
class, the king attempted to construct a constitutional monarchy. Unfortunately, 
this goal was nulliied by the rural population’s unpreparedness for civil rights 
and popular government. The 1964 constitution was plagued with ‘critical dei-
ciencies’ and ‘the executive and legislative branches remained at loggerheads’.53 
Elections in 1965 and 1969 were supericial and political parties never became 
legalized. Anti-government protests and an outspoken press were quickly sup-
pressed. Daoud returned to power through a coup in 1973. The alliance he forged 
with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) – Afghanistan’s com-
munist party – proved to be his downfall, as its leaders secured positions of power 
within the government and the army.
The Saur Revolution, instigated on 22 April, 1978, marked the beginning of 
PDPA rule in Afghanistan. This triggered a fountain of military and economic aid 
from the USSR. The PDPA was, in fact, completely dependent on the Soviets to 
maintain its rule. Although the party was tarnished by virulent internal turmoil, it 
nonetheless pursued ambitious reforms.
Spurred on by the Soviets, the PDPA applied drastic changes to marriage rights 
and agricultural practices, and outlined plans for a system of universal education. 
Each of these reforms exhibited the inluence of Soviet-style Marxism. In essence, 
they represented an attempt to implement an ersatz communist blueprint – 
‘a canned Soviet critique that could have been applied just as well (or ill) to any 
dozens of post-colonial countries’.54 Such measures were at complete odds with 
many of Afghanistan’s cultural traditions. The overhaul of rural property relations 
met especially strong resistance from tribes and villages, whose customary prac-
tices were uprooted. Meanwhile, changes in the role of women were perceived 
to be ‘atheistic meddling in key Islamic rituals’.55 Dupree asserts that ‘it almost 
appears that they systematically planned to alienate every segment of the Afghan 
people’. Localized protests soon transformed into a national uprising; ‘the rejec-
tion of the regime was universal’, and ‘one of the most truly popular revolts of 
the twentieth century’.56 While the army had been vital to the ascendance of the 
PDPA, its disintegration through mutiny, desertion and purges meant that it was 
unable to restore order.
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With the collapse of the PDPA being imminent, the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan in December 1979. In similar fashion to the British, they swiftly 
gained control of the major urban centres. The Soviets appointed a ruler, but 
again, in similar fashion to the British, the Afghan populace dismissed him as 
a puppet. As Newell and Newell suggest, ‘Afghan oficials became ornaments, 
handing the phone to their Soviet counterparts when matters of substance were to 
be discussed’. During the occupation, the Soviets engaged in infrastructure devel-
opment and established an extensive bi-lateral trade network. But they ignored 
Afghanistan’s complex political landscape and its cultural nuances. This was ‘the 
height of futility’ and caused a national uprising analogous to the one that had 
been faced by the British. Uniied under the banner of Islam, and encouraged 
and supported by the US, the core of this resistance was known as the Mujahe-
deen. The contest against the Soviet military leviathan was asymmetrical, but the 
Mujahedeen successfully opposed the Soviets through a blend of guerrilla tactics 
and advanced, US-supplied weaponry.57
The Soviet prediction that its forces would remain in Afghanistan for six 
months proved to be erroneous. It soon became apparent that 100,000 soldiers 
were not near enough to hold territorial gains. Its attempts to reinvigorate the 
Afghan army were plagued by desertions, inighting and ethnic and tribal divi-
sions, which determined that the loyalty of the army to the state was tenuous 
at best. By 1988, the Soviets had lost 50,000 men, caused 1.24 million Afghan 
deaths, and created ive million refugees. Gorbachev saw the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan as ‘a bleeding wound’, and removed its forces before the end of the 
year. This left ‘Afghan society rent to pieces, the economy in tatters, a vast num-
ber of Afghans dead and the survivors profoundly traumatized’.58
Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces, conlict erupted and Afghanistan 
slipped into anarchy. As a state, Roy argues, it fundamentally ceased to exist. The 
1992 Peshawar Accords nominally created an interim government to incorporate 
the diverse Mujahedeen factions. But in reality warlords carved out kingdoms of 
autonomous rule, with Islam being used as ‘a lethal weapon’.59 In such an envi-
ronment, the Taliban arose as a religious and social movement that promised to 
restore security and purge corruption.
They swept through the country like wildire, with tribal authorities and war-
lords offering little opposition. By September 1995 the Taliban had occupied 
Kabul, and in 2001 they were in control of approximately 95 per cent of the coun-
try. The Taliban government capably imposed order through intimidation and cor-
poral punishment, but its strict religious dogma was antithetical to reform and 
57 Newell and Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan, 120; Rubin, Secrets of State: The State Depart-
ment and the Struggle over Foreign Policy, 85; Newell and Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan, 
78; Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 66.
58 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to Present, 192; Saikal, Modern Afghani-
stan: A History of Struggle and Survival; Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 9 and 198.
59 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
149.
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progress. In 1979, for example, Afghanistan had 220 working factories. By 1999 
there were just six.60 The Taliban made no substantial attempts to rectify the dam-
age sustained in the previous two decades of civil war. Instead, its leader, Mullah 
Omar, fostered an intimate relationship with Al Qaeda, one consequence of which 
was the US invasion of his country in October 2001.
Conclusion
As we have seen, then, war, religion, and tribal hierarchies made it dificult for 
Afghanistan to advance historically, with much progress being reversed each time 
a new conlict erupted. The experiences of both Britain and the Soviet Union 
should have served as warnings to the United States that a forceful military pres-
ence, coupled with an ambitious democratic programme, would face major hur-
dles. Bearing Afghanistan’s past in mind, it is not surprising that the country was 
considered alien by one of the irst western observers, Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
who said for outsiders it would be ‘dificult to comprehend how a nation could 
subsist in such disorder’.61 To combat that disorder, the United States would need 
a whole-of-government strategy, which combined the expertise and resources of 
its various agencies and individuals. But the problems illuminated by a review of 
Afghanistan’s history congealed with the ambiguity and complexity of nation-
building itself. Moreover, the shape and nature of the US bureaucracy, to which 
we now turn, created its own obstacles to realizing nation-building goals.
60 Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 
(1999), 25–35.
61 Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 178.
In the realm of domestic politics and administration, it is widely accepted that the 
United States is far from united. Socio-economic and cultural cleavages overlay 
a fractured political geography, with structural divisions being shaped by US his-
tory and federalism. These divisions are relected in governance. Conlict within 
and between a myriad of state and federal government agencies has been exten-
sively discussed in scholarship examining US democracy and bureaucracy.1 Yet 
when we shift from domestic to foreign policy the picture is somewhat different. 
Although most reputable scholars would accept that conlict does not ‘stop at the 
water’s edge’, there is still, nonetheless, a tendency to speak of US interests, US 
strategy and US behaviour in overly unitary terms. Along with this is the dis-
tinct but related assumption that the United States functions as a rational actor. 
This framework for thinking about and analysing US foreign policy – hereafter 
referred to as the rational actor model (or RAM) – has been so dominant that ‘we 
rarely remember we are reasoning by analogy’.2 From such a perspective, shared 
values, ideas and interests are the fulcrum around which US foreign policy turns.
The rational actor model has some limited usefulness in terms of identifying 
broad patterns and trends, but it is rather less insightful when it comes to describ-
ing and explaining the iner grained, contested aspects of US foreign policy mak-
ing. In particular, it underestimates the impact of bureaucratic politics on the 
formulation, interpretation and implementation of speciic policy decisions. This 
chapter offers an alternative framework for analysing US foreign policy in general 
and US nation-building in Afghanistan in particular. Bureaucratic politics is at the 
core of this framework. This focus on the foreign policy bureaucracy is not, of 
course, without precedent. During the 1970s, the Carnegie school revealed that 
beneath the monolithic US State, there are ‘various gears and levers in a highly 
1 Thomas Hammond and Jack Knott, “Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congres-
sional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional 
Policy-Making”, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 12: 1 (1996), 120. William 
Gormley, Bureaucracy and Democracy: Accountability and Performance (Washington DC: CQ 
Press College, 2013).
2 Allison, Essence of Decision, 252.
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differentiated decision-making structure’.3 To understand foreign policy decision-
making, one has to understand the ‘various gears and levers’ and the tensions 
between them. These gears and levers include, but are not limited to, the Presi-
dent, Congress, the US military and the various bureaucratic agencies of execu-
tive government, all staffed by professional oficials with differing interests and 
differing images of the world. In an updated version of an earlier work, Halperin 
et al. note that the participants in the foreign policy bureaucracy,
. . . while sharing some images of the international scene, see the world in 
very different ways. Each wants the government to do different things, and 
each struggles to secure the decisions and actions that he or she thinks best.4
Despite continued attention in works such as that of Halperin et al., it would be 
fair to say that scholarship on bureaucratic politics is something of a poor cousin 
in the International Relations literature. Focused empirical studies on struggles 
within and between the agencies of the US foreign policy bureaucracy are rela-
tively few. This chapter develops a new bureaucratic politics model that builds 
upon the strengths of the current literature, while recognizing and transcending 
its weaknesses.
The chapter begins by irst outlining the key assumptions of the rational actor 
model. It continues with a critique of the RAM and a discussion of the ways 
in which bureaucratic politics confound and obstruct decisions taken by rational 
actors, including the President. Finally, an alternative model of bureaucratic poli-
tics is elaborated, centred on four interrelated, but distinct variables: bureaucratic 
interests, perceptions, culture and power.
The Rational Actor Model
Students of international relations often assume that the state is a unitary actor. 
From this perspective, one typically associated with realism, the foreign policy 
bureaucracy is a rational and relatively uniied entity.5 The rational actor model 
argues that although there may be debate and discord within government cir-
cles, shared interests, goals and values ultimately shape a national state’s foreign 
policy. Consequently, explaining foreign policy revolves around identifying the 
interests of the state, which are embodied in its leaders, who are able to determine 
the decisions and actions of the state in an international context.6 Options for 
3 Ibid., 6.
4 Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp, with Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2006).
5 Stephanie Lawson, International Relations (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).
6 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (1974), and Graham Allison and Mor-
ton Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications”, in Raymond Tan-
ter and Richard H. Ullmann, Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1972).
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a given foreign policy direction are considered, and then a path is chosen that 
relects the combined values of the decision-makers. This includes assessing the 
various courses of action available and the costs/beneits of each alternative. As 
Welch notes, the RAM, ‘conceives of states as unitary and purposive, making 
consistent, value-maximizing choices’.7
The rational actor model certainly has its advantages. First, it is a clear and 
coherent method that is easy to apply to most foreign policy issues. Second, it 
is well developed and can offer objective and neutral standards of evaluation. 
Third, it promotes varied and imaginative analysis to generate diverse hypotheses 
centred on government choice and reasoning. Finally, it allows ‘an armchair strat-
egist’ to produce accounts of a given foreign policy incident without the need to 
draw on a mass of empirical evidence.8
The rational actor model provides an overarching template that can fuse com-
peting international relations theories, thus providing ‘basic tools for explain-
ing general theoretical statements’.9 It can lead to the construction of a lexible 
model, which may be as complex as necessary, but at the same time straightfor-
ward and coherent. Some scholars consider the RAM to be a simpliied model 
that still retains signiicant analytical power.10 By focusing on macrocosmic 
trends and themes, the rational actor model bridges the gap between individual 
behaviour and collective action. Its focus on unity also gives license to logically 
interpret a correlation or a set of events ‘through plausible and compelling story’ 
that uncovers universal principles and causal mechanisms.11 Consequently RAM 
theories characterize a States as having a certain set of norms and beliefs, which 
opens the possibility of explaining foreign policy over a long period of time.12 
The RAM approach has been applied to a diverse range of problems, such as elec-
toral choice, revolutionary movements, institutional formation and state-building.
Rationalist theorists criticize the bureaucratic politics approach, which Krasner 
has derided as ‘misleading and dangerous’ because it obscures the power of the 
US President and undercuts the expectations of democratic politics by discharging 
 7 David Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect 
and Prospect”, International Security, 17:2 (1992), 114.
 8 Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making (New York: Norton and 
Company, 2012), 14. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 246 
and 251.
 9 James Morrow, “A Rational Choice Approach to International Conlict”, in Nehemia Geva and 
Alex Mintz (eds), Decision-Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner: 1997), 12–18.
10 Siegwart Lindenberg, “The Method of Decreasing Abstraction”, in James Coleman and Thomas 
Fararo (eds) Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique (London: Sage, 1992), 18; Paul J.H. 
Schoemaker, “Strategic Decisions in Organizations: Rational and Behavioral Views”, Journal of 
Management Studies, 30: 1 (1993), 107–129.
11 Margaret Levi, “A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis”, in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Cul-
ture and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 19–42.
12 Morrow, “A Rational Choice Approach to International Conlict”, 12–18.
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high oficials of responsibility for their actions. Government failures, Krasner 
argues, are ‘not so much the inertia of a large bureaucratic machine as a confu-
sion over values which aflicts the society in general and its leaders in particular’. 
A bureaucratic politics approach, from this perspective, also ignores the fact that 
objectives and values of foreign policy are ‘perfectly coincident with the ethical 
assumptions of democratic politics’. Especially when it comes to the formation 
of policy, moreover, RAM provides explanations, whereas the bureaucratic poli-
tics approach, which focuses on disorder and obfuscation, does not. Nor does the 
bureaucratic politics approach offer much in the way of solutions beyond ‘improv-
ing managerial techniques’ with limited capacity to change the overall direction of 
foreign policy. Finally, evoking bureaucratic politics as a reason for foreign policy 
problems has been used as an excuse for leaders to blame their deiciencies on the 
bureaucratic structure of the US State.13
Given these strengths, it is perhaps unsurprising that the RAM has produced 
a large and important body of scholarship on the foreign policy of the United 
States. Above all, the RAM has been the theoretical lens through which issues of 
national security have been viewed. The reason for this is clear: during moments 
of national security threat the US government and its oficials are more likely to 
speak with one voice than at other times. Should the President place a foreign 
policy issue within the frame of national security, it will usually generate pub-
lic support, bi-partisan resolve and bureaucratic unity of purpose. Huntington 
argues that after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, for example, ‘a remarkable har-
mony prevailed in the high councils of the American government’. Military per-
sonnel, politicians, bureaucrats and the US populace were united in their shock 
and outrage.14
More recently, much the same has been said of reactions in the US government 
immediately after the 9/11 attacks. Irrespective of one’s assessment of the Bush 
regime’s response, and regardless of whether or not the impetus for it sprung 
from Bush, his top foreign policy advisors or a cabal of neo-conservatives, it is 
generally accepted that there was relative unity, at least initially, in responding 
with decisive military force. James Mann notes that there was clarity of purpose 
within the Bush Administration, where ‘the interconnecting relationships and the 
overhang of the past extended down through the ranks of the faithful’.15 Andrew 
Bacevich, speaking from a very different theoretical and political position, places 
the response within a broader historical context where national security has cre-
ated a ‘Washington Consensus’. Although he notes that oficials often pursue ‘the 
favored agendas of their own agencies’, he argues that ‘an emphasis on coercive 
13 Stephen Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)”, Foreign Affairs, 7 
(1972), 159–179.
14 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Harvard University Press, 1957), 326.
15 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 
2004), xi.
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power held at the ready; and a penchant for global interventionism, both overt and 
covert’, is what characterizes the US foreign policy system as a whole.16
The rational actor model has not been restricted to the issue of national security. 
In a detailed study of US Anti-Expropriation policy, Lipson claims that although 
the White House, Congress and various agencies have independent interests, they 
are united by ‘common ideology, common symbolic referents and a shared under-
standing of certain state function’. He suggests that this produces broad areas 
of agreement, which is more important than the divergent opinions of various 
factions within the foreign policy bureaucracy.17 Expressed differently, the imper-
atives of bureaucratic interest are trumped by national interest and the shared 
ideology on which it rests, which in turn allows us to think of the US as being 
a relatively uniied, rational actor. While such an approach may help to identify 
broad patterns of state behaviour, ultimately it is based on questionable assump-
tions that underestimate the complexity of US foreign policy making. However, 
in spite of Krasner’s dismissal of the bureaucratic politics approach, the rational 
actor model is a paradigm that neglects the ‘bureaucratic jungle’ that encroaches 
on the shores of US foreign policy.18
In the 1970s, a body of scholarship began to emerge that questioned the key 
assumptions of the RAM, while elaborating an alternative approach that focused 
on the differentiated role of the US foreign policy bureaucracy. Published more 
than four decades ago, Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision remains a key early 
text in this tradition, and still has lessons for scholars today. Although he focuses 
on a particular foreign policy event – the Cuban Missile Crisis – his analysis has 
a broader relevance for understanding US foreign policy.
In discussing the crisis that unfolded in October 1962, after the US learned that 
the Soviets had positioned ballistic missiles in Cuba, Allison proposes and analy-
ses three possible models that could be deployed to explain US policy. Model I is 
equivalent to the RAM. To explain the US response, particularly the US naval 
blockade of Cuba, this model focuses on strategic calculus, US capabilities, and 
relevant US values and interests. Using this backdrop, Model I considers US 
actions to represent a ‘purposive response to the strategic problem’. The blockade 
‘is an aggregate act’ and ‘the perceived context, formal decision, and implementa-
tion are all aspects of one coordinated, rational choice’. In his discussion, Allison 
concludes that the assumptions and predictions of Model I are ‘crudely reduc-
tionist’, as they ignore agency interests and other bureaucratic considerations.19 
Many other scholars display similar reservations and argue that it is presumptuous 
16 Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rules, 247; Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of 
American Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), 95.
17 Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Cen-
turies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
18 Daniel Drezner, “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy”, American Jour-
nal of Political Science, 44: 4 (2000), 734.
19 Allison, Essence of Decision, 250 and 254.
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to ‘assume the existence of a central intelligence and guiding force’.20 Whether 
explaining the past or the future, the weakness of the rational actor model is that 
it assumes that the United States chooses a course of action in order to realize its 
foreign policy goals ‘most eficiently and economically’.21 Such an approach, 
Halperin observes, relies on a ‘digniied, even majestic progression, with each of 
the participants having well-deined roles and powers’.22 Most of the bureaucratic 
politics literature agrees that there is no strict order or rules to foreign policy-
making; rather it comes as a result of bargaining and negotiation between the 
relevant parties.23
Allison’s Model II and Model III abandon the presumption that the United 
States functions as a unitary and purposive subject. Model II proposes that US for-
eign policy is not produced by a single calculating decision-maker, but instead by 
a number of agencies within government: ‘The actor is not a monolithic “nation” 
or “government”, but rather a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top 
of which government leaders sit’. On the basis of this model, Allison suggests 
that foreign policy is less a relection of deliberate choices than a compromise 
between large agencies with diverse interests, which operate in accordance with 
deeply entrenched patterns of behaviour.24 Welch, who reviewed Allison’s mod-
els 20 years later, agrees. He claims that the usefulness of the Rational Actor 
Model ‘should not be permitted to obscure the fact that rationality is constrained 
in various important ways by factors that are either determined or strongly inlu-
enced by organizational or bureaucratic considerations’.25
Allison’s Model III, meanwhile, contends that individuals who sit at the fore-
front of foreign policy are neither a monolithic group, nor merely an emblem 
of the agencies that they represent. Instead, each actor is engaged in a complex 
political game where decisions are made ‘not by a single, rational choice but 
by the pulling and hauling that is politics’.26 With this in mind, Model III posits 
that decisions are a consequence of ‘intelligent interest-based action by rational 
20 Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform, 5.
21 Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defence and Foreign Affairs (New Jersey: Pren-
tice Hall, 1990), xi.
22 Roger Hilsman, “The Foreign-Policy Consensus: An Interim Research Report”, Journal of Con-
lict Resolution, 3:4 (1959), 362.
23 Huntington, The Soldier and the State; Allison, Essence of Decision; Hilsman, The Politics of 
Policy Making; Walter Schilling, “The Politics of National Defence”, in Thomas Hammond, Wal-
ter Schilling and Paul Snyder (eds), Strategy, Politics and Defence Budgets (New York: Columbia, 
19620, 21–26; David Kozak, “The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: The Evolution of the Para-
digm”, in David Kozak and James Keagle (eds), Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: 
Theory and Practice (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 13.
24 Allison, Essence of Decision, 3, 80 and 67.
25 Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Pros-
pect”, 138.
26 Allison, Essence of Decision, 144 and 146; Robert Jervis, “Why Intelligence and Policy-makers 
Clash”, in James McCormack (ed.), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights 
and Evidence (Maryland: Rowman & Littleield, 2012), 267–285.
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players in a complex, partially hidden intergovernmental game’.27 In another 
study, Allison and Halperin reined and expanded Model III, in order to produce 
a broader theoretical approach. But the core of their approach remains that, ‘the 
individuals within a government, and the interaction among them, [are] determi-
nants of the actions of a government’.28 More recent academic criticism of the 
rational actor model makes the argument that it fails to account for the way in 
which ideas impact on the behaviour of individuals. Drezner, for example, claims 
that the rational actor model relies on dominant ideas, but fails to account for 
what happens when competing ideas assert themselves.29 Often competing ideas 
are abstracted from the institutional bases from which they arise, and treated as 
if they have material consequences that can be understood in isolation from the 
actors and institutions that promote them.30
What Allison and other scholars have demonstrated is that competing concep-
tions and interpretations impact upon each foreign policy issue. This is because 
the bureaucracy consists of parochial agencies, factions and individuals. The abil-
ity of the US foreign policy establishment to act as a single, rational and thus 
purposeful unit is constrained by the behavioural nuances of its various parts.31
The President and the Bureaucracy
Sceptics of this view might immediately ask: but what of the President? Does 
he not transcend the machinations of the foreign policy bureaucracy and have 
the power to ultimately determine foreign policy? Many have thought so. Arthur 
Schlesinger characterizes the US President as an imperial dictator of foreign pol-
icy, ‘on the issues of war and peace the most absolute monarch among the great 
powers of the world’.32 He is ‘the President Emperor’, Bacevich writes, who 
‘functions as the ultimate decider’ in foreign affairs.33 While these descriptions 
are an exaggeration, the President and his advisers do have the capacity to domi-
nate a foreign policy issue.
Prima facie, there might appear good reasons for accepting this view of Presi-
dential powers and their critical role in determining the particular ‘rationality’ of 
US foreign policy. The President can set the rules of engagement, appoint key 
27 Edward Rhodes, “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Discomiting Findings from the Case of 
the US Navy”, World Politics, 47: 1 (1994), 2.
28 Allison, Essence of Decision; Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some 
Policy Implications”, 43.
29 Drezner, “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy”.
30 Paul Rohrlich, “Economic Culture and Foreign Policy: The Cognitive Analysis of Economic 
Policy-Making”, International Organization, 41: 61, 92.
31 Stone, Policy Paradox, 10–14; Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics 
Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect”, 116–117.
32 Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (New York: Popular Library, 1973), 11.
33 Bacevich, The Limits of Power, 84.
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igures and establish channels of communication.34 Informally, his prestige and 
reputation constitute ‘a useful antidote to bureaucratic immobilization’.35 When 
it comes to matters of warfare and national security the US Commander-in-Chief 
is especially well equipped to shape policy, leading General Douglas MacArthur 
to quip that the US military is ‘merely the agent of the President’.36 Despite Con-
gress having the Constitutional authority to declare war, it has in fact been the 
President who has led the US into every major war since Korea in 1950, albeit 
while sometimes relying on enabling resolutions from Congress, as was the case 
with Vietnam in 1964 and Iraq in 2002. More recently, the form and substance 
of the War on Terror was fashioned by President George W. Bush and his senior 
staff. All of this suggests that leadership from the White House fuses the US into 
a united, rational actor.
While the Presidential powers sketched above do lend some weight to the idea that 
the US can act with unity of purpose, it neglects the ways in which even Presidents 
are constrained. Neustadt argues, for example, that the President is circumscribed by 
bureaucratic forces and must still make use of his power to persuade and bargain if 
he wishes to accomplish his goals.37 Persuasion and bargaining entails compromise, 
but also unintended consequences of the deals struck. This implies that rather than 
directing agencies and oficials to form rational, coherent policy, the White House 
ights a constant battle against a variety of agencies and individuals. The will of the 
President does not necessarily translate into substantial policy action.38
Many scholars also highlight the capacity of the President to breach bureau-
cratic barriers at the policy formulation stage, while being much more constrained 
at the implementation stage.39 Destler, for example, observes that we ‘tend to 
forget the often substantial gap between what our Presidents seek and what the 
bureaucrats oficially working for them actually do’.40 Holbrooke draws a similar 
conclusion: due to its size and make up, ‘the foreign affairs community cannot 
be pulled together under any central agency – not even the White House’.41 The 
President can make decisions and guide the behaviour of a handful of senior ofi-
cials, but he inds it more challenging to oversee implementation and the daily 
actions of an army of bureaucrats.42
34 David Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Per-
formance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 51–81.
35 Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, “The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Perspective”, 
in Halperin and Kanter (eds.) Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspec-
tive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 6–7; Allison, Essence of Decision, 148; Destler, Presidents, 
Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, 88.
36 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 414.
37 Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Free Press, 1991), 11.
38 Garry Clifford, “Bureaucratic Politics”, 93–94.
39 Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)”, 169.
40 Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, 20.
41 Richard Holbrooke, “The Machine that Fails”, Foreign Policy, January 1, 1971, 4, http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/the_machine_that_fails.
42 Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (1974), 236.
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Aggravated by this realization, many US Presidents have perceived the bureau-
cracy to be their natural enemy.43 When Franklin D. Roosevelt vetoed the ‘Paciic 
First’ strategy, for example, the military establishment acquiesced but then 
undermined his authority by pursuing an alternative strategy for the remainder 
of WWII.44 Elements of the bureaucracy also frustrated John F. Kennedy by fail-
ing to extract Jupiter missiles from Turkey, despite an initial agreement with the 
President that the missiles were obsolete and the assurance that they would be 
removed. Ted Sorensen, the Special Counsel and Advisor to Kennedy, remarks 
that it was never certain ‘who was in charge, who was clearly delegated to do what 
and why his policy line seemed consistently to be altered or delayed’.45
Evidently, there is a signiicant gap between a policy direction that is chosen 
by the President and the way in which his orders are carried out. This highlights 
a broader problem; that it is impossible to closely monitor and control all of the 
agencies and individuals that make up the US foreign policy establishment. Even 
where oficials close to the President conscientiously try to implement his deci-
sions, those more distant may, for personal or bureaucratic reasons, frustrate 
the effective execution of decisions taken at the top. In other words, decisions 
already taken continue to be debated at various points in the bureaucracy, and can 
effectively be ignored or reversed.46 Even the most diligent senior US oficial 
would ind it impossible to observe and monitor all the activities of his or her 
subordinates.47 The structure of each agency and the US foreign policy system 
more generally, means that ‘decisions are rarely tailored to facilitate monitoring’. 
As a consequence, ‘senior players have great dificulty checking on the faithful 
implementation of a decision’.48 Destler has characterized this separation as one 
between policy and operations. The former is seldom able to adequately guide the 
latter, which results in conlicting interpretations between and within US agen-
cies.49 Richard Holbrooke crystallizes the problem succinctly: ‘Between the gen-
eralities of a vague policy document and its implementation . . . lies many places 
for miscalculation or derailment’.50
The interpretation and implementation of policy reinforces agency norms and 
permits factional cleavages. Agency routine will often obfuscate or supersede any 
central rational choice made by senior oficials or the President. At the implemen-
tation stage, the number of agencies and factions that become involved greatly 
expands, expanding the possibility for inter-agency competition and conlict. 
43 M.S. Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers (New York: Knopf, 1951), 336.
44 Clifford, “Bureaucratic Politics”, 93.
45 Ted Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 287.
46 Allison, Essence of Decision, 172.
47 Welch, ‘The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Pros-
pect’, p. 133.
48 Allison, Essence of Decision; Allison and Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some 
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50 Holbrooke, “The Machine that Fails”, 4.
44 Background and Methodology
Divisions also appear between the upper and mid/low level of the bureaucracy. 
Halperin draws a distinction between two types of bureaucrats: senior participants 
and junior participants. Allison more colourfully described these two categories 
as Chiefs and Indians. In their subsequent collaborative study, the two combined 
these monikers to argue that there is a dichotomy between what they call decision 
games and action games. While senior oficials dominate decision games, action 
games give mid- and low-level oficials the ability to play a more signiicant role. 
When all of these factors are considered, it is little wonder that Henry Kissinger 
could claim that, ‘making foreign policy is easy, what’s dificult is its coordination 
and implementation’.51
A New Bureaucratic Politics Model
The foregoing discussion suggests that US foreign policy making is a more com-
plex phenomenon than the rational actor model suggests. Yet Allison’s alternative 
embryonic models, and the others that have followed, have also been subject to 
criticism. These criticisms typically turn around two alleged weaknesses. On the 
one hand, it is said that they over-emphasize the volitions of individuals and do 
not pay suficient attention to the bureaucratic agencies themselves – their form, 
function and broader institutional context. On the other hand, the models are said 
to be rigid and untested, and unable to provide a complete picture of ‘how the 
bureaucracy is controlled and who controls it’.52 In other words, they provide 
an incomplete picture of how the foreign policy bureaucracy actually works, and 
what are the mechanisms that link it with foreign policy outcomes.
The purpose of this chapter is not to interrogate these criticisms at length, but 
they do illuminate some of the shortcomings in existing approaches to bureau-
cratic politics. To overcome these deiciencies, a new bureaucratic politics model 
will be introduced, one centred on bureaucratic interests, perceptions, culture and 
power. For the purpose of presentation each of these will be discussed as if they 
constitute a distinct phenomenon. In reality they are overlapping and mutually 
constitutive. The four variables are adaptable enough to explain how agencies 
function as a single purposeful unit, but also how they interact with other agencies, 
and how factions and oficials within agencies behave. Importantly, the model that 
is outlined below does not constitute some universal theory that claims to explain 
all US foreign policy, but rather a framework for thinking through the failings of 
nation-building in Afghanistan, which may be applicable to similar cases.
51 Allison, Essence of Decision, 477; Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and 
Some Policy Implications”, 47.
52 Hammond and Knott, “Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional 
Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional 
Policy-Making”, 119; Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: 
Retrospect and Prospect”, 120 and 138; Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond, “Rethinking 
Allison’s Model”, American Political Science Review, 86:2 (1992), 317.
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The irst consideration in this new model is bureaucratic interests. Interest refers 
to that which is beneicial to an agency. Interests can be both tangible and intan-
gible. Examples of tangible interests include the ongoing survival of an agency, 
but also its access to resources that can bolster its capacities. An example of an 
intangible interest is the prestige and status of an agency vis-à-vis other agencies 
in the foreign policy bureaucracy. Interests are important because they inluence 
the goals and priorities of an organization, shape the behaviour of its personnel, 
and help determine how it interacts with other agencies and arms of government. 
Such interests often conlict with other agencies, not to mention with White House 
agendas and priorities. Rather than engaging in an ordered pursuit of common 
goals, each agency strategizes ‘to survive and thrive in a world of competing 
ideas and institutions’.53 Agencies place survival above all else and will stile any 
perceived threat to it.54
Instead of being strictly ‘national’, bureaucratic interests are by deinition par-
tial, interpreted to suit speciic purposes such as increasing a budget, procuring 
resources or limiting costs. Indeed, agency interests are often far more concrete 
than the generalized national interest of the government.55 As a result, agencies 
will often attempt to undermine or overrule certain foreign policy initiatives. Dur-
ing the invasion of Grenada, for example, the military establishment deployed 
a battalion of Rangers for bureaucratic rather than tactical reasons in order to 
buttress congressional support for another Ranger battalion.56 When faced with 
human rights reforms throughout the Presidency of both Carter and Reagan, the 
Treasury Department fought against the linkage of economic assistance to a coun-
try’s human rights record, and did everything in its power to avoid the application 
of trade restrictions that were justiied by human rights considerations.57
It is no wonder, then, that conlict often erupts when a foreign policy issue 
involves multiple agencies with divergent interests. But this can also motivate 
compromise between agencies, which undermine the policy intent of decision-
makers in the White House. Holbrooke explains that agency programmes,
. . . are often carried out by one agency despite concern and even mid-level 
opposition from others, as part of a tacit trade-off: ‘We’ll let you do your 
thing, and you let us do ours’. Such deals or ‘non-aggression treaties’, are 
almost never explicit, but are nonetheless well understood by the participants. 
53 Drezner, “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy”, 733.
54 Valerie Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Speciic Theory and the Ground of International 
Relations”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 1:1 (2005), 8.
55 Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive: 30th Anniversary Edition (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971); Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making 
Processes in Administrative Organization (New York: Free Press, 1997).
56 Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Pros-
pect”, 133.
57 Edwin Maynard, “The Bureaucracy and Implementation of US Human Rights Policy”, Human 
Rights Quarterly, 11:2 (1989), 242.
46 Background and Methodology
The results from such arrangements obviously vary. Sometimes programs are 
in direct conlict.58
During the Salt I negotiations, for example, the State Department and the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency were concerned with arms limitations, while 
the military was hostile to any move to reduce US irepower. Similar currents 
of discord were manifested in respect to Foreign Aid Sanction and Investment 
Protection, when different interests provoked a heated dispute between State and 
Treasury. In the early 1990s, meanwhile, a multitude of agencies clashed over US 
pre-war technology sales to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.59 To sum up, different sets of 
interests within agencies shape relations between them and often provoke conlict.
Bureaucratic interests are intimately bound up with and help mould bureau-
cratic perceptions. Perception refers to the ways that agency personnel tend to 
view the world, their place in it, and the problems that they confront. Perception 
is often encapsulated in the observation that ‘where you stand depends on where 
you sit’. Neustadt placed this adage at the centre of his study Presidential Power, 
arguing that the US government is characterized by a convoluted power sharing 
arrangement between and within separate agencies, who all view the world in 
very different ways.60 Allison and Halperin extended the aphorism to contend 
that, ‘where you sit inluences what you see as well as well as where you stand 
(on any issue)’.61
On any given issue an agency or government department will view the world 
through different lenses, which relect their own partial interests and preoccupa-
tions. The US Treasury and Department of Commerce, for example, might view 
relations with China principally through an economic lens focused on trade, mar-
kets and potential revenue. The Pentagon, meanwhile, is more inclined to view 
China through a military lens that sees in that country a strategic competitor. Simi-
larly, the proposal to withdraw American troops from Europe was considered by 
the State Department to be a development that would damage US relations with 
NATO; by the military to be a threat to its budget; and by the Treasury Department 
to be a way to save money. In the 1950s, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Program was 
viewed by the military as an initiative that would increase its budget and pres-
tige. In contrast, the State Department worried that such an aggressive programme 
would negatively affect relations with US allies and provoke its adversaries.62 
What these examples illustrate is that an agency’s collective perceptions are very 
much shaped by its interests.
58 Holbrooke, “The Machine That Fails”.
59 Jerel Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in 
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61 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications”, 44.
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But perceptions do not only differ between agencies; they can also differ within 
an agency. Even oficials within the same department can have differing percep-
tions regarding an issue, and have differences over what is considered to be the 
correct response to that issue. A foreign policy issue may be of signiicance to 
one person, yet trivial to another. Alternatively, each of them may consider the 
issue to be of importance, but for different reasons. The perceptions of military 
oficials operating within a war-zone, for example, are distinct from those who are 
ensconced within the Pentagon in Washington.
Perception is also shaped by what Allison has termed ‘peculiar preferences’. 
This refers to the personal likes or dislikes of US foreign policy oficials. ‘Per-
sonal baggage’ may inluence a US oficial’s commitment to a certain issue, his 
stand in respect to another agency or his attitude toward the implementation of 
a particular project.63 Bloomield highlights the capacity of ‘fallible (or obstrep-
erous) human beings to implement (or thwart) . . . foreign policy programs’.64 
During World War II, for example, personal animosity between Secretary of State 
Hull and Under-Secretary Wells, driven by very different perceptions of the inter-
national context and its problems, led each to undermine the other’s authority, 
crippling the State Department’s ability to function effectively.
Nonetheless, perception generally correlates with the position an individual 
holds within the foreign policy bureaucracy. Based on their proximate position, 
US oficials have certain loyalties, receive certain information and are exposed 
to particular views and interpretations of how their agency’s interests are best 
served. Despite the fact that the individual character traits of a US oficial can play 
a part, therefore, his behaviour is still inextricably linked to and constrained by the 
position she or he holds within the bureaucracy.
The way of perceiving the world and concrete foreign policy issues is not only 
shaped by agency interests. Perception is also inluenced by and is a part of an 
agency’s culture. Culture is here understood as the patterned beliefs, values and 
symbolic representations shared within a given group, which constrain thinking 
and instil behavioural norms. Each agency has a relatively distinct culture based 
on past experiences, repertoires and formal and informal procedures, which com-
bine to create its own unique character.65 In Bureaucracy, Wilson emphasizes the 
role that culture plays: ‘Every organization has a culture’ he writes, ‘a persis-
tent, patterned way of thinking’, which passes from one generation to the next’. 
An agency’s culture embeds dominant images and ingrains certain expectations 
through doctrine and teaching, in order to inluence the behaviour of its oficials – 
whether they are aware of it or not.66
63 Allison, Essence of Decision, 166–174.
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An agency’s culture helps shape perceptions and interpret agency interests. It 
is, therefore, dangerously complacent to dismiss cultural nuances as a collection 
of ‘idiosyncrasies’ that can be easily overcome.67 It can inculcate a strong resist-
ance to change, limit the exchange of ideas and provoke irrational reactions to a 
foreign policy directive, and reduce the available options for a policy’s implemen-
tation. As a former Washington insider remarks of the inertia of agency culture, 
‘for every argument inside government that some jerry-built bureaucratic arrange-
ment should be changed, there are usually twenty arguments to show that it rests 
on God’s own logic’.68
‘Standard operating procedures’ embodied in and perpetuating agency culture 
can also impede organizational memory, and make it dificult for an agency to 
adapt to unfamiliar circumstances.69 In addition, culture encourages suspicion 
of bureaucratic forces that operate beyond the agency’s borders. An agency with 
a strong culture is able to resist legislative decrees and broad policy initiatives, 
and pursue goals that are contrary to what the President and other high oficials 
intended when making a decision. ‘Suficient differences in bureaucratic culture’, 
Drezner argues, ‘lead agencies to distrust the ability of other institutions to make 
any contribution to foreign policy’.70
Each agency, moreover, has its own nomenclatures and lexicon, which can 
result in a breakdown in communications with outsiders. Differing agency cul-
tures prompt vastly different, often conlicting, responses to the same situation. 
An agency’s culture frequently prompts US oficials to respond as their agency 
expects, rather than as the situation requires. At the implementation stage in par-
ticular, an agency’s decisions are inluenced by its culture. Many oficials receive 
vague direction from their superiors and are instead guided by embedded agency 
culture and norms. Indeed there is often little oversight of their activities. The 
task of monitoring all activities within even a single department is staggering. 
Secretary of State Rusk informed the Jackson Subcommittee in 1963 that he only 
saw ’20 or 30’ of the 1,300 incoming State cables each day, and ‘perhaps 6’ of 
the outgoing ones. A large volume of bureaucratic trafic increases the capacity of 
agency cultural norms to determine the speciic details of the policy process, and 
therefore decreases the ability of outside forces to inluence agency behaviour.71
Bureaucratic interests, perception and culture operate within a broader constel-
lation of power. Power is here understood in Weberian terms as, ‘the probability 
that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own 
will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’.72 
67 Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational reform, 38.
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The ‘actor’ here can be an individual, a bureaucratic agency or a state. The suc-
cessful deployment of power can be based on either compulsion or persuasion, 
hard or soft power.
In the US foreign policy bureaucracy, agencies, factions and individuals seek to 
obtain and project power, usually against the resistance of others. Each party con-
stantly attempts to increase its strength vis-à-vis other elements of the bureaucracy. 
Schilling compares this to diplomatic struggles between contending national states, 
where each intends to isolate the other, secure alliances, and inluence neutral par-
ties. He considers such machinations to be inevitable due to the fragmented power 
structure of the US system.73 The role of power within the paradigm of bureaucratic 
politics, however, is complex, ambiguous and dificult to evaluate.
Despite this, one way to measure power is to focus on hierarchy. According 
to Allison, power within US foreign policy is not evenly distributed. Rather, he 
argues that there is a set hierarchy in respect to each issue, with power concentrated 
in particular sections of the bureaucratic hierarchy. He compares this to a game 
of chess: ‘The hierarchy structures the game’, in which players with a mixture 
of conlicting preferences have ‘unequal power over particular pieces’.74 Other 
scholars agree that the distribution of power is relatively stable, and is attached to 
and lows from formal positions within a bureaucratic hierarchy. ‘Battles may be 
fought anew each time’, Freeman writes, but ‘gains low in a persistent, if slightly 
wavering, direction’.75 When connected to an established hierarchy, the projec-
tion of power is determined by capacity, capability and prestige. These in turn are 
inluenced by depth of resources and control over information. The US military 
and the State Department, for example, are more powerful in the realm of foreign 
policy than USAID or the Department of Agriculture.
When understood in the terms outlined above, hierarchy alone cannot account 
for the complex nature and distribution of power. Bureaucratic politics literature 
that focuses mainly on hierarchy has been criticized for saying little on how a 
stable hierarchy is maintained in respect of speciic policy decisions and their 
implementation. Such arguments have merit. Agencies and factions that suf-
fer ‘numerical or status disadvantage vis-à-vis more dominant bureaucratic 
players’,76 have little inluence over the broad contours of foreign policy, but may 
have considerably more inluence around a speciic issue. The CIA, for example, 
has the power to dominate foreign policy issues linked to intelligence and more 
recently counter-terrorism. Similarly, as the Navy specializes in maritime warfare, 
neither the Defence Department, nor the Ofice of Management and Budget, are 
able to dictate its force posture.77
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For US oficials also, power cannot be simply read off the formal hierarchy 
of authority and jurisdiction. Personal skill, reputation and relationships are also 
extremely relevant. Power is, therefore, associated with a US oficial’s capacity to 
effectively manage and shape the resources, reputation and authority linked to this 
position. Here an individual’s personality can have a powerful effect. According 
to Allison ‘the hard core of the bureaucratic politics mix’ is personality, formed in 
a crucible of organizational, national, domestic and emotional interests.78 Skill (or 
charisma) can help a US oficial overcome bureaucratic problems. For example, 
it is a skill to persuade others that a recommended course of action is in their 
own best interests. With this in mind, Clifford considers skill a crucial element in 
understanding who inluences US foreign policy and why. Carafano agrees that 
the knowledge, skills and attributes of senior oficials are vitally important.79
A inal consideration when discussing power is that there are often multiple 
hierarchies that bear on a single foreign policy issue. For example, in a decision 
to go to war:
One action channel for producing US military intervention in another country 
includes a recommendation by the Ambassador to that country, an assess-
ment by the regional military commander, a recommendation by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, an assessment by the intelligence community of the conse-
quences of intervention, recommendations by the Secretaries of State and 
Defence, a Presidential decision to intervene, the transmittal of an order from 
the President through the Secretary of Defence and Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 
regional military commander, his determination of what troops to employ, the 
order from him to the commander of those troops, and the orders from that 
commander to the individuals who actually move into the country.80
These multiple hierarchies create multiple channels where power is exercised, 
which complicates the line of command. Richard Myers says that during the War 
on Terror it was never clear as to who was in charge of operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq:
When I talked to civilian audiences they’d often say, ‘Oh, well, the Secretary 
of Defence, Secretary Rumsfeld or Secretary Gates’. I would say, ‘Oh, so 
he’s in charge, he’s responsible? What authority does he have over the State 
Department, National Security Council, Justice Treasury, Commerce, Home-
land Security? What is his authority there?’ The answer is that he has no such 
authority. So how can you put someone in charge if we’re talking about all 
78 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications”, 48; 
Halperin et al, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (2006), 16.
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80 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications”, 45–46.
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the instruments of national power focusing to solve a problem when this per-
son ‘in charge’ doesn’t have complete authority?81
In summary, the power of agencies, factions and individuals within the foreign 
policy bureaucracy is related to hierarchy, but is projected through an amorphous 
blend of resources, capacity, prestige, skill and knowledge. Furthermore, char-
acteristics such as the attitude and character traits of US oficials may determine 
whether they have the power to overcome or compound bureaucratic hurdles.
Conclusion
This chapter suggests that the rational actor model is an inadequate starting point 
for understanding US foreign policy formation and implementation, in general and 
in Afghanistan. It takes little account of the ways in which different bureaucratic 
interests and agendas frustrate the will of political decision-makers, or of the unin-
tended consequences of power struggles within the bureaucracy. One approach 
that partly overcomes these weaknesses is that of the so-called Carnegie school of 
Graham Allison and his fellow travellers, who developed important insights into 
how bureaucratic politics impacts on US foreign policy. The model that was con-
structed here builds on the insights of that school of thought while avoiding some 
of the pitfalls and suggests that bureaucratic politics can be usefully analysed 
through the lens of bureaucratic interest, perceptions, culture and power, which 
together enable and constrain actors with the US foreign policy bureaucracy. The 
heuristic value of this approach, however, can only be determined by putting it to 
work on a concrete case. In Part II therefore, the model elaborated here is used to 
try and come to grips with nation-building in Afghanistan.
81 Interview with Richard Myers, PRISM 2:4 (2011), 155.

Part II
US Nation-Building in 
Afghanistan

4 The US Foreign Policy 
Bureaucracy and  
Nation-Building in Afghanistan*
The contemporary US foreign policy bureaucracy is often described as a troika 
consisting of defence, development and diplomacy – the ‘3D’s’ in Washington 
parlance. This has been interpreted to mean that each foreign policy issue falls 
under the authority of either the military establishment, USAID or the State 
Department. Nation-building, however, does not unambiguously it within the 
jurisdiction of any of the three realms. As Bowden notes, it ‘has elements of each’, 
but is ‘exclusively none of them’.1
Despite or perhaps because of this, nation-building would become something 
of a shared undertaking in Afghanistan, once it became clear that the ‘shock and 
awe’ of the initial military campaign would be insuficient to stabilize the country. 
The overarching aim of nation-building, in so far as there was one, was to pro-
ject US power in order to secure political stability and economic development, 
coupled with the pretence of US-style democracy. This was encapsulated in vari-
ous documents, including the Quadrennial Defence Reviews, the National Secu-
rity Strategy, the State Department’s Transformational Diplomacy Initiative and 
USAID’s Fragile State Strategy.2 But beneath the veneer of common cause, there 
were serious fractures and problems. This chapter provides a general backdrop to 
these problems, as a primer for the more speciic, issue-focused chapters that fol-
low. It describes an approach to nation-building that was chaotic and disordered, 
which was driven by both inadequate leadership and bureaucratic factions with 
different interests, perceptions, cultures and power.
1 Commission on Wartime Contracting, An Urgent Need: Coordinating Reconstruction and Stabili-
zation in Contingency Operations, Commission on Wartime Contract (Washington DC: 2010), 11.
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The chapter proceeds by irst considering President George W. Bush’s rela-
tively disinterested attitude to nation-building in Afghanistan, which enlarged 
the scope for bureaucratic manoeuvring and power plays. It then outlines the 
roles that the military establishment, the State Department and USAID played in 
nation-building in Afghanistan. The ‘Counter-Bureaucracy’, a blanket term for 
Washington’s regulatory bodies, is also examined. In the inal part of the chapter, 
a series of inter-agency problems are discussed, which ultimately rendered the US 
nation-building project in Afghanistan incoherent.
The Military Establishment
The US military’s response to a foreign policy issue is shaped by its percep-
tion of how that issue its within the paradigm of national security. It is deeply 
reluctant to stray from its primary purpose: the enforcement of national secu-
rity through violence. In a description that is as valid today as when it was 
irst written, Hilsman writes that the US military establishment is, ‘extremely 
conservative, nationalistic, aggressive, power oriented and simplistic’. This 
ensures that its relexive response to most issues is to ‘resort to crude force’. 
Warfare is the foundation of the military establishment’s culture and ‘the 
peculiar skill of the military oficer’.3 To suit this agenda, each branch of the 
US military has strict chains of command and regimented behavioural norms. 
As a result, US soldiers, along with civilian oficials at the Department of 
Defence, respond to foreign policy problems by following military nomencla-
ture and certain combat-oriented routines. This was illustrated in the invasion 
of Afghanistan.
The military establishment and its civilian oficials were central in the deci-
sion to invade Afghanistan and in its execution. Once it became clear that Al 
Qaeda was responsible for the attacks on the Twin Trade Towers and the Penta-
gon, the Taliban were given an ultimatum by President George W. Bush: ‘hand 
over the terrorists, or . . . share their fate’.4 The Taliban refused to comply with 
that demand, which resulted in Operation Enduring Freedom being unleashed in 
October 2001. The invasion deployed CIA and Special Forces teams to establish 
targets for the US Air Force.5 They were assisted by the Northern Alliance, a 
loose conglomerate of anti-Taliban militia. The Northern Alliance was bribed 
3 Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defence and Foreign Affairs (Lanham: Prentice 
Hall, 1990), 203; Michael Meese and Isaiah Wilson, “The Military: Forging a Joint Warrior Cul-
ture”, in Roger George and Harvey Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the 
Labyrinth (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001), 117–139; Samuel Huntington, 
The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1957), 11.
4 Robert Draper, Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Free Press, 2007), 
156.
5 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 
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with money, weapons and other incentives to ight for the US cause. It substi-
tuted for a substantial US ground presence, because the military establishment in 
general, and the Defence Secretary in particular, was disinclined to commit large 
numbers of US troops.
Rumsfeld made it clear that it was not in the interests of the US military 
to ‘go in with large conventional forces’.6 Instead, the US adopted a strat-
egy that involved a minimal investment of manpower for maximum reward. 
The removal of the Taliban and the capture of Osama bin Laden and other 
members of Al Qaeda’s leadership were the primary objectives. The military 
had no intention of committing to a protracted occupation of Afghanistan. The 
‘top priority is shaking Bin Laden’s tree’, Rumsfeld said, ‘we’re not invading; 
we’re not going to stay’. George Tenet, the CIA Director, conirmed that, ‘We 
are not invading . . . we are not occupying, Mullah Omar betrayed the Afghan 
people. He let in these outsiders. That’s the problem’. During the invasion 
and immediately thereafter, President Bush gave a relatively free hand to the 
Department of Defence (DoD) and its outspoken Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. 
When he declared the War on Terror, Bush had told Rumsfeld that ‘the ball 
will be in your court’.7 Rumsfeld accepted the cultural precepts of the military 
establishment, but he had a peculiar perception of how its interests were best 
served. After adopting the position of Defence Secretary he was determined to 
apply structural changes to the military apparatus. His agenda could essentially 
be reduced to a single word: ‘transformation’. Rumsfeld considered the US 
military an outdated creature of the Cold War, which was unnecessarily slow 
and troop heavy. To transcend these supposed problems he advocated a reli-
ance on precision weaponry and information technology, deined not by size, 
but instead by mobility and speed. He argued that military power was needed 
‘to help discipline the world’, and that a high-tech, mobile ighting force would 
make that possible.8
By organizing the invasion of Afghanistan, Rumsfeld was able to test the valid-
ity of his assumptions. In a signiicant role change from his predecessor, he con-
versed daily with Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Tommy 
Franks, in order to pilot the invasion in the direction he had chosen. Rumsfeld 
also took the Pentagon press podium each day, while General Richard Myers, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stayed in the background ‘saying little, looking on 
as though he had been reduced to serving as a minor spear-carrier’.9
6 Geoffrey Wawro, Quicksand, America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East (New York: The 
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In National Security Council meetings, meanwhile, the military establish-
ment had the power to dismiss the reservations of the civilian agencies. Pen-
tagon oficials advocated combat-minded solutions, but ignored Afghanistan’s 
political problems. The ability of the military establishment to overshadow 
diplomacy represented a paradigm shift from the 1990s. In a post-9/11 epoch, 
Ahmed Rashid observes, diplomacy became ‘the prerogative of the Department 
of Defence . . . rather than the domain of the State Department’.10 Owing to 
the unilateral and expeditionary nature of the invasion, the Pentagon tolerated 
the State Department’s overtures to the international community, but it did not 
allow it to circumscribe its invasion strategy. From the perspective of the military 
establishment, an international coalition was convenient but far from necessary, 
despite NATO invoking its mutual Defence clause for the irst time in history. 
Apparently, ‘the Pentagon had it well in hand’. Similarly, a United Nations role 
was only appropriate, according to a DoD Oficial, ‘as long as it does not inter-
fere with America’s right to use military force’. In his now memorable aphorism, 
Rumsfeld announced that, ‘The mission determines the coalition. The coalition 
must not determine the mission’.11
As a consequence of the military establishment’s invasion plans, the bombing 
campaign involved little assistance from the international community. It was car-
ried out effectively and eficiently, and produced an impressive display of ire-
power. All of the Pentagon’s strategic targets were destroyed and it was (falsely) 
claimed that every target hit was a military one.12 Providing succour for Afghanis 
took a backseat to the bombardment of the country’s already battered landscape.
When it was reported in the media that the bombing campaign had caused high 
numbers of civilian casualties and widespread population displacement, pres-
sure from the White House encouraged the military establishment to consider the 
humanitarian repercussions of the invasion. It responded with ostentatious food 
drops that were clearly carried out for domestic political purposes rather than a 
genuine interest in helping Afghanistan’s rural populace. From high altitude, the 
US Air Force sprinkled over one million aid packets across Afghanistan in what 
President Bush announced was ‘the fastest delivery of humanitarian aid in the his-
tory of warfare’. The food drops were considered by experts to be expensive and 
unproductive. Astoundingly, aid packages were the same colour (yellow) as clus-
ter bombs dropped by American B-52s, a mistake that could have been prevented 
had military procedure been modiied to suit the task. The Pentagon, however, did 
not adapt its procedural norms in response to the debacle with the aid packages. 
The inluence of military culture meant that it rejected changing the colour of aid 
10 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, xlii.
11 Phyllis Bennis, US Foreign Policy and the War on Terrorism, 82; Colum Lynch, “Annan Urges 
Cautious Response”, Washington Post, September 25, 2001; Julian Borger, “Powell Loses Power 
over Pentagon”, The Guardian, December 11, 2001.
12 Bennis, US Foreign Policy and the War on Terrorism; BBC, “Aid Drops Target Civilians”, BBC, 
October 7, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1585554.stm (accessed 26/06/2011).
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packages as an option, but it also refused to suspend the use of the yellow cluster 
bombs, as the success of the military campaign took precedence.13
Meanwhile, at the ground level, in the absence of a signiicant US presence, 
two infamous Afghan warlords, Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Muhammad Nur, 
occupied the city of Mazar-e-Sharif on 9 November. On 7 December, the Taliban 
lost their inal stronghold in Kandahar Province. The removal of the Taliban had 
required only a few hundred CIA oficers and members of the US Special Forces. 
But victory came at a price, as it bolstered the position of violent and avaricious 
Afghani igures who would later enter government and contribute to continued 
political instability.
During the invasion, from the planning stages to the occupation of Kabul, US 
policy toward Afghanistan did not evolve beyond a military operation set ‘against 
a backdrop of Pentagon theorising and politics’. Short-term military operations, 
therefore, were conducted unilaterally and any broader involvement from the inter-
national coalition, the United Nations or the US civilian agencies was rejected by 
the Pentagon as unnecessary. Operation Enduring Freedom seemingly vindicated 
warfare based around Rumsfeld’s ‘lighter, smarter, more agile US forces that could 
do more with less’. The US military had succeeded in its initial goals, but without 
any deeper consideration of Afghanistan’s political future. For the Pentagon, what 
happened next in Afghanistan was less important. On 16 December Rumsfeld – 
who much like Afghanistan’s warlords had solidiied his position as a result of the 
invasion – claimed that Afghanistan was a done deal. But there were now other 
targets that beckoned: ‘Your job is certainly not over’, Rumsfeld told US soldiers, 
‘there are a number of countries that are known as being on the terrorist list’. 
George Tenet added that, ‘Afghanistan was merely the opening act’.14
Even after the White House expressed a desire to pursue nation-building in 
Afghanistan, the military establishment’s ability to adapt and embrace was cir-
cumscribed by its behavioural norms. Antipathy toward nation-building remained 
deeply embedded in the military’s culture. This had been on display in Vietnam, 
Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo and continued to resonate in Afghanistan. Misgiv-
ings about the humanitarian and political nature of the activity were compounded 
by the fact that the military perceived Afghanistan to be just one of a number of 
battlefronts in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). As a result, its preference was 
‘to prepare for major combat’, a Senior State Department Oficial argues, ‘and not 
to disperse their efforts in stability operations, which were regarded as of second-
ary importance and something that detracted from their primary mission’.15 For 
the military establishment, nation-building came second to the destruction of the 
enemies of the United States.
13 George Bush, Decision Points (New York: Random House, 2010), 198; Bennis, US Foreign Policy 
and the War on Terrorism, 149.
14 Wawro, Quicksand: America’s Pursuit of Power in the Middle East, 496–499; Mann, Rise of the 
Vulcans, 309; Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA, 176.
15 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 15, 2012.
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The reluctance of the US military to support nation-building did nothing to 
curb its capacity to manipulate US policy toward Afghanistan. For example, it 
was able to steer inter-agency committees to focus ‘exclusively on ensuring that 
the US military buildup in the region proceeded smoothly’.16 The US military 
framed budget battles in Congress almost exclusively around weapons procure-
ment for the destruction of Al Qaeda strongholds in the Tora Bora Mountains and 
elsewhere.
Only once a violent Taliban-led insurgency emerged in 2004, did the military 
recognize that Afghanistan required a deeper commitment that went beyond sim-
ple combat operations. The signiicance of nation-building was then repeated reg-
ularly by the Pentagon until plans for a US withdrawal were announced in 2011. 
The rhetoric of the military leadership suggested that it had gained an appreciation 
of the complexities of nation-building and the need for a whole-of-government 
strategy. William B. Caldwell, a senior US military commander, made it clear that
The margin of victory will be measured in far different terms from the wars 
of our past. The allegiance, trust and conidence of the population will be the 
inal arbiters of success.17
According to Robert Gates, who replaced Rumsfeld as Defence Secretary 
in 2006, an interest in ‘reviving public services, re-building infrastructure and 
promoting good government [had] moved into the mainstream of military think-
ing, planning and strategy’.18 Military documents relected this shift in attitude. 
The 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review proposed that oficers of all ranks make 
efforts to collaborate with other US agencies, and encouraged them to assist civil-
ian agencies in areas such as security, governance and reconstruction. Similarly, 
the Army Field Manual (FM 3–07) indicated that the US Armed Forces were man-
dated to provide ‘requisite security and control to stabilize an operational area’, 
which would build ‘a foundation for transitioning to civilian control’.19
Despite this apparent renewed interest in nation-building, warfare remained the 
military establishment’s chief concern. Beneath the rhetoric of inter-agency coop-
eration, the nomenclature and strategy of the military married nation- building 
to combat operations, and thus implanted it within the framework of counter-
insurgency. The Counter-Insurgency Doctrine (COIN), which was spearheaded 
by a cadre of oficers led by David Petraeus, centred upon winning the ‘hearts 
and minds’ of the Afghan populace – in essence, the pursuit of ‘social work with 
guns’.20
16 James Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Potomac 
Books, 2008).
17 Bacevich, Washington Rules, 201.
18 Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism.
19 Wade Markel et al., Developing US Army Oficers’ Capabilities for Joint Interagency Intergovern-
mental and Multinational Environments (Washington DC: RAND, 2011), 36.
20 Bacevich, Washington Rules, 200–201.
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Previously a central component of US strategy in Vietnam, the concept of 
 counter-insurgency was reinvigorated by the US military during the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. COIN was codiied in 2006 in Field Manual 3–24. In 
Afghanistan, the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) evoked 
counter-insurgency in a response to the increasing violent and powerful Taliban-
led insurgency. Although counter-insurgency efforts could be argued to have 
begun earlier, from 2006 onwards the ISAF made it clear that its main priority 
was to engage in counter-insurgency. Broadly stated, COIN doctrine stressed the 
need to protect Afghan civilians, eradicate insurgent leaders, and establish a legiti-
mate and accountable Afghan government capable of delivering essential human 
services. The effectiveness of this doctrine was apparently conirmed through the 
2007 troop surge in Iraq and subsequently identiied by many US oficials as a 
panacea for nation-building problems in Afghanistan.21
COIN also promoted the infallibility of military leadership to assuage conlict 
and violence. Many considered it to have failed in Afghanistan because it ignored 
the country’s complex internal dynamics. It has been derided as armed nation-
building, which misguidedly posed military solutions to complex problems and 
failed to ensure development that would beneit ordinary Afghans, but at the same 
time expected them to embrace the foreign occupation. US agencies and oficials 
disagreed on counter-insurgency priorities, how it could be achieved and how 
it correlated with nation-building. A rift emerged between military intellectuals 
during strategy sessions in Washington. While some embraced the strategy, other 
military oficials believed it detracted from the military’s core policy objective 
in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Along with US civilian agencies, 
elements of the military challenged the conception that the US military should 
spearhead nation-building through counter-insurgency.22
Although DoD reports recognized how important cooperation and commitment 
were for US nation-building in Afghanistan, they declined to mention how this 
could be achieved through COIN.23 Instead, year after year, the reports focused on 
the best way to overcome the Taliban-led insurgency. Bacevich considers COIN 
to be nothing more than a chimera that allowed, ‘senior and civilian military ofi-
cials to sustain the pretense of having reasserted a measure of control over a situ-
ation in which they exercised next to none’. He continues, ‘Where it pretended to 
21 Karl Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counter-Insurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan”, Foreign Affairs, 
September/October (2013). http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139645/karl-w-eikenberry/
the-limits-of-counterinsurgency-doctrine-in-afghanistan (accessed 1/09/2014)
22 Girardet, Killing the Cranes, 382; Colonel Gian Gentile, America’s Deadly Embrace of Coun-
ter-Insurgency (New York: The New York Press: 2013); Eikenberry, ‘The Limits of Counter- 
Insurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan”; Colonel Gian Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens 
US Army’s Conventional Capabilities”, World Politics Review, March 4, 2008, http://www.world 
politicsreview.com/articles/1715/misreading-the-surge-threatens-u-s-armys-conventional- 
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23 Department of Defence, “Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report on Progress”, 
Department of Defence, June 2009, Section 2.1, 20.
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speak most authoritatively, it managed to say next to nothing. There was lots of 
foam, but not much beer’.24
Notwithstanding the fact that the military’s interest in nation-building was nar-
rowly centred on its use as a tool to combat the insurgency, it cast a long shadow 
over the small US Embassy, skeletal USAID contingent, and other US civilian 
agencies that operated in Afghanistan. It had the money, resources and manpower 
to dominate nation-building activities. US soldiers functioned as veritable ambas-
sadors to district and tribal leaders. Moreover, as conditions in Afghanistan con-
tinued to deteriorate, the military supplanted other government agencies in areas 
such as development and humanitarian assistance. Congress provided an abun-
dance of funding for counter-insurgency, which enabled soldiers to undertake 
development initiatives such as schools and agricultural projects.
Rather than attempting to facilitate governmental cooperation, therefore, the 
military establishment replaced other US agencies. The Pentagon’s Directive 
3000.05 exempliied COIN’s pervasiveness by creating a Deputy Secretary of 
Defence for Stability Operations, and a Defence Reconstruction Support Ofice 
to oversee its nation-building programme, separate from the rest of the US gov-
ernment.25 According to Directive 3005, which was implemented in Novem-
ber 2005, the military was mandated to ill gaps in capacity on the civilian side. 
The Directive indicated that the Pentagon had a requirement to provide skills for 
nation-building that were not present in civilian agencies.
The military establishment, like any other large organization, contains numer-
ous parts and internal fault lines. Ideas on how best to pursue counter-insurgency 
and identify its relationship with nation-building varied, and areas of jurisdic-
tion were sometimes unclear. Senior oficials at the Pentagon exerted nominal 
control over the armed forces, but that relationship was much more complicated 
in practice. A gulf of understanding between US soldiers in the ield and their 
commanders emerged as each group experienced the conlict in Afghanistan 
very differently. Ongoing intelligence and combat operations were juxtaposed 
with nation-building, which left soldiers with a ‘Catch 22’, where their role as 
a ighting force in an enemy combat zone competed with the auxiliary task of 
rebuilding a country and revitalizing its populace. By contrast, DoD oficials and 
military commanders in Washington were primarily guided by more traditional 
cultural precepts and interests.26 Alternatively, the perspective of factions such 
as the National Guard and Corps of Engineers was that they were better suited 
24 Bacevich, Washington Rules, 186 and 197.
25 “Nation-Building Elevated”, The Washington Times, December 14, 2005. http://www.washing 
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than regular US forces to handle nation-building tasks, due to their self-professed 
expertise outside of the paradigm of war-ighting. Mark R. Warneke, a Colonel 
in the National Guard, described how the electricians, carpenters, plumbers and 
police oficers under his command had uniquely valuable skill sets that should not 
have been ignored by his colleagues at the Pentagon.27 The interaction of these 
competing factions combined with the military establishment’s combat-minded 
culture and narrow interests to compromise its ability to engage in effective 
nation-building in Afghanistan.
The State Department
In contrast to the military establishment, the primary purpose of the State Depart-
ment is to engage in diplomacy. Subtle, nuanced, consensus-building, the art of 
persuasion and negotiation, cultural sophistication and exemplary etiquette are 
used to interact with foreign governments in a way that no other branch of the US 
government can.28 The State Department’s interests, therefore, are fundamentally 
linked to diplomacy, and it discourages any other agency’s involvement in diplo-
matic relations with other countries. Its ingrained cultural traditions nurture the 
perception among its oficials that change is to be resisted, and most individuals 
within the department prefer to inherit policy legacies than create their own. With 
this in mind, Scott considers it naive to expect ‘bold and innovative policy from 
the Department of State’.29
The State Department’s conservative approach to foreign policy facilitates 
bureaucratic obfuscation. It is slow to promote its interests because of complex 
procedural clearances that also reward its oficials for ‘paper-pushing’. For this 
reason, Rubin contends that its culture is characterized by ‘a stubborn entrench-
ment of unimaginative careerism’.30 Other government agencies describe the 
State Department as overly cautious and unimaginative, which determines that it 
is ‘incapable of producing coherent recommendations or carrying out policy’.31 
Power within the State Department is spread among various competing factions. 
Large and dispersed, it includes regional bureaus, embassies, and a headquarters 
in Washington. Roughly half of its oficials operate within the nation’s capital, 
while the rest reside overseas. Factionalism creates iefdoms that are extremely 
protective of what they perceive to be their turf.
27 Larry Minear, The US Citizen-Soldier and the Global War on Terror: The National Guard Experi-
ence (Medford: Feinstein International Center, 2007).
28 Harry Kopp and Charles Gillespie, Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the Foreign Service 
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 2–3; Donald Warwick, A Theory of Public 
Bureaucracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 30–32.
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Notwithstanding the State Department’s internal conlict, it ights ferociously 
against outside forces that seek to inluence its agenda. A former Presidential 
staffer observes that State Department oficials view the White House as ‘a tran-
sient meddler in their business’.32 Executive appointees who were positioned 
within the State Department itself have levelled similar criticisms. For example, 
John Galbraith, the US Ambassador to India, from 1961 to 1963, complains that 
there was ‘a widespread feeling . . . that God ordained some individuals to make 
foreign policy without undue interference from Presidents and politicians’. He 
claims that because the State Department is so parochial and territorial, the only 
way in which he could successfully advise President Kennedy was to bypass it 
entirely.33 This narrow parochialism and resistance to the interference of outsiders 
was also expressed in Afghanistan.
Before the invasion of Afghanistan, the State Department relished the opportu-
nity to act as diplomatic mouthpiece for the United States. Global solidarity was 
widely considered a ‘silver lining to the cloud of September 11’, and provided 
an opportunity for animosity toward America’s hegemonic position to be replaced 
with international cooperation.34 Coalition-building was pursued by Colin Powell 
in September 2001, as the War on Terror took shape. The US Secretary of State was 
‘engaging with the world’ in order to form ‘a long-standing coalition’.35 Moreover, 
the State Department laboured assiduously to obtain the support of Afghanistan’s 
neighbours for the impending invasion. Of utmost importance was Pakistan, and 
US oficials were able to secure the backing of Pakistani President, Pervez Mush-
arraf. Meanwhile, through diplomatic overtures to Russia, the State Department 
carved a path for friendly relations with the Central Asian Republics and facilitated 
a US-alliance that included the major European powers. Bush said that it ‘had done 
an impressive job’ rallying the global community to the US cause.36 When it came 
to the question of Afghanistan’s future, however, the State Department was less 
organized. Embedded interests, idiosyncratic perceptions, cultural conservatism, 
and factional diversity converged to inluence its approach to nation-building.
The irst indication of the State Department’s plans for nation-building in 
Afghanistan was a series of meetings conducted in late September 2001by Rich-
ard Haas, the Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs. The meet-
ings advocated a political transition headed by the UN, and advised that the US 
commit to a strategy of ‘nation-building lite’.37 Haas’s cautious recommendations 
were not supported by the military establishment. For the military, diplomatic ties 
were only important in so far as they could facilitate the US invasion. Beyond that 
they had no purpose. Once military victory had been achieved in Afghanistan, 
32 Ibid.
33 Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, 156–158.
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the White House and the US military considered it to be the State Department’s 
responsibility to deal with the political fallout, and eschewed any deeper role in 
shaping Afghanistan’s future. In other words, in the absence of interest from the 
White House or the military, the State Department was left with the responsibility 
of nation-building. Some of its oficials embraced that obligation: ‘We are looking 
at a deining moment, if only we will grasp the opportunity to shape a post-Taliban 
Afghanistan’, one said. Another oficial argued that ‘a US-led alliance could help 
reconstruct a new government, which could inally bring peace after 23 years of 
war’. Powell had grand ambitions for Kabul. He saw it as an, ‘international city, 
symbol of a united Afghanistan’. But he was also careful to stress that Afghani-
stan would not be ‘a huge Marshall Plan kind of investment’.38
As Afghanistan’s tortured history suggests, the challenge of achieving stability 
was far more demanding than the rhetoric of the State Department suggested. In 
order to meet that challenge, Steven Hadley, the Deputy National Security Advi-
sor, headed a diplomatic effort to ind someone else to conduct nation-building. 
Once again, the State Department exhorted the international community to pro-
vide economic support in the form of large but ambiguous monetary commit-
ments, and convinced the United Nations to steer the political transition.
This resulted in the Bonn Conference in December 2001, which was held in 
order to navigate a complex blend of political, economic, developmental, humani-
tarian, security and legal issues. The two US representatives at the conference, 
Richard Haas and James Dobbins, were both career diplomats. A Senior State 
Department Oficial claimed that he was given a free hand to represent the United 
States, without the interference of other bureaucratic forces: ‘The State Depart-
ment wasn’t trying to inluence the conduct of the military campaign’, he asserts, 
and ‘the Pentagon wasn’t trying to inluence the diplomacy in a substantial way’. 
He continues, ‘At that point, I had encountered no interagency policy differences 
of any consequence, and Hadley and Rice were on Board for a UN-sponsored 
conference to form the next Afghan government’.39
The Bonn Agreement that emerged from the conference provided the foun-
dation for a multi-ethnic representative government. An Interim Authority was 
inaugurated on 22 December with Hamid Karzai as its chairman. Karzai was 
nominated by the State Department as the most suitable choice for head of the 
interim administration, and he was closely linked to its policies in Afghanistan 
thereafter. There were, however, two signiicant problems with the Bonn Agree-
ment. On the one hand, it was conducted in complete isolation from the US war-
effort, and thus failed to clarify how the military campaign would coordinate 
with the nation-building process. The only input the military establishment had 
during the talks was to insist that the Northern Alliance – many of whom were 
known warlords – were given positions within the new Afghan government. For 
38 Ahmed Rashid, “A Path Paved with Pitfalls”, Far East Economic Review, October 4, 2011; Draper, 
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the Pentagon, it seemed, the legitimacy of a given actor was premised on their 
support for the United States. It was ‘not whether you have guns, nor whether you 
use them against people, and certainly not that you use them for personal gain’, 
but rather how a given actor helped with the mission against Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban.40 Although the State Department did not agree with legitimizing these 
actors, it was powerless to prevent the military from adopting that posture, espe-
cially after it had just spearheaded a successful invasion.
On the other hand, the Bonn Agreement divided responsibility between the US 
and its allies. Although the United States formed the bulk of the military presence, 
most aspects of nation-building were outsourced to other countries. Because the 
State Department had focused on its traditional diplomatic role, it neglected the 
issues of security and development. Development may have been more of a prior-
ity had USAID and the United States Department of Agriculture been consulted, 
but their input was negligible. Instead, the conference determined that the US 
would focus exclusively on the construction of Afghanistan’s army, while respon-
sibility for the creation of a police force was given to the Germans and counter-
narcotics to the British. Judicial reform went to the Italians and disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration to the Japanese.41
In essence, it was an ad hoc allocation of responsibilities that bore no resem-
blance to each country’s area of expertise. Nor did it represent a comprehensive, 
organized front within the US government, despite claims to the contrary from 
State Department oficials. The delegation of authority and deadlines of the Bonn 
Agreement exempliied a preference for a short-term commitment. It included 
ambitious timetables that outlined progress indicators. This was acceptable to the 
State Department but antithetical to USAID’s development philosophy. Conse-
quently, and against what nation-building experts considered best practice, the US 
mission had no clear allocation of responsibility or established lines of authority 
between different US agencies. The only irm understanding was that the United 
States would commit to training the Afghan National Army (ANA), but even the 
way in which this would be approached was unclear. Nonetheless, from a diplo-
matic perspective the State Department considered Bonn to be a success.42
Some analysts believe that the State Department was the most appropriate organ 
to realize the nation-building aims of the Bonn Agreement.43 But in the years that 
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followed, a State Department oficial with experience in Kabul notes that ‘there 
was no real effort to try to deine or articulate a national strategy’ and ‘no pres-
sure to coordinate’.44 Instead, the State Department fragmented into a number of 
different factions, and an overlap in their respective responsibilities characterized 
its involvement. Powell’s military background meant that he was unfamiliar with 
the culture, hierarchy and interests of the State Department, which circumscribed 
his ability to organize it, or facilitate cooperation with other US agencies. Further-
more, deeply embedded cultural norms made it dificult for development experts 
or any other specialists to steer the State Department toward the unfamiliar shore 
of nation-building in Afghanistan. Therefore, little was done to redress the disor-
ganization and internecine conlict between factions within the department and 
with other civilian agencies. These conlicts only intensiied over time.
The State Department’s mission in Afghanistan was divided haphazardly 
between Bureaus, Planning Divisions, the Embassy in Kabul and factions in 
Washington. To begin with, Chistina Rocca, the Head of the Bureau of South 
Asian Affairs, formed one part of the apparatus, but ‘lacked the staff, the budget, 
and the authority to handle the myriad issues associated with Afghanistan’s lib-
eration and reconstruction’.45 Richard Haas led another faction. His role as the 
Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan placed him at the Head of the State 
Department’s Policy Planning division (DPP). The DPP had more varied exper-
tise, but still ‘lacked authority to instruct overseas missions or to conduct relations 
with foreign governments . . . having even less operational capacity than the South 
Asian Bureau’.46
The US Embassy in Afghanistan was another competing power centre. As 
head of each US Embassy, the Ambassador is considered by the Foreign Affairs 
Handbook to be prestigious and inluential – a fountainhead for the direction and 
coordination of US policy in the country to which he is deployed. However, one 
former diplomat argues that,
It would be manifestly impossible for a chief of mission to accomplish, as 
ambassador, anything in the way of business with the government to which 
he is accredited, if in addition he tried personally to supervise all the programs 
operated in the name of the American government within his bailiwick.47
This observation relected the situation in Afghanistan where each US Ambas-
sador had some authority, but neither inancial control nor executive license to 
oversee nation-building. In reality, the Ambassador held no sway over other US 
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agencies or even factions within the State Department, which tended to pursue 
their own parochial interests. Competing bureaucratic hierarchies in Kabul were 
completely removed from the US Ambassador’s chain of command, and many of 
them included private communication channels and separate headquarters.
To sum up, although the State Department was more familiar than the military 
with the diverse and complex considerations of nation-building in Afghanistan, its 
factionalism, preoccupation with diplomacy and animosity toward other agencies 
circumscribed its ability to play a leadership role.
USAID
When the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was 
established in 1961, President Kennedy believed that he had created a separate 
agency to prevent development assistance from being marginalized by the mili-
tary, or subjected to the bureaucratic machinations of the State Department.48 
As its name suggests, USAID is the international development wing of the US 
foreign policy bureaucracy. Technically it falls under the purview of the State 
Department, but it is, for all intents and purposes, practically autonomous.
While USAID considers national security and democracy as important as the 
rest of the government does, it maintains a unique developmental creed. This creed 
emphasizes the importance of local autonomy, community empowerment, and 
economic and political progress through long-term development projects, which 
involves building institutions that are self-sustaining and creating a productive 
relationship with local partners.49 To suit its interest in long-term development 
assistance, USAID has a nebulous and lexible hierarchy. Each and every one of 
its oficials is an emblem for the interests of the whole agency, and he or she is 
given a higher degree of responsibility and power than the average US soldier 
or State Department oficial. According to Andrew Natsios, the USAID director 
from 2001 to 2006, it is ‘not an overstatement to say that USAID staff of each 
mission is the program, providing technical expertise to design projects, advis-
ing government ministries struggling with policy reform, and helping with civil 
society organizations to implement their projects’.50 The interests and culture of 
the USAID, therefore, combine with the autonomy its oficials possess to foster 
the perception that it is more suited to spearhead overseas development than other 
US agencies.
Nation-building in Afghanistan presented USAID with an opportunity to secure 
a more powerful and prestigious position within the foreign policy bureaucracy. 
After the initial military intervention, a signiicant aspect of nation-building in 
48 Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform, 195.
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Afghanistan involved development projects in various issue areas. As a result, 
USAID’s power increased in terms of both resources and responsibility. Its budget 
almost tripled from $10 billion in 2001 to $27.5 billion in 2005. But this must be 
viewed in a context of longer term decline. USAID declined from 4,300 oficers 
in 1975, for example, to just 1,300 in 2010. In the 1990s alone, the agency had 
lost approximately 35 per cent of its permanent staff base. When nation-building 
in Afghanistan began, it had only 16 full-ledged agricultural experts and 6 engi-
neers, woeful igures compared to the hundreds who were employed in the 1980s. 
Even as funding for nation-building activities increased, USAID’s staff numbers 
increased at a much slower rate. The number grew by only 100 from 2001 to 
2006, which led one commentator to dismiss it as no more than ‘a check writing 
agency’.51 Another outcome of the gulf between funding and manpower was that 
the majority of USAID’s projects in Afghanistan were outsourced to local or US 
civilian contractors. The later straddled the border between the private and public 
realm, creating yet another disparate faction within the foreign policy bureaucracy.
The other US agencies seemed to have little understanding of USAID’s lack of 
manpower. In the irst few years of nation-building, Rumsfeld constantly asked 
Natsios why his agency had not mobilized in Afghanistan. The USAID direc-
tor informed him that it had sent 120 people to the country, which equated to 
over 10 per cent of his entire staff. When hearing this, Rumsfeld was completely 
shocked that USAID only had a total of 1,100 oficers. Irrespective of its decline 
in numbers, USAID perceived the reconstruction of Afghanistan to be its ‘turf’. 
Natsios considered his oficers to be closest to and most aware of the require-
ments of nation-building. He describes them as ‘the real development experts’, 
whose ‘policy input serves as a check on Washington politics’. Similarly, USAID 
Deputy Administrator, Donald Steinberg, made it clear that USAID was ‘best 
suited to bringing together the different elements of development’. When ques-
tioned whether or not USAID oficials had the qualiications and talent to manage 
the funds they were given to pursue nation-building in Afghanistan, one Senior 
USAID Oficial conidently replied: ‘of course they do, they’ve been doing it 
since the Marshall plan. We have millions of documents on nation-building efforts 
for 50 years’.52
After 30 years of civil war, however, Afghanistan did not resemble the envi-
ronment that USAID had experience operating in elsewhere in the world. Yet 
it continued to advocate long-term development projects in Afghanistan, akin 
to the ones that it had conducted in Africa and elsewhere. This highlighted the 
inluence of agency culture on its policies. USAID was under the impression that 
it knew the correct path to successful nation-building in areas such as security, 
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infrastructure development, agriculture, governance and law and order. It was 
also interested in Afghanistan’s ‘absorptive capacity’, which was the ability of 
Afghanistan to effectively utilize the money funnelled in from outside sources. 
But at the same time, it was not mindful of the unique challenges Afghanistan 
presented.
Not all of USAID’s oficials was as conident in its ability as Steinberg. One 
USAID oficial, for example, believed that the agency simply did not have the 
power, in terms of capability, resources and expertise, to spearhead nation- 
building in Afghanistan
USAID did not have the capacity in 2003 to organize, manage and imple-
ment a comprehensive state-building project in Afghanistan, absolutely not. 
To create the grants, contracts and agreements necessary to implement it all – 
that capacity didn’t exist. There wasn’t the capacity to oversee the num-
ber and size of the contracts and grants that were going to be necessary in 
Afghanistan. There certainly wasn’t the regional or national expertise, at least 
on the ground team. In a country in which you had sustained engagement 
such as Kenya or Nepal, USAID had a long-standing presence in the country; 
they have connections throughout the community. In Afghanistan, there were 
virtually no institutional operations. There was no on the ground capacity. So 
they had to be built from scratch and without the ability to surge, USAID was 
a much weakened player.53
USAID’s perspective on how to pursue nation-building in Afghanistan also 
clashed with that of the rest of the foreign policy bureaucracy, which sought 
immediate results from nation-building projects, especially once the insurgency 
intensiied after 2004. When it was under pressure to meet the timetables of the 
State Department and the military establishment, USAID continued to pursue its 
projects in isolation.54 A USAID Oficial notes a disconnect between his agency 
and the remainder of the US government, observing that there was ‘no strategic 
plan’ and that he had ‘no idea’ what US policy was. Another senior agency staffer 
recalls that, ‘There was enormous disinterest and lack of support [within USAID] 
in working with military forces in Afghanistan’.55 Meanwhile, some oficials 
within the State Department considered USAID’s approach to be delusional and 
that the agency failed to recognize that it was operating in a hostile environment, 
which unlike its unilateral development projects in Africa, required inter-agency 
coordination.56
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The Counter-Bureaucracy
The inal component of the bureaucracy to be discussed is not an agency, but a 
loose assortment of organizations charged with regulatory and inancial over-
sight over other wings of government. William Gormley refers to this amalga-
mation of agencies and committees as the “counter-bureaucracy”. He describes 
the counter-bureaucracy as a ‘relatively durable government agency whose 
principle mission is to monitor, criticize, and improve the performance of other 
agencies’. It was erected by Congress ‘as a response to bureaucratic growth, 
bureaucratic ineficiency and bureaucratic misconduct’.57 In other words, the so-
called counter-bureaucracy is meant to be a counterweight and overseer of the 
rest of the US government bureaucracy. Gormley’s label is intentionally ironic, 
as instead of preventing bureaucratic obfuscation, the counter- bureaucracy adds 
to it.
The two lagship organizations within this framework are the Ofice of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) and the General Accounting Ofice (GAO). The OMB 
is a strand of the executive branch. Originally called the Bureau of Budget, it was 
expanded by President Nixon into its current form. Although it claims to ‘serve 
the President of the United States in implementing his vision’, the construction of 
the OMB was at the behest of Congress to make sure that certain agencies spend 
only what it appropriates.58 The GAO, which describes itself as the ‘congressional 
watchdog’, was created in 1921 to support Congress in promoting increased per-
formance and accountability through auditing.59 Since their inception, both the 
OMB and GAO have signiicantly increased in power, budget, scope and capacity. 
Additionally, the Oficers of the Inspectors General (OIG), the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Recon-
struction (SIGAR), all monitored nation-building in Afghanistan and have similar 
interests to the OMB and GAO.
On the one hand, the counter-bureaucracy is meant to help other US agencies 
perform as eficiently and effectively as possible. It places checks on proligate 
behaviour in order to promote good practice and prevent waste and duplication. Its 
principal role, in the opinion of many members of Congress, is to recognize and 
correct errors in other agencies’. On the other hand, US oficials have described 
the counter-bureaucracy as insular, narrow-minded, inlexible and both distrust-
ful and distrusted. The ‘counter-bureaucrats’ themselves are seen as paid public 
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scolds, who are ‘grumpy and tetchy’. Gormley criticizes the interests, culture and 
perceptions of the counter-bureaucracy and its oficials:
In their quest for scandals, counter bureaucracies sometimes overlook deeper 
systemic problems. In their obsession with outputs, counter bureaucracies 
often neglect outcomes. In their zeal for compliance, counter bureaucracies 
may divert attention from performance.60
In the irst few years of the Bush Administration, the counter-bureaucracy was 
hardly involved in Afghanistan, as the US nation-building budget was too small 
to provoke its interest. Once the insurgency precipitated a more comprehensive 
inancial commitment, however, Congress subjected the endeavour to increased 
scrutiny, which encouraged the Counter-Bureaucracy to ill its investigative role. 
But the interests that drive the counter-bureaucracy were not entirely suited to the 
examination of nation-building in Afghanistan. Like the military establishment 
and the State Department, the counter-bureaucracy did not view nation-building 
as a complex task. Tangible indications of progress from US projects in Afghani-
stan often failed to materialize, at least in the form that the counter-bureaucracy 
demanded. As a consequence, the counter-bureaucracy perceived US agencies 
that operated within Afghanistan to be wasting money, and it was severely critical 
of the way that they undertook nation-building projects.
The culture of the counter-bureaucracy determined that such criticism focused 
upon metrics and accountability, rather than the merit of the projects themselves. 
It applied ‘extraordinary layer-upon-layer of procedural requirements’ to nation-
building activities.61 The OMB, for example, required USAID, the State Depart-
ment and the military establishment to report monthly on their disbursement rates. 
The GAO constantly called for more accountability in respect of funds. Thus the 
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) was established to monitor agency 
spending. It required USAID, the Department of Defence and the State Depart-
ment to submit detailed reviews of their programmes. But the counter-bureaucracy 
itself did not have a completely free hand, as the mandates of its many com-
mittees and organizations were subject to periodic change by the congressmen 
or senators who directed their activities. The inluence of Congress toward the 
counter-bureaucracy varied between its various elements. The GAO and SIGAR 
had signiicantly more autonomy than the OMB and the Commission on Wartime 
Contracting. This in part relected a lack of clarity within the US government on 
what the objectives were in Afghanistan and how they could be achieved.
Considering the unique interests, perceptions, cultures and power of the bureau-
cratic factions involved in Afghanistan, it is in some ways unsurprising that the 
US was unable to establish overarching nation-building objectives. Usually one 
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agency takes the lead on a foreign policy issue, but nation-building did not lend 
itself so easily to unambiguous leadership: ‘What that means’, Bowden says, ‘is 
that there is no single point of accountability’.62
The experience of a number of senior oficials reveals how challenging it was 
to establish common goals. A Senior State Department Oficial contends that at 
the most senior levels the United States started with a lawed and unrealistic con-
cept, because there was no way to coordinate between agencies.63 Another USAID 
staffer, who attended various inter-agency meetings on the topic of nation- building 
in Afghanistan, remembers that it was almost impossible to get the full array of 
US agencies behind the same prioritized set of goals and synchronize their time-
tables.64 Members of the military establishment had similar experiences. A US 
General posted in Afghanistan argues that there was no method of developing 
a common understanding of the mission or producing concrete objectives that 
transcended agency interests.65 A Senior Defence Department Oficial compart-
mentalizes the intragovernment divisions:
I said at the time that we were ighting these wars with 2 1/2 agencies; the 
defence Department, there is a chunk of the State Department, a chunk of 
USAID and a chunk of everybody else, but our government as a whole was 
certainly not ighting the war. It was a very uneven distribution of responsi-
bility and participation.66
Similarly, a former US Ambassador to Afghanistan recalls that each agency had 
a ‘tendency politically to look at something not working as a failure rather than a 
learning point’. Each agency also possessed an ‘inadequate understanding of how 
much one needs to adapt as one learns’.67 In reference to just one budget submis-
sion, Ronald Neumann, US Ambassador to Afghanistan 2005–2007, says there 
was ‘a long list of important tasks we should be doing, but no agreed sense of 
priorities’.68 Another Senior State Department Oficial claims that the US bureau-
cracy became dysfunctional because ‘responsibility was too dispersed’ and ‘there 
was too much overlap among competing iefdoms’.69
An example of this overlap was Zakheim’s appointment as Coordinator for 
Afghanistan. In addition to his responsibilities as Defence Department Comptroller, 
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he was selected to oversee the US mission, a position that he was neither quali-
ied for nor suited to.70 Zakheim’s title and role duplicated the one already held 
by Richard Haas, whom the State Department had appointed as the Coordinator 
for the Future of Afghanistan. Zakheim’s appointment implied that the military 
either ignored or was ignorant of the State Department’s command hierarchy. For 
Dov Zakheim, Defence Department Comptroller 2001–2004, the two overlapping 
appointments were ‘a sorry testimony to the state of disarray that governed the 
administration’s approach to Afghanistan once the military mission seemed to be 
under control’. He postulated that he was appointed because the interests of the 
military establishment and the White House had ‘turned elsewhere’.71
In his biography Duty, Robert Gates observed the same problems that were 
described by the US oficials who were interviewed for this study. According to 
Gates, ‘muddled and overly ambitious objectives’ combined with unclear lines 
of authority within the military establishment and confusion among the civilian 
branches as to what nation-building required. Gates was frustrated by the complex 
and entrenched nature of bureaucratic conlict, which was only exacerbated by 
personal animosity between oficials and commanders and the mixed messages 
that he received about how nation-building in Afghanistan was progressing.72
Prominent individuals within the US bureaucracy, therefore, were largely in 
agreement that a framework for common goals was absent in Afghanistan. But each 
oficial’s perception relected his position within the foreign policy bureaucracy, 
and their explanation for the reasons behind such disarray varied signiicantly. 
Problems ran deeper than simply a failure to agree upon what nation-building 
in Afghanistan required. These problems can be usefully categorized as ‘a lack 
of leadership’, ‘the military/civilian divide’, ‘the marginalization of USAID’, 
 ‘counter-bureaucracy interference’, and ‘Washington vs. the ield’.
Inter-Agency Problems
During President Bush’s irst year in ofice, there were clear indications of a par-
ticular foreign policy persuasion. He withdrew the US from the Kyoto Proto-
col, planned a high-tech missile Defence system, adopted a more confrontational 
stance toward China, and reversed diplomatic overtures to North Korea. Those 
moves not only exhibited a disdain for international law and institutions, but also 
a pivot from multilateral engagement to unilateralism. One aspect of this was a 
derisive attitude to nation-building. From the beginning of his Presidential cam-
paign, Bush had said that he was against ‘open-ended deployments and unclear 
missions’. He would later add that, ‘I don’t think our troops ought to be used 
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for what’s called nation-building’.73 As if to add substance to his words, once 
he entered ofice PDD-56 – President Clinton’s framework for military/civilian 
coordination in post-conlict states – was discarded.
Bush’s hostile attitude to nation-building continued during and immediately 
after the invasion of Afghanistan. In a National Security Council (NSC) meeting 
in October 2001, he had asked ‘who will run the country?’ but was left without 
answers to his own question, at least initially. After the apparently spectacular 
success of the military intervention he reiterated his aversion to nation-building:
I oppose using the military for nation-building. Once the job is done, our 
forces are not peacekeepers. We ought to put in place a UN protection then 
leave . . . there’s been too much discussion of post-conlict Afghanistan.74
Bush’s hostility towards nation-building combined with ignorance about 
how nation-building goals could be accomplished if the post-conlict situation 
demanded it. When asked whether the President understood the nation-building 
literature, a Senior USAID Oficial responded: ‘absolutely not’. The White House, 
he continued, perceived nation-building to be ‘little NGO projects doing good’.75 
James Dobbins, Bush’s special envoy to Afghanistan, suggested that after the 
invasion, ‘the President and his closest advisers felt they were at the top of their 
game and that the hardest part in Afghanistan was over’.76
In 2003, the White House committed economic, military and political resources 
to the invasion of Iraq, which prompted further disengagement from Afghani-
stan. Bush’s preoccupation with Iraq drove a series of troop withdrawals from 
Afghanistan between 2004 and 2006. These were conducted against the advice 
of military oficials in the ield. David Barno, who was the Commander of the 
Combined Forces in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, argues that the President’s 
actions ‘altered the calculus of both our friends and adversaries across the region – 
and not in our favor’.77
Bush did not visit Afghanistan until 2005. The only time he mobilized the 
US government towards a common objective in the country was by declaring 
a commitment to holding elections. The White House then extolled the success 
of Presidential and Loya Jirga elections, but ignored the instability, corruption 
and violence that marked Afghanistan post-Taliban political order. As a violent 
insurgency grew, the President continued to portray Afghanistan as a country 
with an improving security situation and the potential to transform into a thriving 
democracy. When the situation worsened considerably in the later part of Bush’s 
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second term, the ambitious democratic programme was all but abandoned in deed 
if not rhetoric.
As senior US oficials have highlighted, Bush failed to exercise any mean-
ingful leadership over the foreign policy bureaucracy during this period, which 
could have potentially improved the situation in Afghanistan. A former US 
Ambassador, for example, argues that the ability of the Ofice of Management 
and Budget (OMB) to impede funding may have been overcome with pressure 
from the President. The National Security Council (NSC) could have and should 
have restricted OMB inluence, but Bush did not place the NSC in a position 
to ‘actually crack the whip’.78 A Senior State Department and USAID oficial 
believes that Bush had the opportunity to foster partnerships between agencies. 
He acknowledges the entrenched problem that divergent bureaucratic interests 
and culture presented, but argues that the President could have done a lot to 
mitigate them.79 Another State Department Oficial agrees that Bush had the abil-
ity to oversee the nation-building process and surmount bureaucratic hurdles in 
Afghanistan. He points to the previous CORDS programme in Vietnam, to which 
President Johnson attached a high priority. The Ofice of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created to promote coordination 
between agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. But S/CRS was given little authority 
by the White House.80
According to another Senior State Department Oficial, Bush’s attitude rep-
resented a serious dereliction of duty, for three reasons. First, the President was 
uninterested in exercising any discipline over outspoken members of the military 
establishment, such as Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, who eschewed any 
responsibility for nation-building. Second, he asserts that bureaucratic problems 
were not insurmountable: ‘If the effort had been perceived as a top priority by the 
President then people would have fallen in line’.81 But without signiicant pres-
sure from the White House, some issues that should have been solved fell prey 
to inter-agency conlict. The President was not interested in ‘getting into detail or 
adjudicating interagency disputes’, which ‘led a lot of issues to fester, that should 
not have been allowed to fester’.82 Third, he suggests that Bush failed to bestow 
authority on positions that were created to enhance collaboration. For example, 
James Dobbins chaired a multi-agency committee, but he had no power to inlu-
ence the US military:
I had serious doubts about the workability of this arrangement. Only the 
White House could adjudicate differences between the State Department and 
DoD, of which there were bound to be many. Assigning State the lead for an 
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activity where most of the assets were bound to come from DoD was in my 
view an abdication of White House responsibility.83
In contrast to Dobbins, President Bush had the power and authority to do signif-
icantly more in Afghanistan. But due to his style of leadership and lack of interest 
in nation-building he did little to mitigate intragovernmental conlict. Agencies, 
factions and strong-minded individual oficials illed the vacuum left by Presiden-
tial neglect.
Another issue was that almost from the outset there was open hostility between 
the military establishment and the civilian agencies. The resources and capacity 
of the US military meant that it had more power, both in Washington and in the 
ield, than any of the other civilian agencies. The Department of Defence (DoD) 
alone has over 3 million employees and a budget exceeding that of corporate 
giants such as Exxonmobil and Wal-Mart. In 2001, the US Armed Forces had 
more than 500,000 permanent soldiers, who could be swiftly deployed anywhere 
in the world. In comparison, the State Department, which is the largest and most 
inluential civilian agency, had only 6,500 oficers to draw upon for overseas 
engagement: ‘As the military folks like to say on occasion’, Barno writes, ‘the 
entire State Department’s worldwide deployable force . . . would it on one carrier 
battle group’.84 The US Armed Forces sent over 1.5 million troops to Afghanistan 
and Iraq in the irst ive years of the War on Terror. This determined that a com-
pany commander in Kandahar Province was often in charge of more people than 
the US Ambassador in Kabul.
During a 2008 congressional hearing on nation-building in Afghanistan, 
Ambassador Karl Inderfurth, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian 
Affairs, described the imbalance between the military and civilian realms as ‘the 
Popeye syndrome’, whereby the strong right arm, the military, is fuelled by spin-
ach and thus overshadows the anaemic left arm of the civilian agencies. In the 
same hearing, Barnett Rubin recognized a ‘severe imbalance on the civilian side 
of our international relations apparatus’.85
The military’s relationship with the civilian side of the US foreign policy 
bureaucracy evolved over time. Throughout the irst term of the Bush Admin-
istration, Rumsfeld did not feel it to be in the military’s interests to engage in 
nation-building in Afghanistan, and he actively discouraged cooperation with the 
civilian branches. This perspective translated into policy because of his control 
over the military realm. Rumsfeld made sure that there was no resistance to his 
authority within the oficer corps: ‘Confronted with contrary views, he moved 
quickly to crush them’, Bacevich writes. A Senior State Department Oficial said 
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that he ‘was the one running the show . . . there was no one in Rumsfeld’s ofice 
who made policy except Rumsfeld’.86 Rumsfeld’s determination not to become 
involved in nation-building went unchallenged. The Commander of the United 
States Armed Forces, Tommy Franks, argued that it was his duty to unequivocally 
support the Defence Secretary. When Franks was asked by President Bush for his 
opinion on one of Rumsfeld’s decisions he replied: ‘Sir, I think exactly what my 
secretary thinks, what he’s ever thought, what he will ever think or whatever he 
thought he might think’.87
Rumsfeld’s discouragement of a multilateral framework for Afghanistan 
provoked hostilities between the military establishment and the State Depart-
ment. The animosity between Rumsfeld and Colin Powell, the US Secretary of 
State, was emblematic of this hostility. This inhibited cooperation in the ield 
between military and civilian oficials, which at least some military men viewed 
as problematic. But they were reluctant to speak out as they feared it would 
draw an unfavourable response from their obstinate superior.88 The one nation-
building programme that Rumsfeld did support was the training of the Afghan 
National Army. Yet he did so only to free US troops for engagement in Iraq. 
In Afghanistan, meanwhile, he made it clear that he wanted as ‘few people in 
uniform doing non-military functions’ as possible.89 Rumsfeld’s perception of 
military interests greatly compounded bureaucratic problems. As one Senior US 
Oficial remarks, ‘the political leadership is designed to overcome that bureau-
cratic inertia, but instead of overcoming it, Rumsfeld’s attitudes just tended to 
reinforce it’.90
Rumsfeld departed in 2006 as the Taliban-led insurgency intensiied. As US 
casualties multiplied, intergovernmental cooperation toward nation-building was 
included as a part of the military establishment’s new counter-insurgency plat-
form. Robert Gates, Bush’s second Defence Secretary, claimed that the solution to 
Afghanistan’s problems lay in a comprehensive US commitment, and he adopted 
a conciliatory stance towards the new Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. But 
he later highlights Rice’s frustration with the way in which the military command 
criticized the civilian branches:
Condi was very protective of State Department turf and prerogatives and she 
bristled quickly at any hint that State wasn’t pulling its weight in the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. More than once I got an earful about some general or 
admiral who had complained publically about the lack of civilian support.91
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Notwithstanding Gates’s amiable disposition, a more violent conlict in Afghan-
istan was an opportunity for the military establishment to maintain a position of 
dominance within the realm of foreign policy and increase its already expansive 
budget. The budgetary imbalance between the military establishment and US 
civilian agencies was considered by Olson and Gregorian to be ‘the biggest obsta-
cle to a whole of government approach to failed states’, where power asymmetry 
blocked productive dialogue.92 According to Burke, moreover, the military’s atti-
tude precluded any form of civilian inluence or oversight.93
Although one US Oficial who was interviewed did not consider the military’s 
heightened interest in nation-building to be ‘nefarious or malign’, many of his col-
leagues interpreted it as ‘a conspiracy to take over the role of the State Department 
and USAID’.94 ‘There was a great deal of bitterness between people at Defence 
and people at State’, a Senior Defence Department Oficial, recalls.95 On trips to 
Washington, a US Military Commander found the ‘blame game’ between Defence 
and State at its most severe:
The war seemed to be between Defence and State and not the US and the 
Taliban. The bureaucratic turf battles back in Washington were tangible, they 
were extraordinary.96
Meanwhile, in the ield, Neumann as the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, expe-
rienced how little proiciency the State Department and the military establishment 
had in working together.97 A Senior US Oficial reveals a deep gulf of understand-
ing that was generated by agency culture:
The military criticizes the civilians for being too slow to move, too inclined to 
observe, and the civilians criticize the military for rushing forward with bad 
ideas. We teach quality military oficers to try and get what they need, to go for-
ward with what they’ve got usually in a fairly short term perspective. Civilians, 
whether AID or State are working in a world where a great many of the issues 
they handle are never going to be solved. So you spend a lot of your time trying 
to keep things from getting worse, trying to understand the political culture.98
In Afghanistan, by the time civilian oficials came to understand how they 
wanted to proceed, ‘the military establishment was ready to move forward and 
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they were bumping heads’.99 The civilian agencies were also under the impres-
sion that the Pentagon dismissed any nation-building initiatives that interfered 
with combat operations. For example, Dobbins claims that his efforts to put an 
end to indiscriminate bombing attacks by the US Air Force were ignored and met 
with hostility:
When I raised this issue and suggested that we look for some way to address 
the Afghans’ expectations, my Defence Department colleagues responded 
with the ultimate bureaucratic stonewall. They told me, ‘This is a legal, not a 
policy issue, and as such, we cannot even discuss it. Your lawyers will need 
to talk to our lawyers’.100
During a Congressional Committee Hearing, another Senior State Department 
Oficial said that the military’s focus on immediate success in hot spots such as 
Kandahar resulted in merely a temporary calm, which failed to address the need 
for an overarching political, economic and development strategy in Afghanistan.101
Although the civilian agencies were quick to blame the military for its narrow 
focus, the military establishment claimed that the civilian agencies failed to mod-
ify their own behaviour to promote cooperation. The US military considered the 
State Department’s handling of the nation-building process to be compromised by 
its internal disharmony, which consistently hampered nation-building initiatives 
and projects.102 Barno highlights the myriad of different authorities which were 
‘much more dificult to overcome’ than within the military sphere. He character-
izes the State Department’s approach to nation-building in Afghanistan as ‘akin 
to punching an adversary with ive outstretched ingers rather than one  powerful 
closed ist’.103 A Senior Defence Department Oficial, meanwhile, says that the 
military resented the fact that, in the absence of civilian capacity, it was the default 
option for ‘just about everything’,
Because the only guys that carried the guns were the military guys they were 
the guys upon whom everybody depended. There was uneasiness between the 
military folks who were bearing the overwhelming brunt of the Afghan mis-
sion, and everybody else who was clearly not doing the same.104
 99 Ibid.
100 Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan.
101 Strategy and Operations Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Assessment 
of Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Development in US, One Hundred Tenth Congress, 
Hearing held on February 13, 2007, 10.
102 Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory”, in Francis Fuku-
yama (ed.), Nation-Building, Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Maryland: John Hopkins University 
Press, 2006), 9.
103 David Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’ ”, 36.
104 Author Interview with a Senior Defence Department Oficial, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, 
July 15, 2013.
US Foreign Policy Bureaucracy 81
Zakheim’s comment encapsulates the lack of enthusiasm for a whole-of- 
government approach to nation-building within the corridors of a State Depart-
ment that was not interested in providing oficials to initiate cooperation with the 
military establishment. As a result, only 26 foreign policy advisory positions had 
been attached to the US military by 2009. Even this was essentially a token ges-
ture as most of those who had been sent were low level appointees: ‘State doesn’t 
exactly send it’s A Team’, one military commander admonished.105
According to one State Department staffer, the reason for the military/civilian 
divide in Afghanistan was that the current generation of bureaucrats and soldiers 
have no signiicant experience in operating in a military dominated framework. 
He claims that this explains why each US agency lacked the ability to co-exist 
and collaborate.106 Even the seemingly simple matter of providing security for 
US civilian oficials to operate outside Kabul was compromised by traditional 
cultural precepts and competing agency interests. Only with the military’s support 
could civilian oficials operate in rural Afghanistan. But lawyers had to establish 
who would be responsible if someone was killed and there was disagreement over 
who would pay for the security detail.107 The question of whether the military 
would embrace the arrangement was for a long time left unanswered, as US ofi-
cials struggled to igure out how it would provide transportation and assistance. 
Another point of contention was how and when civilian agencies would reimburse 
them for their services.108 Because of these bureaucratic issues, civilian oficials 
were usually conined to Kabul.
The military establishment, meanwhile, had unrestricted access to the rest of 
the country. Although it had the power to enable civilian oficials to operate in 
rural Afghanistan, it instead undertook tasks normally associated with the State 
Department (diplomacy), USAID, (development), the United State Department of 
Agriculture (agriculture), and the United States Department of Justice (counter-
narcotics). The military’s engagement with those nation-building issues was often 
arbitrary, undertaken without the consultation of civilian oficials, and usually 
displaying a combat-minded mentality. Even when there was a civilian presence 
in a province that the military operated in, the structure of the military command 
in Afghanistan determined that US soldiers were more likely to reject the unfa-
miliar and somewhat ambiguous strategies employed by the civilian agencies, 
in favour of the more regimented and straightforward objectives of their com-
manders. Likewise, military commanders were obliged to report through a strict 
military hierarchy that was disconnected from the US Embassy: ‘As the US and 
coalition military commander’, a US Military Commander explains, ‘I reported 
to the commander of US Central Command, General John P. Abzaid and through 
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him to the Secretary of Defence. Your system dictates your top diplomat and main 
military commander receive orders and report to different people’.109
The prominent place of USAID in Afghanistan engendered a different layer 
of conlict. The more powerful military establishment and State Department 
ordinarily tolerate USAID’s divergent behaviour. In the past, both agencies 
have been prepared to cede jurisdiction on development issues to USAID that 
were beyond the parameters of their interests. But this only occurs when more 
important foreign policy matters are removed from the equation, which was 
not the case in Afghanistan due to nation-building’s close association with the 
GWOT.
From the perspective of USAID, an inability to coordinate with the rest of 
the government stemmed from a lack of understanding outside the agency of 
how to implement projects and prioritize mission directives. For this reason, 
USAID struggled to accept the prerogatives of the State Department and the mili-
tary establishment. Natsios considered doing so to be against the interests of his 
agency. He protested that projects that were conducted by the State Department 
and the military were out of tune with the ‘developmental reality:’ ‘Military plan-
ners and to a lesser degree diplomats often take reconstruction as a literal concept: 
the physical rebuilding of infrastructure which, while a part of reconstruction, is 
not at the heart of it’.110
The military establishment interpreted USAID’s stance toward nation- building 
as impractical and ineffective. Even at the beginning of the nation-building 
process, there was ‘tremendous tension’ between USAID and the US military.111 
The Pentagon was frustrated by the fact that USAID had not mobilized quickly 
enough. Rumsfeld’s reluctance to become involved in Afghanistan did not stop 
him criticizing the agency:
He kept saying ‘Why don’t you focus on the priority for Afghanistan’. I said 
‘Whose priority? That’s your priority; I have the rest of the world to worry 
about’.112
USAID’s preference for long-term projects, its lack of man-power and its hos-
tile response to advice and criticism, fostered the impression among the military 
oficials that it was ‘totally useless and couldn’t do anything on time’.113 Many 
DoD oficials held a deep-seated resentment towards the agency. One Pentagon 
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oficial who saw the merit of USAID’s policies in Afghanistan was seen as betray-
ing the interests of the military establishment:
I have scars on my back for defending USAID at the Pentagon. There was 
a time when people thought I had been iniltrated by the enemy. There 
was even talk of getting rid of me!114
Alternatively, the relationship between the State Department and USAID was 
characterized by indecision, rivalry and competing priorities, which precluded the 
two agencies from establishing a united nation-building front.115 The ambiguous 
nature of nation-building in Afghanistan did not offer promising conditions for 
overcoming that problem. Instead, hostilities intensiied. When USAID argued with 
Afghani President Karzai over the suitability of certain development programs, for 
example, Karzai was supported by the State Department. The State Department 
considered itself to be the most suitable diplomatic conduit for US policy toward 
Afghanistan and resented the fact that USAID had spoken to Karzai without its 
permission. USAID, meanwhile, did not take kindly to the State Department’s 
encroachment, and as a result of the two agency’s incongruent priorities, ‘what we 
came out with was a mess that was lamentable’.116 This type of conlict occurred 
over and over in respect of a number of different nation-building initiatives.
Although the military establishment, State Department, and USAID were 
divided on everything else, they were united in their resentment of the counter-
bureaucracy’s interference. In fact, many US oficials in the ield perceived the 
counter-bureaucracy to be the single biggest constraint on their agency’s ability to 
implement nation-building projects in Afghanistan.
From atop the ramparts of USAID, Natsios railed against the involvement 
of Washington’s regulatory bodies. He describes the counter-bureaucracy as a 
‘behemoth of bureaucracies’ and admonishes it for ignoring the key principle of 
development theory: ‘that those development programs that are most precisely 
and easily measured are the least transformational, and those programs that are 
most transformational are the least measurable’.117 In sharp contrast to this maxim, 
he argues, an interest in recordkeeping and the documentation of project perfor-
mance led the counter-bureaucracy to encourage rapidly measureable, but unre-
alistic, quantitative performance indicators. Adopting the role of psychologist, 
Natsios diagnoses the counter-bureaucracy with ‘Obsessive Measurement Disor-
der’. ‘Nothing could be further from good development theory and practice’, he 
concludes.118
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Ken Schoield, the USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator, shared this opin-
ion. He argues that the counter-bureaucracy hampered innovation in Afghanistan:
Almost eight months of every iscal year are dominated by reporting and 
budget processes, leaving program and technical experts precious little 
time to design new programs and monitor the implementation of ongoing 
programs.119
The animosity USAID expressed toward the counter-bureaucracy was also 
common to other US agencies. Although some were more tolerant of SIGAR and 
the GAO than USAID, they saw the OMB as a threat to their agency’s interests. 
The State Department, for example, believed that the auditing procedures and 
budgetary evaluations of the OMB were dysfunctional when applied to nation-
building operations, while the US Embassy oficials found that the iscal road 
blocks the OMB erected were insurmountable.120 Even the more powerful mili-
tary establishment often had its ambitions quashed by the OMB. One DoD ofi-
cial states that he constantly ‘had to wrestle with OMB’, which made obtaining 
resources extremely dificult.121
Part of the problem was that the OMB reviewed operations in Afghanistan in 
the same manner that it did domestic programmes in the United States: ‘They 
were applying all of these bizarre standards to the program management system 
in Afghanistan’, a Senior USAID Oficial recalls, ‘it didn’t work; we had yell-
ing matches with people at OMB over this’.122 The OMB’s opposition to budget 
measures proposed by the US diplomatic core in Kabul was described by a State 
Department oficial as ‘specious arguments that went away a year later when we 
had a larger budget’. Platitudes or ‘gamesmanship’, he claims, were the only things 
that could ‘keep them off your back’.123 Military oficers also expressed frustration 
at the fact that the OMB placed legal requirements on spending ‘a certain amount 
of your money until you can certify things that are virtually unveriiable’.124 This 
implies that the GAO, SIGAR and OIG were a nuisance that could be ignored, 
while the OMB was a more powerful force with the ability to disrupt an agency’s 
plans.
Finally, there were problems between actors in the ield and those in Wash-
ington. The embassy and military command in Afghanistan were power centres 
that held a different perception of nation-building priorities than Washington. 
Harr observes that ‘operators in the ield are prone to see Washington as a great 
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bureaucratic sludge which is either unresponsive when something is wanted or 
bristling with bright ideas that no one needs’.125 True to his assertion, US ofi-
cials and soldiers in the ield considered factions within the US capital to be out 
of touch with the nation-building situation in Afghanistan. Due to their practical 
experience, they claimed to be more adept at understanding the complexities of 
nation-building, and were sceptical of the policies that emanated from the US cap-
ital. Both civilian and military oficials were frustrated by the fact that the higher 
up the chain of command their ideas travelled the more ethereal they became. 
Washington’s control over funding also resulted in unnecessary delays, and 
restricted the ability of actors in the ield to act decisively. This hamstrung senior 
US oficials who were attempting to direct and organize nation-building efforts. 
Gates, for example, claims that the gap between DC intelligence evaluations and 
‘the take of the guys in the ield’ left him feeling frustrated and confused.126
Dobbins considers his agenda to have been hampered by the Washington bureau-
cracy, which consisted of a luctuating combination of the Pentagon, various civil-
ian headquarters, Congress, the White House and the counter-bureaucracy:
I had organized what was regarded at the time as a model operation . . . 
[Washington] could not sustain the longer-term commitment that might have 
yielded more enduring results . . . Washington had no plans for such engage-
ments and, furthermore, it had not set aside any money to fund it.127
Similarly, a former US Ambassador could not comprehend why Washington 
consistently ignored suggestions from the US Embassy in Kabul. When ques-
tioned on the matter he was perplexed: ‘It’s not a question I have been able to 
answer completely to my own satisfaction’, he says; ‘why people [in Washing-
ton] couldn’t understand is something I still don’t know’. Neumann despaired 
of ‘Washington’s slowness to act on our predications of worsening security 
conditions’ and argues that ‘Washington’s perceptions were stuck in an increas-
ingly unrealistic appraisal of the situation’.128 Both he and Karl Eikenberry, the 
Commander of the Combined Forces, provided statements and reports to their 
colleagues in the US capital that stressed that they needed more resources and 
soldiers. Instead of granting that request, Washington did the opposite: it reduced 
US combat forces in the south from three to two battalions.129
Even oficials with close ties to the Bush Administration, such as Zalmay Khal-
ilzad, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, found it dificult 
to gain the necessary resources for effective nation-building. Similarly, inluen-
tial military oficials ‘had great dificulty getting additional resources, which was 
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very frustrating and vexing’. One describes obtaining funding from Washington 
as ‘rowing up the river against the tide, because the institutions and bureaucracies 
were trying to get other things done or trying to ight their turf battles’.130
Alternatively, the Washington bureaucracy was aggravated by the fact that the 
day-to-day implementation of nation-building activities in Afghanistan was a far 
cry from what it desired. Washington saw itself as a source of instruction and 
guidance and questioned the validity of decisions undertaken by those in the ield, 
who had a lesser place in each agency’s formal hierarchy. Military commanders 
and civilian authority igures in Afghanistan were dispersed around the country, 
and maintaining effective communication channels in Afghanistan proved to be 
extremely dificult. As a result, agency headquarters in Washington received con-
licting and confused proposals from the ield. From the perspective of US ofi-
cials in Washington, it would be against the interests of their agency to simply 
apply a rubber stamp to all of the suggestions that came from either Kabul, or the 
military headquarters at Bagram airbase. Moreover, as those operating in the ield 
were removed from the policy-making process in Washington, they were igno-
rant of the numerous meetings that discussed how policy should be carried out in 
Afghanistan. Consequently, many complex and nuanced prerogatives that were 
developed to facilitate inter-agency cohesion, and produce overarching nation-
building objectives, were unable to inluence the distant hierarchies in the ield.131
Conclusion
This chapter has provided evidence for both a lack of strong leadership on nation-
building in Afghanistan, and bureaucratic incoherence driven by different agency 
interests, perceptions, culture and power. President Bush failed to address the 
bureaucratic problems associated with nation-building in Afghanistan. Although 
he was not the cause of intragovernmental divisions his actions, or lack of actions, 
exacerbated the problem.
The relative unity displayed during the invasion came as a consequence of 
the military establishment’s dominance in its traditional area of expertise, war-
ighting. But that unity was not to last long. In the years after the Bonn Confer-
ence, there was a lack of agreement on the US’s objective in Afghanistan, and the 
bureaucratic fracture lines widened. Each agency viewed Afghanistan’s problems 
through the lenses of its own interests and entrenched culture, and hence pur-
sued nation-building strategies that were frequently at odds with other agencies. 
Furthermore, each agency was endowed with unequal resources and capacities, 
which shaped differential power relations between them. This expressed itself 
in a range of problems, including ones driven by the military/civilian divide, 
the marginalization of USAID, the counter-bureaucracy’s interference and the 
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different views from Washington and those in the ield. All of these intragovern-
mental problems combined to affect the way that the US foreign policy bureau-
cracy interpreted nation-building issues and approached nation-building ventures 
in Afghanistan, which was comparable to the blind man examining the elephant. 
Consequently, the ‘whole-of-government’ strategy so widely touted as being the 
solution to nation-building in Afghanistan eluded policy makers. This was clearly 
manifested around the issue of security, to which we now turn.
Afghanistan’s tumultuous history has been characterized by conlict across a land-
scape dominated by tribal and ethnic rivalry. With this in mind, Lakhdar Brahimi, 
the United Nations Special Representative to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2004, 
stated that ‘without genuine and lasting security in Afghanistan nothing will be 
possible, let alone the establishment of a new government’.1 William Maley, a 
seasoned observer of Afghani politics argues that restoration of a stable Afghan 
State depends ‘heavily on a capacity to deliver security for the Afghan people’.2 
In the aftermath of the 2001 invasion, therefore, an effective strategy for secur-
ing and then maintaining security was the irst premise of all US nation-building 
efforts. The US foreign policy bureaucracy, however, was ill-prepared for the 
complex challenges that this entailed.
This chapter discusses how intragovernmental divisions impacted on US 
efforts to establish a secure environment for nation-building in Afghanistan. First, 
it examines US attitudes towards and relationships with the International Secu-
rity and Assistance Force (ISAF). Second, it evaluates the US military’s training 
programme for the Afghan National Army (ANA). Third, it reveals the disorderly 
approach that the State Department and the military establishment took toward 
the enterprise of training the Afghan National Police (ANP). Finally, the chapter 
examines the CIA’s role in supporting Afghanistan’s warlords and the impact that 
this had on security and the US nation-building programme.
The International Security Assistance Force
Numerous studies have found that a substantial commitment to achieving country-
wide security is required within the irst 6–12 months after external intervention, 
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if nation-building is to be effective.3 With this in mind, the formation of the Inter-
national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was announced in December 2001, at 
the conclusion of the Bonn Conference, as an umbrella organization to incorpo-
rate military personnel from multiple countries.
Inside Kabul the ISAF performed admirably and it has been commended as 
an effective security force.4 But the stability of Afghanistan’s capital was distin-
guishable from the violence that inundated the remainder of the country. In 2002, 
President Karzai revealed that ‘Afghans from the country’s most remote corners 
had come to him asking for peacekeepers’.5 Most of the non-US NATO countries 
were determined to give the ISAF a nationwide mandate so that it could provide 
a comprehensive security blanket for Afghanistan. This never came about, largely 
because of resistance from the US military and the White House. Although Gen-
eral John McColl, the irst ISAF commander, exhorted the US to allow his forces 
to have a country-wide mandate, his and other appeals were rejected by the Bush 
Administration.6 Initially, the ISAF was only authorized to conduct small-scale 
operations outside of Kabul in areas that were controlled by the Northern Alli-
ance, such as the north-east province of Kundunz. In its irst four years, the ISAF 
gained no broader mandate than this. As a consequence, it was widely considered 
to be an ineffective force, its deliberate neutering derided as ‘a blunder of hor-
rendous proportions’.7
The blame for the ISAF’s ineffectiveness has often, and with good reason, 
been levelled at the United States. The European Union Special Representative 
to Afghanistan, Francesco Vendrel, argued that the US decision to restrict the 
expansion and jurisdiction of the ISAF ‘limited its effectiveness’.8 Maley is more 
emphatic. He said of its corralling that ‘there could have been no move more cal-
culated to undermine the positive momentum of Afghanistan’s transition’.9 Addi-
tionally, because the ISAF was not suficiently supported by the US military there 
were severe equipment shortages. In December 2003, for example, the ISAF air 
presence consisted of only a few transport helicopters. Troop numbers increased 
at a snail’s pace, with just over 6,000 operating by April 2004, which amounted to 
one ISAF soldier for every 5,000 Afghans. Due to the inconsequentiality of ISAF, 
the balance of power shifted to tribal leaders, warlords and the Taliban: ‘If you’re 
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going to call these troops security forces . . . then put “security” in quotes and tell 
us what speciically you mean by it’, one senior UN oficial bitterly quipped.10
Despite generalized US antipathy, or at least indifference, to the ISAF, the US 
bureaucracy was not united in its approach. The military establishment and State 
Department had contrasting perceptions of the ISAF’s value and signiicance. 
Although there were occasionally supportive statements from senior military 
oficials, the US military establishment largely viewed the ISAF as a distraction 
from its war-ighting role in Afghanistan. The DoD was especially uninterested 
in committing US troops to what it considered to be a vague security mandate 
in Afghanistan. For the Pentagon, a US troop presence under the auspices of the 
ISAF smacked of UN-style peacekeeping. US military culture typically dismisses 
such activities as fanciful and beyond the scope of the soldier’s vocation, thus 
encouraging military commanders and DoD oficials to avoid them. Indeed, the 
name ‘ISAF’ was an outcome of the military establishment’s opposition to any-
thing that even remotely resembled a peacekeeping force. In addition to this cul-
tural aversion to ‘peacekeeping’, and a lack of interest in issues that sat outside 
the GWOT, was Donald Rumsfeld’s perception that Afghanistan had, by 2003, 
switched to a ‘stabilization operation mode’. Rumsfeld assumed ‘the bulk of the 
country today is permissive, it’s secure’, and this interpretation subsequently per-
vaded the Pentagon and the White House.11
Alternatively, the State Department’s interest in diplomacy predisposed it to take 
the opinions of NATO countries more seriously, and to view the ISAF as an essen-
tial component of the nation-building mission in Afghanistan. There was no cul-
tural aversion to a US commitment to an international force that was based around 
peacekeeping ideals. In a number of inter-agency meetings throughout 2002, there-
fore, the State Department proposed that the US commit soldiers to the ISAF.12 
The military establishment opposed this position. This resulted in the two factions 
attempting to steer the US government towards an acceptance of their own posi-
tion. The battle lines were drawn between senior State Department oficials – who 
were of the opinion that the ISAF could stabilize key urban areas in Afghanistan – 
and military oficials, ‘who vehemently opposed any pretense of nation-building’.13
The Departmental Secretaries engaged in a protracted debate. Colin Powell 
expressed his wish for the US to take ‘charge of the whole country by military 
force, police or other means’, while Donald Rumsfeld trenchantly opposed the 
commitment to the ISAF.14 Rumsfeld ostensibly premised his opposition to the 
ISAF on the historical animosity Afghans held toward foreigners. More 
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realistically, he was determined to block Powell’s proposal because of the impact 
it would have had on the military’s unilateral mobilization for the invasion of Iraq, 
an endeavour that further strengthened the Defence Secretary’s apathetic attitude 
toward NATO. Not content with abandoning the ISAF, the military also cam-
paigned to restrict its operational capacity. Despite the urgings of Powell, Richard 
Haas and the US Special Envoy to Afghanistan, James Dobbins, the Pentagon 
refused to condone the expansion of the ISAF.15 Meanwhile, Senator Joe Biden, 
amongst other members of Congress, questioned the resistance from the military 
wing of US government to ‘any expansion of ISAF when everyone has called for 
an expansion’.16 His question largely fell on deaf ears within the DoD.
We can see, then, that US policy toward the ISAF was riven with tensions 
and contradiction. But most critics had no inluence within the corridors of the 
Pentagon, whose interests were given precedence by the White House. Helped 
by Rumsfeld’s close relationship with powerful igures such as Dick Cheney, the 
military gained the support of President Bush. This ensured that the US would not 
commit a single soldier to the ISAF until it was rebranded in 2006 to incorporate 
US troops.
US Efforts to Train the Afghan National Army
In place of the ISAF, developing the Afghan National Army (ANA) was the cen-
trepiece of the US commitment to Afghanistan’s security. From 2002 to 2010, the 
US spent approximately $29 billion, developing Afghanistan’s security forces.17 
The White House claimed that this was the most feasible path to stability: ‘Better 
yet than peacekeepers . . . let’s have Afghanistan have her own military’, Presi-
dent Bush said.18 He asserted that ‘peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan 
train and develop its own national army’.19 Like the US President, the military 
establishment argued that the ANA was a silver bullet for Afghanistan’s security 
problems. General Tommy Franks claimed that it would ‘permit a free country to 
evolve and prosper’.20 Some elements of the US military were comfortable with 
US assistance to establish the ANA, which fell within their traditional area of 
expertise. For example, the support of foreign militaries is a role that the United 
15 Michael Gordon, “Policy Divisions: CIA sees Threat, Afghan Factions May Bring Chaos”, New 
York Times, February 21, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/21/world/nation-challenged-
policy-divisions-cia-sees-threat-afghan-factions-may-bring.html (20/9/2012).
16 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 134.
17 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Janu-
ary 30, 2011, 32.
18 Todd Purdum, “Bush Offers Afghanistan US Help for Training of Military and Police”, New York 
Times, January 29, 2002.
19 James Dao, “Bush Sets Role for US in Afghan Rebuilding”, New York Times, April 18, 2002.
20 Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 549.
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States Marine Corps has performed in the past, most proliically in Central and 
South America.21
In the irst few years of nation-building, all other issues were secondary to 
the training and equipping of Afghanistan’s army. But its development did not 
progress smoothly. The US oficially began to cultivate the ANA in April 2002. 
Due to bureaucratic delays, however, its plans would not begin to be implemented 
until June 2002, over 6 months after the fall of the Taliban. From the outset, deser-
tion rates were a signiicant problem, and had reached 10 per cent by mid-2003. 
Criminality was common in most ANA units, and because its recruits were mainly 
former guerrilla ighters, they had no formal military experience.22 Moreover, 
diverse ethnic and tribal loyalties made the creation of a cohesive national ighting 
force all that more dificult.
Yet the ANA’s initial problems cannot be blamed solely on the calibre of its 
recruits. Despite accepting responsibility to train the ANA, the US military was 
still more interested in and committed to combat operations in Afghanistan. This 
meant that the ANA lacked resources. There was not enough equipment for it to 
function properly – in terms of weapons, vehicles and communications infrastruc-
ture. ANA recruits were also paid an extremely low wage, which was insuficient 
to adequately support a family. Approximately $290 million a year was pledged 
by the State Department for the ANA programme at the Bonn Conference, but this 
was far short of what was required. Astonishingly, reluctance from the Pentagon 
and other bureaucratic forces to commit US resources in Afghanistan reduced this 
number to $70 million in 2002 and $151 million in 2003. This occurred regardless 
of lobbying from State Department Oficials, one of which described the level of 
funding for the ANA from 2001 to 2004 as ‘grossly inadequate’.23
General Craig Western, the US commander in charge of the ANA programme, 
supported Taylor’s assessment. Western constantly informed his superiors that he 
required more resources to properly train and equip Afghanistan’s army, but his 
requests fell on deaf ears.24 Some US trainers claimed that a lack of funds was 
due to a lack of interest from policy makers in Washington, who at that time were 
preoccupied with events in Iraq.25 The Pentagon was unmoved by these assess-
ments. As a consequence, in stark comparison to the multitudes of Afghan militia 
forces roaming the country, in 2004 the ANA consisted of only 9,000 soldiers, a 
21 William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
22 Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan, 72; Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to 
the Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 338.
23 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 21, 2012.
24 Anthony Cordesman,. The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warighting, Intelligence, Force 
Transformation, and Nation Building (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International 
studies, 2005), 140.
25 Benjamin Tupper, Greetings from Afghanistan: Send More Ammo (New York: Penguin, 2011), 
17–88.
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number ‘grossly inadequate to provide the Afghan government with a meaningful 
security capability’.26
In 2005, the Taliban-led insurgency intensiied and began to violently contest 
the US occupation. In this context, the Pentagon’s interest in the ANA trans-
formed from rhetoric to substance. Increased media exposure of Afghanistan’s 
tribulations led Congress to pressure the military establishment to organize a more 
effective training programme for the ANA. The dire situation in Afghanistan also 
corresponded with a more stable political climate in Iraq, which gradually altered 
the Pentagon’s perception as to which country was the primary battleield in the 
War on Terror. Month after month the conlict in Afghanistan continued to inten-
sify, and US military commanders in the ield requested a drastic increase in US 
attention toward the ANA. Karl Eikenberry, the Commander of the Combined 
Forces from 2006 to 2007, and Major General Robert Durbin, the Security Tran-
sition Commander, asked Washington for more funds and equipment so that the 
ANA forces could ight alongside US soldiers against the Taliban-led insurgency. 
These factors combined to increase funding for the ANA to $788 million in 2005 
and $830 million in 2006.27 By some estimates, between 2006 and 2008 the US 
military was able to secure $5.9 billion to enhance Afghanistan’s security forces.
With this increase in funding, and with a more comprehensive commitment 
from the US military, the ANA ‘displayed a high degree of discipline, profession-
alism and combat effectiveness’.28 US trainers received clear orders from their 
superiors in Washington and this helped the military establishment to function 
as a cohesive unit.29 The Ethnic Integration Program helped ANA recruits to put 
country ahead of tribe or ethnicity, and close monitoring and mentoring by US 
forces served as a check against abuses within the force.30 US trainers were ‘com-
mitted and capable’, and one of them described the ANA as ‘irmly committed to 
ighting and destroying al-Qaeda and the Taliban’.31 A US Army colonel said that 
the ANA were ‘fearless on the soldiering side’ and quick to learn.32 As a result of 
US efforts, by the end of 2006 the ANA was operating in all regions of Afghani-
stan, and its soldiers took their place alongside coalition forces in areas where the 
Taliban were strongest, such as Kandahar Province.
26 Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society, 
Are we Losing the Peace? (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 11.
27 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 171; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 203.
28 Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan, 253.
29 Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Elections, Constitution and Government”, in Carey Gladstone, 
Afghanistan Issues: Security, Narcotics and Political Currents (New York: Nova Science Publish-
ers, Inc., 2007), 54.
30 Cordesman, The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan, 139.
31 Jeff Courter, Afghan Journal: A Soldier’s Year in Afghanistan (Illinois: Independent Publishing 
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Robert Gates, Rumsfeld’s successor, considered the US training programme 
to have produced ‘tangible results’. Rather than linking the ANA to US nation- 
building, Gates described it as the lynchpin of the US military’s counter- insurgency 
drive.33 Other observers, meanwhile, praised the ANA as an effective multi- ethnic 
institution that was ‘the most successful US-led nation-building exercise in 
Afghanistan’.34 When questioned as to why the ANA programme proved to be 
effective, at least when compared to other US nation-building projects, a Senior 
Military Commander stated that ‘you had a pretty powerful animal in the zoo 
called the US military behind that particular problem set’.35 The relative absence 
of bureaucratic hurdles to the ANA’s development after 2005/6 is a testament to 
the power of the military establishment when it commits to a task that sits inside 
its traditional area of expertise.
US Efforts to Train the Afghan National Police
A credible police force provides public security and reinforces the legitimacy 
of the state.36 But establishing a police force in a conlict-ridden environment, 
such as Afghanistan, was a steep challenge. Initially, Germany was responsible 
for the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP), but they committed 
little money and few trainers, and had only managed to create a force of approxi-
mately 3,000 oficers by the end of 2003. This number did not come close to 
the 50,000 oficers, plus 12,000 border police, proposed at the Bonn Conference. 
The US believed it could improve on the German effort and commandeered the 
ANP programme in 2004. Thereafter, billions of dollars were committed by the 
US to train and equip Afghanistan’s police force. Unlike the ISAF and the ANA, 
where US policy had been dominated by the military establishment, the ANP pro-
gramme was subjected to a confusing division of responsibilities. Relevant par-
ties included the Defence Department, the US Army, the US embassy, the Bureau 
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and State Department 
contractors.37
There were many problems with the way in which the ANP evolved. Firstly, 
the phenomenon of ‘conveyer belt’ training tarnished the US programme. When 
judged on numbers alone, ANP growth seemed impressive. At the beginning of 
33 Thom Shanker, “Top Oficials Greet Gates in Kabul with Pleas”, New York Times, December 5, 
2007.
34 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 413. Crisis Group Asia, “Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No 
Quick Fixes, Report No123”, November 2, 2006, 16; Seth Jones and Christine Fair, “Securing 
Afghanistan, Getting on Track”, United States Institute of Peace Working Paper, January 23, 
2009, 10.
35 Author Interview with a Senior US Military Commander, Washington DC, April 29, 2012.
36 Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
37 Charles Johnson, “Reforming Afghanistan’s National Police”, Testimony Before the Subcommittee 
on National Security and Foreign Affairs, June 18, 2008, http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/120423.
html (accessed 3/5/2012).
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2007, the US claimed it had an operational capacity of over 65,000 and by the 
end of Bush’s second term its numbers approached 80,000. But these igures were 
misleading. Many oficers on the ANP payroll had deserted and some simply did 
not exist. Those who did desert kept the weapons that they had been given. Those 
weapons strengthened tribal militias and often found their way to the Taliban.38
Notwithstanding the numbers on paper, there were substantial police shortages 
in most of Afghanistan’s provinces. In 2006, a Kandahar governor counted only 
35 to 60 police in each of his districts.39 Moreover, since the US failed to provide 
additional trainers to correspond with the ANP’s growth, the quality of the recruits 
was poor. A staggering 85 per cent of police oficers were considered to have been 
‘incapable of basic police work’.40 The ANP also lacked provisions and less than 
half of its oficers were adequately equipped. In a district in the Kandahar prov-
ince, for example, only 20 guns were available for 110 policemen.41 Meanwhile, 
a police chief in the Ghazni Province had ‘no rank, no money for food, and not 
enough clothing or gear to operate in cold weather’. ANP infrastructure in rural 
villages was often nonexistent. One police headquarters in the Baghlan Province 
consisted simply of a ‘mud and stone building surrounded by a mud wall’.42
For a combination of reasons – including poor pay, inadequate training and 
poor quality recruits – the ANP became heavily involved in criminal enterprise 
across the country. Its oficers participated in Afghanistan’s drug trade and there 
were reports of proliic drug abuse within the force. Corruption descended down 
through the ranks, from captains to individual oficers on the beat. Mirroring the 
tactics used by warlords during the 1990s, illegal checkpoints were constructed by 
the ANP on roads throughout the country in order to extort money from drivers. 
Local police stations were often either a law unto themselves or proxies for local 
powerbrokers. During national and local elections, the police manipulated the 
political process through intimidation and vote rigging. Consequently, much of 
the Afghan populace considered the ANP to represent the interests of local strong-
men, criminals and gangs, rather than those of the Afghan State.43
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The ANP resembled little more than disorganized militias lacking the capac-
ity to enforce the law, let alone engage in counter-insurgency. Nonetheless, 
it was propelled into the frontline. In 2007, the ANP suffered more than 1,000 
 insurgency-related deaths, more than the ANA and NATO combined. When US 
soldiers moved on from a given area, the ANP remained and became the target of 
Taliban retaliation. For example, after US troops withdrew from the Panjwayi and 
Zhari districts in Kandahar, the Taliban assaulted police outposts in bloody retri-
bution. Placing the ANP in such scenarios exacerbated the problem of desertion. 
A senior US military oficial observed that high casualties resulted in the ANP 
‘bleeding personnel’.44
Responsibility for the ANP training programme was divided and dispersed. 
In 2005, primary authority transferred from the State Department to the military 
establishment. The transition was not streamlined, nor was it complete. The 
Pentagon was charged with the execution of the US training programme, but 
the State Department still retained contract management authority for police 
training. Theoretically, the State Department also provided policy guidance to 
assist the military. The State Department staffed the ‘Central Training Center’ 
in Kabul as well as a number of Regional Training Centers. Meanwhile, the 
Defence Department’s Task Force Police Directorate and Police Reform Direc-
torate had a separate mandate, which was ‘training, mentoring and organizing 
the ANP to enable them to perform the full spectrum of traditional law enforce-
ment roles’.45
For nine months during 2005 to 2006, General Barno attempted to convince 
the White House of the need for the military to collaborate with its civilian coun-
terparts, but without success.46 There was no-one from the DoD who had any 
technical knowledge of the contracts that it had inherited from the State Depart-
ment. This caused a great deal of confusion as to its details and thus how to move 
forward. Furthermore, military reports detailing plans to reform the ANP training 
programme did ‘not identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of State’.47 
The State Department did not contribute to those reports, but at the same time 
failed to develop any plans of its own. A joint report between the two agencies 
called for more collaboration to enhance the US training mission, but made no 
mention of how this would be achieved.48 Consequently, the only line connecting 
the State Department’s training centres to the military’s programme was a single 
(American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 2006), 2; Human Rights Watch, 
Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, Human Rights Watch Brieing Paper, 2002, 6 and 14; Brian 
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46 Author Interview with David Barno.
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‘embedded senior staff oficer’.49 This caused numerous bureaucratic delays. 
Ambassador Neumann cited one example where:
An effort to transfer a measly $200 million from army to police equipment 
encountered six months of bureaucratic delay in the middle levels of the Pen-
tagon and was inally broken loose only when I called the deputy Secretary of 
Defence, Gordon England, who resolved the internal problem within twenty-
four hours. I mentally kicked myself for not having called him earlier.50
A Senior State Department Oficial explained how cultural differences exacer-
bated and complicated these and other problems:
There were bureaucratic struggles between, on the one hand, the military, 
which worried about the police surviving attacks, and, on the other hand, 
State civilians concerned that the civilian police force would become milita-
rized, which lasted months. There was some virtue on each side and none in 
their refusal to reach agreement.51
The ANP functioned as the vanguard in the ight against the Taliban because 
the military establishment considered it to be a key weapon in its counter- 
insurgency arsenal. This may explain why it was classiied under the broad banner 
of the Afghan National Security Forces, alongside the ANA. The Department of 
Defence claimed its programme was ‘the critical lynchpin to the efforts to build 
and sustain a viable and resourced national police force’, although it trained the 
ANP as an auxiliary force to support Afghanistan’s army.52 During a congres-
sional hearing in 2007, Eikenberry categorized the ANA and ANP as one and the 
same and spoke of progress with each synonymously. Similarly, Barno asserted 
that the ANP formed ‘the front line of Defence in this war’, a description he also 
applied to the ANA.53 The US military, therefore, embraced the ANP programme, 
but only as far as it suited its interest in typecasting Afghanistan’s security forces 
as a bulwark against the insurgency. A Senior State Department Oficial argued 
that this meant that the military ‘didn’t approach the ANP in Afghanistan as a train 
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ment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness, 8.
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and equip program; they approached it as a take apart from nothing and rebuild 
it program’.54
The military’s interests were displayed when in late 2006 problems in southern 
Afghanistan resulted in the extraction and relocation of US military trainers from 
the north to perform the duty of ‘mentor saturation teams’. The US military modi-
ied its training regime for the ANP in direct response to insurgent attacks. An 
appraisal of this strategy by the Ofice of the Inspector General was critical of the 
fact that ‘this action left a mentor gap in the northern provinces’, and that the mili-
tary declined to produce a ‘timetable for replacing these mentors in the north’.55
Similarly, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) had been created, 
according to a US Deputy Commander for Police Development, to ight against 
the ‘enemies of peace and stability’. Yet it had also been fashioned as another 
instrument for its counter-insurgency strategy. ANCOP was supposedly designed 
to respond to civil unrest, but it functioned as an elite mobile military force in 
dangerous or conlict-ridden provinces, where the Taliban presence was strong-
est. This mirrored the Pentagon’s training regime for the ANA, and discounted 
a broader nation-building mandate. ANCOP’s actions in Marja, for example, 
relected the US military’s interest in sculpting the force into an elite combat 
unit.56
Another example was the Focused District Development (FDD) programme, 
which the Department of Defence modiied in October 2007. Previously, the State 
Department had classiied eight policing regions to relect Afghanistan’s patch-
work of ethnic factions. However, the military warped the FDD so that the eight 
regions were reduced to ive, without cause or explanation. Districts were selected 
on the basis of which of them the DoD perceived to be in need of most help, 
regardless of whether they actually required police reform and retraining. Reor-
ganizing the FDD programme so that they accounted for tribal and ethnic bounda-
ries was aimed at complementing the US military’s command structure. A report 
from the Defence Department conceded that within the irst seven cycles of FDD 
‘there were no formalized procedures for collaboration to select which districts 
would go through the FDD program’.57 A shortage of personnel also constrained 
plans to expand FDD to the rest of Afghanistan. These problems may have been 
avoided had the Pentagon communicated with its colleagues at the State Depart-
ment, but there was only one, or sometimes no, civilian trainers operating within 
FDD teams.
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The military’s ixation on counter-insurgency also produced the Afghan Auxil-
iary Police (AAP), which was created in September 2006. A niche DoD initiative, 
the AAP empowered a patchwork of Afghan militia to perform police duties in 
place of an ANP presence. Assortments of tribal footmen were hurried through a 
ten-day training programme. By this baptism of ire its numbers quickly grew to 
over 10,000. In essence, the DoD had sutured together a supplementary Afghan 
force based on the idea that it could replace not just ANP oficers, but also US 
troops. All it in fact accomplished was the armament of men whose loyalty was to 
their tribes rather than to the national government. Unlike the ANCOP, the AAP 
generated cleavages within the military establishment due to different perspec-
tives as to its worth. The main difference was between DoD oficials in Wash-
ington and military commanders in the ield. Eikenberry, for example, did not 
believe the AAP to be helpful in the military’s quest to construct an effective 
counter-insurgency platform. He argued that it was merely a ‘stopgap measure’ 
and an inappropriate ‘tactical’ solution to a ‘systemic’ problem.58 Outside of the 
military establishment, meanwhile, the AAP was considered to be an ineffective 
and illegitimate force, which had added to Afghanistan’s insecurity instead of 
helping to cure it.59 The programme was terminated in September 2008, after the 
Pentagon inally recognized its failings.
Although there was broad acceptance that the ANP should be involved in the 
counter-insurgency effort, divisions between Washington and military oficials 
in the ield emerged. In 2007, General Barry McCaffrey, a US Army general in 
Afghanistan, wrote a memo to the Military Academy at West Point, which said 
that the effort to create the police was ‘grossly under-resourced’ and that this 
needed to be addressed immediately. McCaffrey’s request was ignored, as was 
Major General Robert Crone’s 2008 request for 2,300 more ANP trainers.60
As soldiers in the ield experienced the deiciencies of the ANP irsthand, they 
were much more critical of the US training programme than their colleagues in 
Washington. Barno despaired of the methods that were being used to train the 
police: ‘You give them a badge, a night stick and a certiicate and then send them 
back to the cesspool that was their original police station’, he bitterly remarked. 
Major General John T. Brennan described the ANP as ‘a hollow force’.61 Colonel 
Rick Adams, head of the Police Reform Directorate for the US-led Combined 
Security Command, made it clear to his superiors at the Pentagon that rather 
than prepare the ANP for counter-insurgency the US irst needed to overcome ‘a 
culture of corruption’. After his translator was brutally beaten, a Special Forces 
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soldier stated that ‘the ANP were known throughout Afghanistan for being cor-
rupt, untrained thugs’. Another US trainer was shocked by the ‘coercive tactics’ 
the police used.62
US military trainers were also frustrated by the fact that counter-insurgency 
training and the size of the ANP were the Pentagon’s only concerns. As US Army 
Captain Philip Poag admonished, ‘you can’t make some kind of human chain-link 
fence’. Another US trainer watched incredulously as inexperienced ANP recruits 
were drilled on how to respond to a full-scale ambush at a training camp. Yet 
another stated that the ANP required ‘more practice [and] more training’. He had 
observed that its frontline status compromised the professionalism and effective-
ness of the US Army in Afghanistan.63
These frustrations were compounded by US trainers not being given adequate 
brieing prior to deployment. Soldiers appointed to train the ANP entered Afghan-
istan unaware of how to do their job. This was partially because the construction 
of a police force was alien to military culture. As a Senior Military Oficial states:
Whereas the military problem set was relatively straightforward for us, the 
civilian police problem set goes down to every village and involves the entire 
fabric of society; the legal system; the penal system; the challenges in crimi-
nality and so on. . . . That is a much more complex, ugly, dificult animal that 
we have experience with.64
Captain Daniel Helmer, a former ANP trainer in Afghanistan, asserts that the 
generic training programme for US trainers made no distinction between sol-
diers who were deployed to Afghanistan and those deployed to Iraq. He con-
sidered this to be extremely problematic as it failed to adequately prepare them 
for the situation on the ground. A trainer with the Afghan Border Police (ABP) 
recounted the same experience as Helmer: ‘We did not know what we were 
getting into – we had no deined training objectives, no training materials and 
no formally deined objective’, he states. He and his colleagues approached the 
task with a willing tenacity, but he admitted that it was a duty they were unquali-
ied to perform.65
Unlike the US military, the State Department viewed the ANP as comple-
menting a broader nation-building strategy, which positioned security and law 
and order as important considerations. But it failed to take responsibility for the 
ANP’s development, and its approach was characterized by disinterest and disor-
ganization, as the following example illustrates.
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The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 
directed the State Department’s ANP programme. The INL seemed to be the most 
logical choice due to its historic support for criminal justice systems abroad. Upon 
closer examination, however, the bureau’s culture prepares its agents to combat 
international drug cartels, rather than to create and organize a nationwide police 
force on a foreign shore. In addition, training the ANP did not it within the paradigm 
of INL’s interests in Afghanistan, which centred on drug eradication and interdic-
tion.66 Instead of spearheading the State Departments programme, therefore, the INL 
empowered private contractors. It briefed them on the vague goals of combating the 
insurgency and strengthening the Afghan State, but was indifferent to the contrac-
tors’ lack of knowledge about Afghan culture and politics. The INL also divested 
itself of responsibility for how the trainers were chosen, which meant that many 
non-professionals joined the trainer ranks. Robert Perito, who led the International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program at the US Department of Jus-
tice, compared the situation in Afghanistan to previous nation-building scenarios:
The Department of Justice, where I headed the ICITAP program, trained 
police in Somalia and in Haiti and in Bosnia and in Kosovo, where you had 
full-time law enforcement professionals in charge of the training. But that 
model was abandoned when we got to Iraq and Afghanistan. Without anyone 
involved in the police training effort who is a law-enforcement professional, 
the leadership and the determination of what goes on in those projects then 
shifts to contractors. The contractors then are left to come up, based on their 
own devices, with what is to be done.67
DynCorp International (hereafter Dyncorp) was the company primarily respon-
sible for the State Department’s training programme. From 2004 to 2009 it 
received over $3 billion in funds from the US government.68 Dyncorp’s empow-
erment by the INL gave it an unfettered capability to decide how to approach the 
ANP’s training. It created a Central Training Center for the police in Kabul, and 
a number of other facilities across the country. Dyncorp’s training programmes 
usually involved no more than a short 2–8 week course for entry-level police. 
Although an intergovernmental assessment claimed that its trainers were ‘a pro-
fessional, dedicated, and enthusiastic group’, the company’s efforts were widely 
criticized.69 Jones asserts that Dyncorp’s training programme produced ‘a heavily 
66 Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Strategy Volume 1 Drug and Chemical Control, March 2010, http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/137411.pdf. 
67 Commission on Wartime Contracting, An Urgent Need: Coordinating Reconstruction and Stabili-
zation in Contingency Operations, 72.
68 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, United 
States Congress, January 30, 2011, 7.
69 Inspectors General, US Department of State and US Department of Defence, Interagency Assess-
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armed, undisciplined and thoroughly venal paramilitary force despised by Kabu-
lis and feared by Afghan civilians in the countryside’.70 A report conducted by 
Crisis Group Asia described the police ofices that the company trained as ‘barely 
qualiied mall guards’.71
Within the State Department there was also an awareness of the problematic 
nature of the company’s training regime. Ambassador Neumann, for example, 
stated that ‘what DynCorp did was take a police oficer out of a cesspool, train 
him for a few weeks, and throw him back into a cesspool’. A State Department 
Oficial who was interviewed for this study agreed: ‘If you are giving people 
two or three weeks’ training to be a policeman you are not training them to be 
much of a policeman’.72 Yet similar observations from State Department oficials 
in Kabul failed to inluence its headquarters in Washington. This demonstrates 
that the agency’s bureaucratic hierarchy prevents experienced oficials in the ield 
from rectifying poor policies.
The inability of Dyncorp and other contractors to adequately train the ANP gen-
erated conlict between the US military and the State Department. The military 
establishment considered the position of power that was given to private compa-
nies to be inappropriate. A Senior Defence Department Oficial asserts that the 
INL’s empowerment of semi-autonomous actors compromised the interests of the 
military establishment:
The State Department’s reliance on contractors caused a lot of friction. 
Strictly speaking, the responsibility (for the ANP) belonged to State, but State 
didn’t have the personnel to do it. Very often the behavior of the contrac-
tors undermined the work of the military guys, because they were moving 
at cross-purposes. So you had incidents with contractors that destroyed six 
months’ work on the part of a company or battalion commander, who was 
trying to develop a relationship with the local Afghans.73
A US General posted in Afghanistan was similarly critical in his analysis:
I think it was a matter of you put a contract on the street and measure success 
by how many individuals come out of the training pipeline, not whether you 
had an effective force. And so companies bid on that and I suspect the low-
est bidder got the contract and a huge amount of money went to them, and 
the result was they produced people coming out the other end of the pipeline 
full stop. There was no effective police force connected to that. It was an 
70 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 176.
71 Crisis Group Asia, Crisis Group Asia Report 138, August 30, 2008.
72 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 174; Author Interview with a Senior State Department Ofi-
cial, Washington DC, April 18, 2012.
73 Author Interview with a Senior Defence Department Oficial, Via Telephone, Sydney to Colorado, 
July 15, 2013.
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individual training program and not part of the fabric of a greater strategy 
toward the police. Fundamentally it was a failure.74
It is important to note how closely the perceptions of these two senior military 
oficials align with that of Ambassador Neumann. Yet these and other like-minded 
individuals were never able to collaborate to overcome the problem of outsourc-
ing. This is a testament to the entrenched barriers that each agency’s interests, 
perception and culture presented to pursuing a logical and productive exchange 
of opinion that may have curtailed the State Department’s reliance on contractors.
DynCorp, meanwhile, had a different opinion about who was to blame for the 
sorry state of its training programme. The company complained that there were 
unclear lines of authority within US bureaucracy, which stemmed from the fact 
that there were two autonomous programmes – one headed by the US military, 
the other by the State Department. According to Dyncorp, the different interests 
and culture of the two agencies led to complications in the deployment and place-
ment of personnel, and the conduct of reform activities. Dyncorp’s trainers, for 
example, were unable to travel unescorted to check police teams’ equipment. Yet 
there was no move from the US military to provide escorts to rectify this problem. 
Moreover, the company argues that it received contradictory instructions from 
two different branches within the State Department: the INL and the Department 
of State’s Bureau of Administration. INL’s nominal authority notwithstanding, 
there was no point of contact to which DynCorp could turn for explanation and no 
consistent method for resolving contradictory instructions.75
As controversies surrounding the ANP bubbled to the surface in Washington, 
the counter-bureaucracy scrutinized the US training programme. From 2005, the 
GAO called for more effective methods of cooperation toward a united ANP train-
ing programme, but became frustrated when its advice was disregarded by the 
State Department and the military establishment. Subsequently, its investigations 
were increasingly critical of the both the military and civilian approach. In 2010, 
the GAO highlighted severe equipment shortages and poorly trained recruits, 
which resulted in no Afghan police unit being fully capable of performing its 
mission.76
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The Ofice of the Inspector General for Afghanistan (OIG), meanwhile, argued 
that there was little indication that military oficials understood the distinct nature 
of policing. But like the GAO, the OIG perceived the main problem to be a lack 
of cohesion between the different training regimes. This, ‘created a situation of 
the blind leading the blind’, and prevented operational clarity: ‘Neither CSTC-A 
[the military command in Afghanistan], nor the INL ofice at the embassy has had 
a full understanding of contract commitments or requirements’, an OIG report 
alleged. Both the advice and criticism of the GAO and OIG were ignored by 
US agencies and US contractors operating in Afghanistan. Although they were 
divided on everything else in respect of the ANP, the State Department and the 
Pentagon held a common interest in repelling the encroachment of Washington’s 
regulatory bodies. Consequently, the indings of GAO and OIG reports were dis-
puted by both. The State Department, for example, maintained that the ANP pro-
gramme was ‘well conceived and well executed’.77
Similarly, a 2008 report conducted by the DoD claimed that ANP recruits 
returned to their districts with ‘enhanced capabilities and better able to serve 
their communities’. During a Congressional hearing in 2007, Karl Eikenberry 
defended the ANP as ‘a good, comprehensive program’.78 At the urging of the 
GAO the military establishment did produce a plan for future improvements to its 
training programme. But that plan consisted of a ive-page document that made no 
mention of the role and responsibilities of the State Department, nor did it provide 
a framework through which to pursue a joint policy platform. The State Depart-
ment made no move to adhere to the edicts of the counter-bureaucracy beyond 
rhetorical platitudes.
Such intransigence notwithstanding, the counter-bureaucracy’s obsession with 
statistics was not what was required to reform the ANP training programme. The 
GAO, OIJ and OMB added to the very problem it denounced, as increased over-
sight and reporting resulted in signiicant delays. The OMB especially, was eager 
to reject requests from US oficials and commanders that may have improved the 
ANP, because they did not consider such requests to be iscally responsible. In 
one instance, a State Department attempt to change one of its police training con-
tractors was blocked by the contractor’s protest to the GAO. Because contractors 
were oficially, albeit controversially, part of the US bureaucracy, they were able 
to delay the process through these appeals. The Commission on Wartime Con-
tracting, arguably another part of the counter-bureaucracy, discovered that ‘the 
contractor won its challenge and set progress back six to nine months’.79
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Inharmonious relations and competing agendas within the foreign policy 
bureaucracy help to explain why the ANP programme was a failure. One State 
Department staffer argues that the enterprise was lawed from the beginning: 
‘Blame should be leveled at the whole system and a lack of comprehension’, 
he states.80 A US Military Commander believes that there was a lack of capacity 
within the US foreign policy bureaucracy to train another country’s police force:
There is this huge gap in our federal government’s capacity. We don’t have 
a national police force. We don’t have a ministry of the interior or a ministry 
of justice that does this kind of work. And we don’t have a federal capacity 
to do prisons abroad.81
Without that capacity, each agency twisted the ANP programme to suit its 
interests. The quality of the training, meanwhile, was affected by each agency’s 
culture. No conduits were developed to promote cooperation and the State Depart-
ment and the military programmes remained entirely separate. The military estab-
lishment was not prepared to meet the challenge of creating a police force that 
could complement nation-building, especially when it was faced with a violent 
insurgency that it perceived to be a more immediate concern.
Dyncorp and other private contractors added another confusing layer of author-
ity to the US programme to train the ANP. Its empowerment was a move that 
revealed a lack of knowledge and interest from the State Department in producing 
a suitable training programme. There was an absence of oversight from the INL, 
which did not have the capacity or any previous experience in overseeing a train-
ing program of such magnitude. The hierarchical and fragmented nature of the US 
bureaucracy also determined that US oficials and commanders who perceived 
the ANP programme to be problematic, struggled to have their voices heard. The 
lawed nature of the US training programme precipitated interference from the 
counter-bureaucracy, which only exacerbated the situation.
The CIA and Afghanistan’s Warlords
In addition to US efforts to build the ANA and ANP, the other important element 
in the overall security situation in Afghanistan was the role of the CIA in empow-
ering various warlords. As discussed in previous chapters, during nation-building 
it is imperative that external agents carefully consider which domestic actors they 
will support. Such decisions were especially important in a post-Taliban environ-
ment, in order to distinguish Afghanistan’s new political order from a violent past. 
But for the CIA this was not a concern. It selected and then maintained support for 
on Wartime Contracting, An Urgent Need: Coordinating Reconstruction and Stabilization in Con-
tingency Operations, 43.
80 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 18, 2012.
81 Author Interview with a US Military Commander, Washington DC, April 29, 2012.
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a number of Afghanistan’s warlords, which compromised US efforts to establish 
a secure and stable Afghan State.
The CIA has been variously described as, ‘a sovereign state within a state’, 
and ‘the invisible government’. The publicly-stated foreign policy of the United 
States takes one direction while the invisible government takes another.82 In 
Afghanistan, ‘the invisible government’ diverged from the rest of the foreign 
policy bureaucracy. The CIA interests revolved around inding remnants of Al 
Qaeda that lurked in the Tora Bora Mountains, tribal enclaves near the Durand 
Line, and other remote locations. In the lawless tribal belt, which functions as a 
de facto border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al Qaeda operatives were (and 
still are) able to move between the two countries like ghosts. From 2001 onwards 
the CIA’s protracted battle against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan/Pakistan has been 
constant, albeit inconsistent.
Unlike military oficials, who are accountable to strict hierarchies, CIA agents 
operate with far greater autonomy. In Afghanistan, neither the US Ambassador in 
Kabul, nor any senior US military commander in the ield, had the power to con-
trol CIA operatives. Security, community relations and development were issues 
that did not impact on the CIA’s decisions, even after the Taliban had re-emerged 
as a signiicant political force. The agency forged alliances with any Afghan leader 
that it believed could aid in the GWOT, regardless of how pernicious an impact 
this may have had on nation-building in Afghanistan.
To begin with, the CIA established a rapport with members of the Northern 
Alliance (NA). Formerly a stagnant force ighting a losing war against the Tali-
ban, thanks to support from the CIA the NA had a tremendous reversal of for-
tune. In preparation for the invasion, Gary Schroen headed the irst CIA team 
to enter Afghanistan. Code-named ‘Jawbreaker’, Schroen’s and other CIA teams 
were given tens of millions of dollars in cash to distribute to warlords who oper-
ated within the NA framework, including such notorious igures as Abdul Rasul 
Sayyaf, Sayyed Jaffar, Abdul Karim Khalili, Ismal Khan and Rashid Dostum.83 
This had a profound and immediate effect. Sayyed Jaffar, for example, had effec-
tively no troops following his return to the country in 2001, but with CIA assis-
tance he quickly obtained a force of over 1,000 soldiers. Through the provision of 
similar funds, the militia of Ismal Khan, which had been reduced to a few hundred 
in 2000, had risen to more than 5,000 men by 2002. By early 2002, the CIA had 
dispersed 767 tons of supplies (including hundreds of tons of ammunition) and 
$70 million, which by some estimates was enough to equip and fund 50,000 mili-
tiamen.84 The CIA’s interest in funding these individuals, and other tribal strong-
men, continued unabated in the years that followed. This allowed those warlords 
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who had the backing of the CIA to forge powerful armies to challenge their rivals 
and control vast territories. One CIA operative asserts that the NA ‘provided us 
with a native army to work with and an extremely valuable intelligence network 
to link into’.85
Alongside the warlords who were ensconced within the dubious framework 
of the Northern Alliance, the CIA established diplomatic ties with other local 
power brokers in Afghanistan’s Central and Northern provinces. The agency also 
approached Pushtun leaders in the south. In each case, monetary bribes were used 
to win support for its efforts to locate Al Qaeda leaders. This contributed to the 
propagation of over 200,000 militiamen by the end of the irst term of the Bush 
Administration.86
George Tenet, the CIA Director, plainly informed the White House that 
Afghanistan’s ‘pro-US’ warlords were ‘getting a lot of money’. ‘Tenet wanted 
the gloves off, he was going to “rent” every warlord necessary in Afghanistan’, 
Moens observes.87 But these overtures were more than just bribes. The CIA pur-
sued a myopic yet resolute strategy to shape the political future of Afghanistan. 
In order to satisfy his agency’s interests, Tenet perceived that it was necessary to 
modify Afghanistan’s political geography:
We had a counterterrorism strategy, now we need a political strategy. We 
need to tell the southern tribes what the political scenario is. We need the 
vision. We need to make it clear that we’re there for the long term.88
This approach was what Ahmed Rashid called the ‘warlord strategy’, a term 
that encapsulates the CIA’s strategy to portray Afghanistan’s warlords as libera-
tors and uniiers.89 If the target had strong democratic credentials he was consid-
ered to be more acceptable, but that was by no means a requirement.
Although the CIA operates outside the strict conines of foreign policy bureau-
cracy, it retains close ties with the military establishment. Rather than discourag-
ing the CIA’s warlord strategy, the Pentagon perceived it to be in its interests. 
A report conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations asserts that the US mil-
itary ‘excluded from their mandate either security enhancement or support for 
central government efforts to bring unruly warlords under its sway’.90 Instead, 
senior military oficials visited regional despots such as Atta, Dostum, Shirazi, 
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and Khan on multiple occasions, which helped consolidate each leader’s power. 
Through CIA brokerage, the Pentagon recognized the warlords’ militias as pro-
US ground forces that substituted for US soldiers and an ANA/ANP presence. 
Rumsfeld described Afghanistan’s warlords as an integral part of the country’s 
security apparatus:
How ought security to evolve in that country depends on really two things; 
one is what the interim government decides they think ought to happen, [the 
other is] what the warlord forces in the country decide they think ought to 
happen, and the interaction between those two.91
The Pentagon also assisted CIA agents in their efforts to fashion alliances based 
on a choice between the United States and Al Qaeda. Tenet recalls that when his 
operatives questioned tribal leaders on whether or not they would support the US, 
‘if the answer was yes, goods, medical supplies, military equipment, and weapons 
would soon be air dropped to them’. But if the answer was no, they would receive 
‘a two-thousand-pound bomb courtesy of the US Military’.92
While senior oficials at the Pentagon accepted the warlord strategy, many mili-
tary oficials in the ield did not. Zakheim argues that some warlords were a sta-
bilizing presence while others undermined security, but the CIA did not attempt 
to make a distinction between the two.93 In hindsight, he admits that the Penta-
gon’s blanket acceptance of the CIA’s strategy, especially in the irst few years 
of the US occupation, was problematic. But although the military establishment 
expressed less enthusiasm for the CIA’s tactics in Afghanistan during the second 
Bush Administration, this may have been due to its preoccupation with ighting a 
worsening insurgency, rather than a realization of how harmful the warlord strat-
egy was to Afghanistan’s security.94
Many US soldiers in the ield, meanwhile, were against the warlord strategy 
from the beginning. They were frustrated by the fact that they could not cultivate 
a lasting relationship with Afghan villagers who blamed the US for the warlords’ 
rapacious behaviour. A number of polls conducted by the US military conirmed 
this. One US Army Oficer, for example, asserts that Afghanistan’s warlords ruled 
by ‘force and fear’. He characterizes them as ‘no more than boorish gangsters’, 
who controlled ‘gangs of bandits’.95
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Some oficials within the US civilian agencies considered the warlord strategy 
to be a harbinger of insecurity.96 The State Department was also aggravated by 
the CIA’s encroachment into the realm of diplomacy. The CIA collaborated with 
the Pakistani intelligence service (the ISI), for example, in an attempt to forge an 
anti-Taliban, Pushtun alliance. In 2010, the agency conducted meetings in Paki-
stan toward that end. These meetings were completely removed from the Rome 
talks, where the US delegation was headed by the State Department. Furthermore, 
by refusing to pressure favoured tribal leaders to disband their private militias, 
the CIA circumscribed the State Department’s efforts at disarmament. USAID, 
meanwhile, believed that CIA teams compromised its development projects by 
supporting a range of local power brokers without consideration of their develop-
mental record.97
By supporting the CIA in its vendetta against Al Qaeda, Afghanistan’s warlords 
adopted Abraham Lincoln’s adage: ‘If you would win a man to your cause, irst 
convince him that you are his friend’. Their cause, however, was no more than a 
hunger for power resting on a foundation of self-interest. A sycophantic show of 
support represented a crude mask worn in order to carve out zones of inluence 
and authority, backed by the CIA’s money and resources.
Many warlords made fraudulent claims regarding the location of Taliban ight-
ers, in thinly veiled attempts to cement authority over their rivals. In Kandahar, 
for example, Gul Agha Shirazi acquired an intelligence monopoly, which he used 
to feed the CIA information that suited his own ends. According to a humanitarian 
worker in the province, he ‘had learned how to exploit the CIA’s blind faith in his 
judgment and their knee-jerk sensitivity to anything that could be described as 
a terrorist threat, to neutralize people he didn’t care for’. In another case, Pacha 
Khan Zadran, a southern commander, successfully called in airstrikes on rival 
tribal authorities, or to terrorize Afghan villages, under the contrivance that they 
were Taliban targets.98 Other warlords openly opposed the Karzai regime and 
provincial governments, with which the civilian agencies had established a work-
ing relationship. The Afghan government’s candidate for governor in Khost, for 
example, was successfully removed from contention by a CIA-backed strongman. 
CIA representatives also simultaneously supported rival factions with weaponry 
and resources.99
In summary, the warlord strategy proved to be antithetical to nation-building in 
Afghanistan. Each CIA-backed warlord had powerful ambitions and was prepared 
96 This was an opinion put forward by many of the oficials who were interviewed for this study.
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to use any means to see them fulilled. They were corrupt, mercenary and violent 
strongmen, who engaged in torture and drug production. Across Afghanistan, war-
lords intimidated and suppressed the Afghan populace, which built further resent-
ment toward the US occupation and helped strengthen the Taliban-led insurgency. 
As well as circumscribing the security efforts of the international community, the 
warlord strategy prevented the establishment of an effective legal apparatus and 
an authoritative national government.
Conclusion
Efforts to promote security in Afghanistan were plagued with problems related to 
divisions within the US state machinery. The State Department and the military 
establishment argued over US policy toward the ISAF, due to different interests 
and perceptions of its value as a mechanism for internationally generated security. 
The military displayed its power by ensuring that there would be no US contri-
bution to the force in the irst four years of nation-building. The Pentagon had 
emerged victorious in its irst skirmish with the State Department, though this 
only served to fan the lames of conlict between the two organizations.
By comparison, the development of Afghanistan’s National Army proved to 
be a relatively successful venture. It is an example of the difference a solid US 
commitment makes when not hampered by waves of discord. Placed under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the military establishment, it was the only aspect of 
nation-building that harmonized with US military culture. The Afghan National 
Police programme, meanwhile, was subjected to blurred lines of authority and 
divergent interests. Efforts from the civilian and military realms to establish 
Afghanistan’s police force failed to transcend bureaucratic boundaries. Within the 
US government, there were simply too many different captains attempting to steer 
the ANP ship. Primary responsibility for the ANP’s training was divided between 
the INL and the Pentagon. The former failed to manage Dyncorp, the company to 
which it outsourced much of the training, while the latter inappropriately prepared 
the ANP for ighting the insurgency. US oficials and soldiers in the ield were 
aware of the problems that shadowed the ANP and their thoughts were relayed to 
Washington. Such opinions were either ignored, or were unacknowledged, which 
created more turmoil within their respective agencies.
Finally, the CIA’s interests in Afghanistan were not only disconnected from 
other US agencies, but also highly damaging to Afghanistan’s political future. 
By pursuing the warlord strategy, the agency stepped beyond the bounds of intel-
ligence gathering and into the realm of nation-building. The Pentagon supported 
the CIA, while the civilian agencies and many US soldiers in the ield perceived it 
to be highly damaging to the nation-building mission. All of this spoke of a disu-
nited US approach to security in Afghanistan, at an inter- and intra-agency level. 
The United States failed to generate a whole-of-government approach, which 
when combined with already dificult domestic circumstances, and discord within 
the NATO alliance, meant that nationwide security for the Afghan people never 
materialized.
Much like security, infrastructure development in Afghanistan was a signiicant 
challenge for the United States. In 2004, the US allocated $1.76 billion for recon-
struction, and funding increased considerably each year thereafter. From 2001 
to 2010, $26 billion was invested in infrastructure projects across the country. 
Despite this spending, in December 2010 the Human Development Index, which 
orders countries in relation to their state of development, ranked Afghanistan at 
155 out of 169 countries. Nearly half of Afghans still lived in poverty, two-thirds 
were without adequate sanitation, and most did not have access to safe drinking 
water.1
Notwithstanding its lack of experience, the military establishment controlled 
a substantial portion of the funds dispersed by the US Government. Its approach 
to development has been widely criticized. The Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan (SIGAR) argues that in some areas close to half of its projects ‘were 
at risk or have questionable outcomes’.2 USAID implemented the majority of 
civilian infrastructure projects, but its approach was also problematic, albeit for 
different reasons, which are outlined below. The State Department controlled the 
remainder of the money allocated for reconstruction. Although the Department of 
Agriculture and the Department of Treasury were involved, it was usually only in 
an advisory capacity.
This chapter discusses the chaotic nature of US efforts to pursue reconstruc-
tion in Afghanistan. First it examines the US military’s approach to infrastruc-
ture development. Second, it explores USAID’s leadership on the civilian side 
and the controversy that this generated. Third, speciic infrastructure projects in 
three areas – road-building, agriculture and education – are inspected. Finally, the 
impact that regulation and oversight from the counter-bureaucracy and Congress 
had on reconstruction projects is assessed.
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The Military Establishment’s Programme
From 2001 to 2003, the military establishment was not interested in infrastruc-
ture development. It restricted itself, in the main, to military affairs. The inten-
siication of the insurgency, however, led the Pentagon to perceive development 
as an important weapon in its counter-insurgency arsenal. After his appointment 
in 2006, the new Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, was forced to respond to 
mounting military casualties in Afghanistan, which had triggered criticism of the 
occupation from Congress and the US media. He did so, in part, by arguing that 
the US military now recognized the signiicance of roads, medical clinics, schools 
and agricultural projects for winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Afghan popu-
lace. With this shift in attitude from the military leadership, at least rhetorically, 
some US soldiers in the ield came to accept that they had broader interests in 
Afghanistan than simply combat operations.3
To implement an effective nation-wide strategy, Gates and other senior US 
oficials called for a whole-of-government approach to infrastructure develop-
ment, which blended civilian expertise with military strength. Yet in practice the 
military leadership eschewed involvement in civilian projects if it perceived them 
to be disconnected from the war against the Taliban-led insurgency. This con-
trasted with Kosovo and Bosnia, where civilian oficials, who had been deployed 
to organize reconstruction efforts in volatile conlict regions, were supported by 
the US military. In Afghanistan, the military did not want to subordinate itself 
to playing a support role to the civilian agencies. The consequence was that the 
Pentagon sought to avoid providing security for civilian reconstruction projects. 
A Senior State Department Oficial contends that,
The Defence Department couldn’t understand the argument that you needed 
some degree of security before you could expand reconstruction. They sim-
ply weren’t inclined to provide the security and, therefore, were inclined to 
ind whatever argument they could against it.4
Despite a substantial increase in US troop numbers from 2006 to 2010 the mili-
tary failed to stop the Taliban’s disruption of development projects undertaken 
by the State Department and USAID. Consequently, USAID oficials and con-
tractors were murdered by the Taliban in increasing numbers and, as the con-
lict in Afghanistan deepened, civilian projects were shelved in key areas such as 
agriculture, roads, schools, hospitals, water supplies and power. The US military 
also destroyed infrastructure projects in bombing campaigns and combat opera-
tions, but then refused to help rebuild or even provide inancial compensation 
3 Robert Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age”, Foreign 
Affairs 88:1 (2009); Scott Peterson, “In Afghanistan, Troops Tackle Aid Projects – and Skepticism”, 
Christian Science Monitor, October 2, 2006.
4 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 15, 2012.
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for what was lost. This drew ierce protest from both the civilian branches of the 
foreign policy bureaucracy and from the Afghani Government.5 A collaborative 
approach to infrastructure development clearly remained unimportant to the mili-
tary establishment when juxtaposed with combat operations against the Taliban.
A lack of faith in the civilian branches, combined with an increased emphasis 
on counter-insurgency as the Taliban-led resistance to the international presence 
in Afghanistan intensiied, led to the creation of the Commanders’ Emergency 
Response Program (CERP). CERP gave US soldiers a new role to fulil in combi-
nation with war ighting. From 2004 to 2010, the programme allocated $2 billion 
worth of funds to low-level US commanders to undertake small-scale infrastruc-
ture development projects. Around 16,000 of these ‘quick impact projects’ were 
completed by 2011, the costs of which ranged from $5,000 to $500,000. Dov 
Zakheim, the Undersecretary of Defence from 2001 to 2004, argued that CERP 
was ‘a very powerful tool for the military commanders in carrying out their cur-
rent security and stabilization mission’. The military establishment had branded 
CERP as a comprehensive and far-reaching programme that responded ‘to urgent 
humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements’.6 Such rhetoric, however, 
was a veneer that disguised its true purpose.
Despite the diversity of the projects that were undertaken using CERP, the 
motive behind them all was to counter-balance the inluence of the Taliban. Rather 
than being an aspect of nation-building, CERP, and also the larger infrastructure 
projects initiated by the Pentagon, were tools for winning a war. General David 
Petraeus, the most prominent advocate of COIN within the US military, bluntly 
stated that ‘money is our ammunition’. Oficial military documents applied 
this description to their training regime. A US Forces Manual, which explained 
CERP to military oficers, was titled ‘Money as a Weapons System in Afghani-
stan’. ‘Funding initiatives to win hearts and minds’, according to another military 
report, complemented a priority to ‘hunt enemies’, both of which fell within the 
paradigm of ‘an unorthodox phase of war’.7
By adhering to this paradigm, the military perceived infrastructure projects 
outside conlict-ridden provinces to be unwarranted. Moreover, as the battlefront 
against the Taliban-led insurgency was amorphous, US soldiers were rarely a 
lasting presence in any given area of Afghanistan, which truncated the military’s 
5 Carlotta Gall, “NATO’s Afghan Struggle: Build, and Fight Taliban”, New York Times, January 13, 
2007.
6 SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress; United States Armed Forces (USAF), 
Commanders Emergency Response Program: Money as a Weapons System in Afghanistan, Decem-
ber, 2009, 12; Mark Martins, “No Small Change of Soldiering: The Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program in Afghanistan and Iraq”, The Army Lawyer, February 2004, 12.
7 Dennis Steele, “The Race to Win”, ARMY, November, 2003, 10–11; Joshua Hersh, “Afghanistan: 
The Long and Winding Roads”, Hufington Post, October 9, 2012, http://www.hufingtonpost.
com/2012/10/12/afghanistan_n_1951668.html (accessed 20/2/2012); Martins, “No Small Change 
of Soldiering: The Commanders Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan and Iraq”, 2.
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reconstruction efforts. Two medics from New Hampshire who served with the 
Alabama National Guard, for example, gained the trust of the locals through the 
construction of a medical clinic. But the clinic did not outlive their departure. 
Lt David Patton, who was involved in a bridge building project in the village of 
Solan, noted that ‘everyone believes in the mission’, but admitted with resigna-
tion that ‘there’s an underlying thought that when we leave, it’ll go back to the 
way it was’.8
CERP was not without its critics in the Pentagon. A DoD oficial criticized the 
ability of US soldiers to appraise infrastructure projects: ‘Let’s say the project is 
not working’, he stated, ‘why would we want to fund that project again the next 
year? Very little evaluation was done to decide what we fund next’.9 Another 
Pentagon staffer came to the realization that there was a disconnect between the 
overall strategic objective and what was being done on the ground and ‘a lot of 
overlap because you could have a CERP project essentially duplicating an AID 
project in the same village’. In other cases, US commanders used CERP funds to 
provide military equipment to local leaders in return for their support of opera-
tions against the Taliban. Ironically, such actions sometimes resulted in the US 
augmenting Taliban units by giving money to their tribal associates and allies.10
Not content with abandoning the civilian agencies, the Pentagon attempted to 
modify the civilian programmes so that they relected the priorities of COIN. The 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Group (ARG), which consisted of DoD bureaucrats, 
was created to oversee development projects. Each of its business-minded ofi-
cials monitored an area of infrastructure development. Although forged by the 
Pentagon, these oficials were ensconced within the State Department, and had 
a direct line of communication with the US Ambassador. This, according to one 
USAID contractor, made them more inluential than the agencies they advised.11
The ARG formed a new and unwelcome faction within the State Department’s 
bureaucracy, which rejected the perceived encroachment of the military establish-
ment. A former US Ambassador recalled that planning meetings between civil-
ian oficials were subject to bickering and inighting: ‘Within my embassy, the 
Afghan Reconstruction Group and USAID experts had differences of opinion, 
which were magniied by disputes over who should lead’, he observed.12 The 
ARG claimed that the civilian agencies had mismanaged education and health 
 8 Larry Minear, The US Citizen-Soldier and the Global War on Terror: The National Guard Experi-
ence (Meford: Tufts University, 2007), 44; Elizabeth Rubin, “Taking the Fight to the Taliban”, 
New York Times, October 29, 2006.
 9 Josh Boak, “US Funded Infrastructure Deteriorates Once Under Afghan Control, Report Says”, 
Washington Post, January 4, 2011.
10 Author Interview with a Senior Defence Department Oficial, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, 
July 15, 2013; Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations At War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2008), 264.
11 Joel Hafvenstein, Opium Season: A Year on the Afghan Frontier (Guildford: Lyons Press, 2007), 
64.
12 Author Interview with a former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Washington DC, April 18, 2012.
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programmes, and that projects were behind the quarterly indicators. This rationale 
was used as an excuse to steer projects toward Afghan provinces where the insur-
gency was strongest. The ARG also admonished USAID’s preference for Afghan 
construction companies – a standard widely adopted by the development commu-
nity, but one that inevitably caused delays. A Senior USAID Oficial considered 
this to be ‘completely dysfunctional . . . which distorted what we were doing’. 
He claimed that it increased the animosity between civilian agencies and the 
military establishment, and witnessed clashes between the State Department and 
ARG in Kabul and acrimonious battles between USAID and the ARG in Wash-
ington during NSC meetings.13 The ARG then declared that USAID was misusing 
resources and manipulating reports, and related this discovery to the DoD and 
State Department. A USAID oficial observed that ‘we found ourselves in friendly 
ire bureaucratically’.14 Clearly, the military’s attempts to navigate development 
toward COIN only increased the tension between the USAID, the ARG and the 
State Department.
While the Pentagon was quick to shift US resources toward the counter- 
insurgency campaign, it often failed to consider the opinions of soldiers in the 
ield. Many of these soldiers had, through their on-the-ground experience, attuned 
themselves to the needs of the Afghan populace. Special Forces Captain Rusty 
Bradley illed the role of ‘diplomat, peace-maker [and] teacher’ and argues that 
Afghanistan ‘needed security, education, organization, honest political represen-
tation, and civil infrastructure’. Army Sergeant Jeff Courter contends that secu-
rity, roads and education were crucial for winning the hearts and minds of the 
Afghans. ‘I can’t count the number of times villagers would express their need for 
roads, wells, seeds and animal medical services to us’, another soldier stressed, 
describing medical clinics as ‘the most powerful weapon in winning this war’. In 
Karawaddin, a US oficer organized the distribution of winter coats and gloves 
to children, which were much needed items to ight a particularly harsh winter in 
2007, while an army unit in another part of the country exhorted the US populace 
to ship school supplies to Afghanistan.15
Some soldiers with experience in the ield argued that the absence of long-term 
planning and support from Washington hampered progress. Captain Leo Docherty, 
for example, believed that there had been no coherent plan beyond combat opera-
tions in Helmand, after which he received ‘disjointed ill-considered directives 
from headquarters’. He considered the Pentagon’s reconstruction plans to be noth-
ing more than a mirage. In another case, a shipment of computers to Afghan civil-
ians and translators was halted by the Pentagon under the justiication that they 
would either sell or steal them. This was a claim which Lieutenant Benjamin 
13 Author Interview with a Senior USAID Oficial, Washington DC, April 19, 2012.
14 Strimling Yodsampa, No One in Charge: A New Theory of Coordination and Analysis of US Civil-
Military Coordination in Afghanistan (Unpublished Dissertation, Tufts University, 2009), 169.
15 Rusty Bradley, Lions of Kandahar, 9; Courter, Afghan Journal, 135 and 277; C.J. Chivers, “On 
Taliban Turf, Lines of Ailing Children”. New York Times, December 12, 2007.
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Tupper, a soldier in the ield, rejected. He believed that the real reason behind the 
Pentagon’s lack of support was that it was not interested in infrastructure devel-
opment in peaceful areas, which it considered to interfere with the primary goal 
of vanquishing the enemy. Tupper resented the mentality of a military leadership 
who were unable to recognize that the Afghans were capable of progress.16
Not all US soldiers were sensitive to the beneits of local infrastructure devel-
opment. An Afghan translator recalled one incident where US soldiers ‘while try-
ing to level a training area, decided to dump dirt inside a hole that belonged to 
local irrigation systems’, which had a punitive effect on the quality of life of the 
local populace. There were also procedural problems that came with this unfa-
miliarity. In Kandahar, Lt. Col. Brian Stoll struggled to make sense of the data-
base for infrastructure projects that had been left by his predecessors: ‘We never 
got it all cleaned up’, he stated, ‘it was like a Hydra, you get part of it cleaned up 
and you ind some more along the way’.17 COIN failed to adequately promote the 
ideas of soldiers who perceived development to be important, nor did that strategy 
suficiently consider the impact that other soldiers, who were unable to recognize 
a role beyond war ighting, had on nation-building.
USAID’s Programme
Infrastructure development abroad is well within USAID’s area of expertise. 
Hence, the agency appeared to be the natural choice to head the civilian recon-
struction programme in Afghanistan. The scale of the challenge, however, was not 
something which USAID typically had to deal with. In 1977, 100 of its oficials 
managed an annual budget of $25 million, monitoring roughly $250,000 worth 
of projects each. But in 2004, 60 oficials managed over $500 million, which 
amounted to $8 million per oficial. USAID endeavoured to embrace this drastic 
increase in responsibility. In Helmand province, it oversaw the completion of an 
airport, doubled the electricity output and, through agriculture projects, reduced 
poppy production by one-third. In 2010, it completed 780 cash-for-work projects, 
employed 103,000 labourers and injected $27 million in wages into the Afghan 
economy, which was the equivalent of 225,000 full-time jobs.18 Yet for every 
successful project, there were many more failures, not all of which can be blamed 
on USAID alone.
Progress in the irst few years of nation-building was slow, but in 2005, with 
the support of the State Department, USAID vowed to increase power access from 
6 per cent to 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s population, and implement a national 
16 David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 223; Tupper, Greetings from Afghanistan: Send More 
Ammo, 136–137.
17 Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue, 142; Boak, “US Funded Infrastructure Deteriorates Once 
Under Afghan Control, Report Says”.
18 David Rohde, “Little America: An Afghan Town, an American Dream and the Folly of For-Proit 
War”, Reuters, June 1, 2012; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 89.
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programme that employed young Afghans to improve the rural economy.19 Yet 
these and other ambitious commitments involved no solid or achievable plan 
through which to channel US resources or collaborate with other agencies toward 
common objectives. James Dobbins, the US Special Representative to Afghani-
stan, remembers that from the beginning, blurred lines of authority between 
USAID and the State Department resulted in conlict as the two agencies jostled 
for power in Washington:
The situation turned into a classic Washington turf battle, all about status and 
prerogative. When Armitage proved unwilling to overrule Natsios, responsi-
bility for overseeing Afghan reconstruction remained divided among half a 
dozen State Department and USAID iefdoms.20
For example, the decision as to whether the US should prioritize roads or agricul-
ture involved months of debate.
Over the preceding decades, USAID’s culture had regressed to focus on small, 
long-term projects. The agency did not have the capacity or the structural mecha-
nisms to handle the number of requests its oficers were making from the ield. As 
a consequence, they went through the US Embassy in Kabul, with State Depart-
ment oficials closely monitoring USAID oficers and often having the inal say on 
many of their project proposals. This determined that the autonomy that USAID so 
desperately craved to fulil its developmental mandate was severely compromised. 
One USAID oficial remembers that, ‘everything had to go through Kabul in terms 
of decision-making . . . no discretion was given to the ield program oficer’.21
Both agencies blamed each other for the mistakes and lack of judgement that 
their discord generated. In 2005, Phillip Bell, an oficial from the State Depart-
ment, admonished USAID in an internal memo. He argued that because of poor 
management and planning, many development programmes were in trouble. The 
health programme, especially, was a disaster. Alternatively, Larry Sampler, a Sen-
ior USAID Oficial who operated in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009, argued that 
the pressure the State Department placed on USAID for immediate results caused 
this ‘disaster’. Such pressure meant that USAID did not have ‘as robust a focus 
on sustainability as we would like’. Sampler maintained that sustainability was a 
core value of development. In so doing, he implied that this key consideration was 
something that the State Department did not understand.22
A new development initiative was put forward in 2008 by the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers. It revolved around the needed for a ‘construction 
19 Committee on Armed Services, Assessment of Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Develop-
ment in US Strategy and Operations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress 
Hearing, February 13, 2007, 20.
20 Dobbins, After the Taliban.
21 Yodsampa, No One in Charge, 104.
22 Joe Stephens and David Ottaway, “A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks”, Washington Post, Novem-
ber 20, 2005; Hersh, “Afghanistan: The Long and Winding Roads”.
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surge’ in Afghanistan, encapsulating a broader philosophy that quick-impact 
development was what the country required. The idea of front-line development 
appealed to Ambassador Inderfurth, the Assistant Secretary of State for South 
Asia, India and Pakistan, who considered this ‘the right kind of surge right now 
in Afghanistan’.23 The State Department’s support for the surge was a testament 
to its disconnect from USAID, and also another example of the military establish-
ment’s power to shape the course of Washington politics in order to complement 
its counter-insurgency strategy.
USAID, meanwhile, resisted shifting development to suit the military’s inter-
ests. USAID preferred long-term nation-building beitting the target country’s 
absorptive capacity. It did not support the faster and arguably more eficient pro-
jects that the State Department and military establishment deemed to be suitable 
for Afghanistan: ‘I call it hijacking’, one USAID oficial stated, ‘aid as a weapons 
system has never been tested – and they are putting it into the ield with no evi-
dence that it works’. USAID’s culture, moreover, did not prepare it for such an 
unorthodox approach to development. Patrick Fine, the agency’s Mission Direc-
tor in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2005, argued that it did not have the capacity or 
expertise to pursue the quick-impact projects that the construction surge called 
for. To support his assertion, Fine sited a problematic example in 2004 where the 
goal of 1,000 schools and clinics ‘gained traction in Washington and soon became 
the number that USAID was required to build’.24 A USAID staffer who worked 
with Fine was similarly unconvinced that the rearrangement of developmental 
priorities to suit counter-insurgency would bear fruit.25
Although USAID continuously emphasized the need for a national develop-
ment strategy, it was commanded by the White House, State Department and the 
military establishment to focus on areas that were the major battlefronts in the war 
against the Taliban-led insurgency. Consequently, from 2006 onwards USAID spent 
approximately three quarters of its budget a year in the southern provinces, such as 
Helmand and Kandahar. In 2010, it allocated $250 million for infrastructure pro-
jects in those two provinces alone. In Helmand’s Nawa district, the agency spent 
over $30 million within nine months, in what was described as ‘[the] carpet bomb-
ing of Nawa with cash’. The substance of this spending was often ‘quick impact’ 
projects that complemented the military’s counter-insurgency strategy. Programmes 
such as the District Delivery Program and the District Stabilization Framework 
were USAID’s version of CERP. Similarly, the Regional Afghan Municipalities 
Program for Urban Populations (RAMP), an initiative by Zalmay Khalilzad, the US 
Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, was ‘a sort of reconstruction slush 
23 Committee on Armed Services, Assessment of Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Develop-
ment in US Strategy and Operations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, 
Second session, January 23, 2008, p. 23.
24 Dion Nissenbaum, “Roads to Nowhere: Program to Win Over Afghans Fails”, Wall Street Journal, 
February 10, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020355410457665528
0219991322 (accessed 02/02/2013); Stephens and Ottaway, “A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks”.
25 Author Interview with a Senior USAID Oficial, Washington DC, April 23, 2012.
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fund’. Khalilzad, a powerful igure with close ties to the White House, demanded 
that USAID undertake what he considered a politically essential project immedi-
ately, such as the Helmand cash-for-work project. These and other cash-for-work 
programmes lasted but a few weeks and usually failed to have a lasting impact.26
Nonetheless, projects like cash-for-work were popular among high-ranking 
State Department and Pentagon oficials because, regardless of how effective they 
actually proved to be, they demonstrated a US commitment to development in 
Afghanistan’s conlict-ridden southern provinces. USAID oficials, however, had 
no experience of operating in such hostile conditions and often found it impossi-
ble to monitor their projects, let alone address their long-term development impli-
cations. Fine stated in a conidential memo that his agency’s attempts to conduct 
these quick-impact projects in Afghanistan were ‘marked by a series of missteps 
and miscalculations that resulted in a lawed business model, inadequate super-
vision and poor execution’. Pressure from outside forces also determined that 
USAID pursued grandly ambitious projects, even though, as Fine conirmed, it 
did not have ‘a quality assurance plan or adequate staff to monitor performance’.27
The most prominent of these projects was the repair and upgrade of the Kajaki 
Dam in Northern Helmand, at an estimated cost of $500 million. The dam pro-
ject, which began in 2004, ostensibly became the jewel of USAID’s infrastructure 
development programme, although some of its oficials shared Fine’s reservations 
and questioned whether it made inancial or strategic sense. Upon completion it 
was claimed that the dam had the ability to create enough power to light 1.7 mil-
lion Afghan homes. An agency spokesperson described it as a ‘critical element in 
our support for Afghanistan because it will provide the electricity to drive private-
sector growth in Helmand and Kandahar’. But it was a massive and unrealistic 
undertaking that involved little coordination with the rest of the US government. 
Nor did USAID adequately account for the security environment in an area lit-
tered with drug lords and Taliban insurgents. The idea of building the dam was 
reasonable, but implementation was always going to prove costly, risky and time 
consuming. It was also well beyond the USAID’s power to construct the dam 
without assistance. Eight years later, the Kajaki dam had still not been completed. 
Taliban attacks blocked the delivery of 900 tons of cement needed to complete the 
job, and the $5 million turbine remained uninstalled. If there had been consulta-
tion with the State Department, in order to construct a realistic timetable for the 
dam’s completion, and coordination with the military establishment to provide 
security for contractors and Afghan workers, the vast resources dedicated to the 
dam project could have been more wisely utilized.28
26 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan Trip Report VI: Counternarcotics Policy in Afghani-
stan: A Good Strategy Poorly Implemented”, Brookings Institute, Foreign Policy Trip Reports 
41–58, May 10, 2012 http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/05/10-counternarcotics- 
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27 Stephens and Ottaway, “A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks”.
28 Jon Boone, “US Cuts Put British-Backed Afghan Hydropower Project in Doubt”, Guardian, 
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In the face of mounting pressure to conform, USAID protected resources and 
independence and still endeavoured to apply some of its cultural norms. When a 
military commander asked a USAID oficer, ‘What is your strategy for province 
X?’, for example, he replied: ‘We don’t have a strategy for each province. That’s 
not how USAID works. USAID has a strategy for the whole country’:
They – the military – need speciic activities – geographic-speciic plans that 
they can help facilitate or participate in . . . They would ask: ‘What is your 
goal for Afghanistan?’ [USAID would reply]: ‘A healthy, stable Afghanistan 
that is no longer a threat’. . . . The military would rub their eyes and say, 
‘Great, but what do we do in the morning?’ It required a big cultural bridge 
between the two organizations.29
It was ‘a debate which had become quite polemical’, according to Stuart Gor-
don, a British researcher: ‘Development practitioners didn’t like the military being 
involved in the quick-impact projects, and the military thought the development 
community had failed to deliver, and lives were being lost as a consequence’, he 
states.30
USAID relied heavily on contractors to implement its infrastructure develop-
ment programme – for three reasons. First, unlike the military establishment, it did 
not have the power, in terms of resources and staff, to undertake large-scale devel-
opment. Second, the use of contractors had been standard practice for USAID and 
was a key component of its activities globally. Third, the quick-impact projects 
that the State Department and military establishment craved were antithetical to 
the agency’s culture. To fulil them it appealed to US, international and Afghan 
companies, each of which recognized that USAID had deep pockets. Hence, they 
voraciously competed for lucrative, short-term contracts.31
Ironically, although USAID resisted the encroachment of other agencies into 
its traditional realm of responsibility, it depended on outsourcing. The agency had 
little control over its contractors, many of which had no substantial experience or 
expertise in implementing infrastructure projects – especially ones that would be 
appropriate for Afghanistan. USAID contractors left a graveyard of uninished 
schools, roads, power supplies and medical clinics. They also managed to spend 
a lot of money on subcontracting in a way that was generally considered by those 
on the ground to be extremely wasteful. One particularly damning report stated 
that outsourcing resulted in large sums of aid money being transformed into 
Failures in Afghanistan” Time, December 15, 2011; Carlotta Gall, “Building a Dam in a Bid to End 
Afghan Instability”, New York Times, September 18, 2007; Rohde, “Little America: An Afghan 
Town, an American Dream and the Folly of For-Proit War”.
29 Yodsampa, No One in Charge, 265.
30 Hersh, “Afghanistan: The Long and Winding Roads”.
31 Hafvenstein, Opium Season, 240.
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corporate proits.32 An observer in the ield revealed that an engineer hired by one 
of USAID’s contractors to implement a $700,000 project to construct 19 small 
irrigation dams ‘was incompetent, did not understand English and submitted an 
initial design that was “a crappy little drawing” ’. During a ive-year contract, 
another of the agency’s contractors spent $4 million just on the salaries of foreign 
agents.33
USAID’s primary contractor for infrastructure development was the US Com-
pany Louis Berger Group Incorporated (Berger), which had contracts worth over 
$665 million. Most of the money it had received was mismanaged. Marshall F. 
Perry, a construction manager at Berger, stated that his company ‘didn’t have 
the staff to read the reports, let alone respond with site visits’. He admitted that 
the entire program was ‘a calamity’. Berger’s subcontractors were found to have 
used poor materials and substandard methods, but still charged exorbitant fees for 
their work. One such subcontractor had the temerity to steal $141,000 worth of 
materials. Eventually, USAID realized its misplaced faith and outsourced much of 
Berger’s responsibility to a number of non-proit relief organizations. A diplomatic 
cable revealed that USAID ‘always had doubts about the ability of the single origi-
nal contractor . . . to complete all schools and clinics on the former schedule’.34
Chemonics replaced Berger as USAID’s largest private contractor, aided (alleg-
edly) by its ability to cut corners and manipulate igures.35 Joel Halfeinstein, a 
developmental expert working for USAID and Chemonics,36 argues that his com-
pany’s subcontracting problems were similar to Berger’s.37 In Kandahar, USAID 
gave millions of dollars to Chemonics, which then hired a series of subcontractors 
to carry out infrastructure development projects. But neither USAID nor Chem-
onics had suficient oversight capacity to monitor their activities in the province. 
Meanwhile, in Lashkargah, USAID subjected Chemonics’ subcontractors to more 
scrutiny. This generated a dispute between the agency and a subcontractor, which 
delayed the construction of a number of infrastructure projects.38
USAID was severely criticized for outsourcing projects to Berger, Chemon-
ics and other contractors, but then failing to suficiently monitor their activities. 
Incredibly, due to staff shortages within the agency, former contractors morphed 
into USAID representatives: ‘the agency was so short on personnel that it hired 
contractors to monitor its contractors’. According to a report from the Ofice of 
the Inspector General, many USAID oficials could not identify the locations of 
32 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 30, 2012; Car-
lotta Gall, “Afghanistan Lacks $10 billion in Aid Report Says”, New York Times, March 26, 2008.
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34 Stephens and Ottaway, “A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks”.
35 Pratap Chatterjee, “Paying off the Warlords: Anatomy of a Culture of Corruption”, in Nick Turse 
(ed.), The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan (New York: Verso, 2010), 82.
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37 Hafvenstein, Opium Season, 62.
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their infrastructure projects. Some of them, such as Catherine Mallay, were not 
even aware of which contractors were inancing which projects. In other cases, 
contractors were directed by USAID to build at locations that were dry riverbeds, 
graveyards or sheer mountain slopes.39
Clearly, USAID was out of its depth in Afghanistan, yet it aggressively pro-
tected its interests. Its oficers tenaciously clung to the conviction that they were 
the development experts and, consequently, the most appropriately qualiied to 
oversee infrastructure development. But USAID did not have the power to man-
age and monitor the contractors that it hired. These contractors, which existed 
in the porous border region between the private sphere and the foreign policy 
bureaucracy, added another layer of conlict and confusion to an already divided 
nation-building effort.
Infrastructure Development Projects
Speciic development projects illustrate the depth of bureaucratic divisions dis-
cussed above. In 2001, Afghanistan had less than 80 kilometres of paved roads. 
A major component of US nation-building was to create a road network that would 
help ensure security, facilitate trade and augment other infrastructure projects. The 
importance of road-building was promoted by oficials within the State Depart-
ment and the military establishment. Daniel Dunleavy, a member of the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), stated that, ‘if you give people mobil-
ity, you bring in prosperity’. Collaborative projects, such as the Khost-Gardez 
road, were perceived by William Wood, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 
2007 to 2009, to be as ‘fully-integrated a civ-mil project you can ind’. Similarly, 
James McConville, a US general who served in Afghanistan in 2009, claimed that 
road-building was a ‘lagship program with interagency results’.40
The apparent agreement on the importance of road-building, however, con-
cealed differences in approaches to the task, particularly between the military and 
the State Department on the one hand, and USAID on the other. Andrew Natsios, 
the USAID Administrator from 2001 to 2006, argued for the need to prioritize 
road-building projects as a necessary foundation for other infrastructure projects, 
citing his agency’s activities in Northern Thailand in the 1970s as an example of 
39 Joel Brinkley, “Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of US Aid to Afghanistan”, World Affairs, Janu-
ary/February, 2013; Rohde, “Little America: An Afghan Town, an American Dream and the Folly 
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40 Kevin Sieff, “After Billions in US Investment, Afghan Roads are Falling Apart”, Washington 
Post, January 21, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_paciic/after-billions-in- 
us- investment-afghan-roads-are-falling-apart/2014/01/30/9bd07764–7986–11e3-b1c5–
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where this had previously been successful.41 But the agency resisted when the 
State Department and the military establishment foisted responsibility for large 
road-building projects onto USAID. Grand and ambitious highways, which 
stretched across Afghanistan’s wild and barren rural landscape, were beyond its 
area of interest and its capability. USAID’s culture did not prepare it for the crea-
tion of these sprawling arteries, and it lacked the resources, manpower and exper-
tise that such projects required.
The type of road-building that the State Department and military establishment 
advocated was a far cry from the gradual and localized road-building initiatives 
USAID had previously pursued in Thailand and elsewhere. They were also out of 
step with USAID’s preference for community-based, locally driven enterprises. 
To attune road-building to its interests, therefore, it initiated the Strategic Provin-
cial Roads Project (SPRP) in November 2007, which helped build wells, small 
soap factories, sewing clinics and reading programmes for illiterate villagers.42 
Through SPRP and other similar initiatives, USAID oficials in the ield infused 
their perception of best practice into US road-building projects, in order to suit the 
agency’s broader nation-building agenda. Jeff Grieco, a USAID oficial, recalls 
one instance that encapsulated USAID’s mentality:
This was never intended to be a major road construction project. It was 
intended to be a capacity building program. We have dramatically improved 
Afghan capacity to build roads and to do community development work.43
Adhering to these preconceived perceptions was often problematic and was 
indicative of what Strachan dubbed ‘the lost meaning of strategy’, whereby a 
lack of strategic clarity determined that agency culture and interests shaped pol-
icy, rather than any broader intragovernment conception of developmental pri-
orities.44 Many inappropriate projects were undertaken that did not relect the 
situation on the ground. In 2005, for example, USAID hired 11 Bolivian cobble-
stoners to teach locals in Helmand. The locals, however, had driven on asphalt 
roads for three decades and the project left them, and US military oficials oper-
ating in the area, bewildered. In another example, USAID distributed 300 solar 
panels to shopkeepers in Kandahar, but ignored the fact that none of their shops 
were wired to use electricity.45
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When USAID did attempt to engage in more ambitious road-building projects 
it often failed to complete them. In 2009, it was given $400 million to construct 
2,000 kilometres of roads in Afghanistan’s conlict-ridden southern provinces. 
But after three years and with $270 spent, it had completed less than 160 kilome-
tres of roads. The termination of failing projects, meanwhile, proved to be difi-
cult due to the complicated network of contractors and subcontractors to which it 
had outsourced road-building projects. A handful of USAID oficials were spread 
across more than half-a-million square kilometres, and they struggled to engage in 
oversight without compromising the projects themselves: ‘How quickly can you 
stop a dump truck?’ one agency oficial asked; ‘You get the momentum going and 
one thing we committed to doing isn’t stopping it and creating a wreck’.46
According to a GAO report, USAID lacked the funding, data collection capa-
bilities and an assessment framework to evaluate projects and monitor its con-
tracts.47 USAID ‘cannot conduct serious oversight’, one military oficer claimed 
after witnessing the sorry state of one of its road-building projects. He described 
it as ‘a shell of its former self’, and ‘just a big contracting mechanism’. USAID’s 
approach ensured that roads moved ‘at a pace that made a snail’s gait look like 
a greyhound’s’. It also allowed contractor’s to put their proits before all else. 
In 2007, the Khost-Gardez highway was contracted to two US companies, the 
aforementioned Louis Berger Group and Black & Veatch. Berger hired a cheap 
but inexperienced Indian subcontractor to handle the construction, and another 
private security contractor, ISS-Safenet, to provide security for the project. Both 
of these subcontractors in turn employed Afghan strongmen and militia to accrue 
inluence in the region and enforce order. Much like the CIA’s warlord strategy, all 
this did was empower forces that sowed disorder and turmoil. In November 2010, 
Berger was tried by the Commission on Wartime Contracting and forced to pay 
one of the largest ines ever to the US government for overbilling.48
Roads were another important component of the US programme. For the mili-
tary establishment, roads enhanced troop mobility, shifted the inluence in a given 
area from the Taliban to the United States, and reduced the potency of Impro-
vised Explosive Devices (IEDs).49 All three of these factors improved its combat 
operations. Accordingly, the Pentagon often funnelled funds from USAID or the 
State Department infrastructure projects, in pursuit of what it considered to be a 
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more important allocation of US resources: highways. One example of this was 
its demand for the construction of a highway in the insurgency-ridden province of 
Urugan, in early 2005. This led a USAID oficial to contend that the ‘the reason 
USAID builds roads is economic growth or employment’, but ‘the reason the mil-
itary builds roads is to penetrate enemy territory’.50 Another of the agency’s ofi-
cials complained that due to the inluence of COIN, road-building was driven by
military or politically driven timelines and locations which make no sense, or 
which force us into alliances with the very same malign actors that are power-
fully part of the broader battles we are ighting. No one steps back and looks 
at the whole picture.51
The military perceived its obligation to be over once a road was completed, and 
it failed to monitor the roads that had been constructed: ‘There was such an urgent 
need to build highways’, a US oficial recalls, ‘maintenance was not the issue 
at the time’.52 Despite committing CERP funds to build 16,000 kilometres of 
roads by the end of 2010, the DoD did not report any data to USAID or Congress 
on the details of their construction, nor did the Pentagon conduct proper project 
evaluations.53
Eikenberry points out that ‘whenever the roads end, that’s where the Taliban 
begins’.54 This was not quite accurate. Due to poor security, roads became prime 
targets for the Taliban. Nonetheless, rather than securing roads the US military 
used them (almost) exclusively as a way of moving between conlict-ridden prov-
inces. When a plan was announced in September 2002 to rebuild the highway 
between Kabul and Kandahar, the State Department successfully lobbied the 
Japanese government to contribute to its reconstruction. The Pentagon, however, 
refused to deploy any of the 3,000 troops it maintained in Kandahar to protect 
Japanese engineers. Thereafter, to the State Department’s dismay, a large number 
of international engineers with expertise to signiicantly improve Afghanistan’s 
horrid road system were forbidden by their respective governments from being 
deployed.55
The US military did little to prevent insurgent attacks on USAID’s road con-
struction sites, which destroyed vehicles and killed workers. By March 2008, 162 
USAID contractors engaged in road-building projects had been killed. This forced 
USAID to shut down many of its road-building projects. The Khost-Gardez high-
way cost signiicantly more because USAID was obliged to spend $43.5 million 
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on security contractors and local strongmen who, it turned out, were powerless 
to prevent Taliban attacks.56 Regardless, the military placed the blame on USAID 
and its contractors for Afghanistan’s crumbling highways and roads, without 
relecting on its own contribution to their degradation and insecurity.
US efforts at agricultural development were similarly controversial. Com-
pared to the rest of the US government, USAID had an alternative perception of 
what agricultural reform required in Afghanistan. The agency planned 150 pro-
grammes, from 2001 to 2010, that focused on approximately 13 fertile agricultural 
areas.57 They involved the extension of agricultural services, land-grants, univer-
sity programmes, partnerships with the private sector, and access to capital for 
agribusiness, through loan-guarantee schemes. USAID wanted to provide access 
to material and technology as well as deliver expertise to help produce high value 
commodities such as fruits, vegetables and tree crops. In other words, it wanted 
to facilitate what it considered to be the best methods for promoting commercial 
agricultural growth, in order to improve the economy and increase opportunities 
for employment. Concentrating US funds and resources on stable and productive 
areas in the middle of Afghanistan was, USAID argued, the most effective conduit 
for US funds. Those geographical locations had a long tradition of bountiful har-
vests, and already had large agrarian systems in place. Yet despite its commitment 
to agricultural reform, USAID essentially ignored traditional land rights and pat-
terns of tenure, much as the Soviets had done in the 1980s. Overtime, this brought 
about resistance from local landholders, and impeded the implementation of many 
USAID agricultural projects.58
The agency’s agricultural projects also came up against State Department and 
military interests. The State Department prioritized a narrowly focused, counter-
narcotic strategy. The military, meanwhile, demanded that agriculture projects be 
focused on the southern provinces, where the Taliban-led insurgency was strong-
est. When these competing interpretations were expressed simultaneously in a 
National Security Council (NSC) meeting, they frustrated one Senior USAID 
Oficial:
Do you want to defeat the insurgency? Do you want to stop poppy produc-
tion? Or do you want us to pursue development that counts? Because they are 
not the same thing . . .59
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In a subsequent NSC meeting, he sardonically quipped that the only way he could 
envisage these inter-departmental goals coalescing would be to move the geo-
graphical location of Afghanistan.60
As his experience illustrates, powerful bureaucratic forces attempted to sway 
the course of USAID’s agricultural programme. The State Department, along with 
many congressmen, pressured USAID to link agriculture to counter-narcotics. In 
order to placate them, USAID initiated the Alternative Livelihood Program (ALP) 
in 2004, which allocated US funds to certain provinces to reduce poppy produc-
tion. Ambassador Neumann considered the ALP to be part of a broader national 
strategy that used ‘agricultural success to counter poppy production’.61 While he 
addressed the long-term nature of the enterprise, however, many of his colleagues 
in Washington and many in Congress perceived it to be an immediate panacea. 
This ignored the fact that, as a senior member of the United Nations Ofice on 
Drugs and Crime stated, ‘the Afghan farmer will not switch to alternative crops as 
long as there is a market for his opium’.62
The State Department ensured that it was supported by the Afghan govern-
ment, which called for the US to ‘provide Afghan farmers with inancial, material 
and technical resources for alternative crop production’.63 Although the US and 
NATO committed $119 million toward the ALP in its irst year alone, according to 
some estimates a mere $4 million had actually been spent by 2005.64 Nonetheless, 
funds did increase as the poppy problem worsened. In Helmand and Kandahar, in 
particular, larger sums of money were committed to ALP projects. The fact that 
the soil quality in these regions was poor and that the arid climate prevented effec-
tive crop production, was perceived by the State Department to be less important 
than the impact the ALP would have on the drug trade.65
USAID, however, resisted being typecast in a role with which it was unfamiliar. 
Its oficials in the ield decided to repel what they perceived to be the perversion 
of development, driven by the State Department’s counter-narcotics obsession. 
Instead, inluenced by the same culture that had provoked Natsios to upbraid his 
State Department and DoD colleagues in NSC meetings, they modiied the ALP 
programmes to create small-scale economic projects for Afghans that were usu-
ally not linked to curtailing drug production. In this way, USAID incorporated 
the ALP under the banner of agricultural and economic development, a strategy 
that went beyond planting orchards and other licit crops to replace poppy ields. 
These projects involved cash-for-work-programmes, the distribution of fertilizer 
60 Ibid.
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and seed for crops, better irrigation and storage, a credit network and business 
platforms. USAID also considered economic conditions, market credit lines and 
the state of agriculture across the country, as well as technology, infrastructure 
and domestic and international markets for Afghan products.66
Predictably, USAID relied on contractors and neglected to closely monitor its 
agriculture projects. USAID ‘did not make suficient site visits to properly monitor 
the program and did not analyze progress reports or conirm their accuracy’, the US 
Inspector General conirmed.67 Notwithstanding its laudable ambitions, the ALP 
programme not only failed to have a signiicant impact on Afghanistan’s opium 
production, but also left a slew of uninished ventures that languished among bur-
geoning poppy ields. When the agency hired contractors to build 370 kilometres of 
irrigation canals, for example, they managed only 40. Another contractor was criti-
cized by the US special Inspector General for spending tens of millions of dollars on 
‘foolish projects that accomplished nothing’. Appallingly, some USAID contractors 
reputedly rented their premises to major drug trafickers. These and other problems 
were scrutinized by Congress, which blamed USAID for ‘putting in large contrac-
tors in Kabul who have limited connection with the people on the ground and the 
communities where the poppies are being produced in the largest numbers’.68
A inal issue was that the military establishment’s lack of involvement in 
the ALP determined that many projects were plagued by insecurity. Successful 
projects that employed a large number of Afghans and helped promote growth, 
according to Hafvenstein, were hampered by a lack of security, resulting in the 
deaths of a number of USAID workers. He contended that the ALP ‘cannot fos-
ter alternatives to opium while under ire’.69 Indeed, in the absence of security 
measures, the programme was always going to have a limited chance of success. 
Yet neither USAID nor the military attempted to cooperate to produce a strategy 
that linked the ALP to COIN operations within Afghanistan’s rural sphere. The 
comically named ‘IDEA-NEW’ programme replaced the ALP in March 2009. It 
was a ive year, $150 million enterprise that, once again, centred on the creation 
of economic opportunities as an alternative to poppy production, but did little to 
address the problems that had beset its former iteration.70
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Other USAID initiatives advocated the manufacture of textiles and oilseeds 
as a way to improve the economy of Southern Afghanistan, but were unwork-
able as they violated the Foreign Operations Appropriations Law. Speciically, 
the Bumpers Amendment prohibited government funding of anything that might 
compete with US companies in world markets. Through the Amendment, USAID 
was prevented from assisting Afghanistan to grow a variety of cash crops. In Kun-
duz, for example, it stopped the agency from implementing a suitable agricultural 
programme. Rubin acknowledged this to be ‘a remarkable example of the fail-
ure to align our tools with our strategy’.71 The Bumpers Amendment was clearly 
anathema to USAID’s efforts at nation-building in Afghanistan. It was an obscure 
regulatory instrument of which most oficials within the State Department and 
military establishment were unaware. This ignorance frequently led them to place 
the blame for project failings at the feet of USAID. If USAID had had more power 
in Washington, it may have overcome this obscure bureaucratic hurdle. But it did 
not have meaningful connections in the White House or any signiicant inluence 
in Congress. Hence the Bumpers Amendment remained a hindrance.
USAID’s agricultural projects were also compromised by blurred lines of 
authority between Washington and Kabul. In 2005, USAID announced 23 agricul-
ture development projects in the Nad Ali District of Kandahar Province. Care and 
consideration had gone into their planning by USAID oficials, who perceived 
these projects to be a helpful stepping stone to the district’s development. Yet 
these plans never evolved beyond an embryonic form, due to poor  communication 
with civilian oficials in Washington, whose interests and priorities did not cor-
relate with that of their colleagues in the ield. As the projects were not linked to 
either counter-narcotics or COIN, they never gained traction in the US capital.72
Due to its frustration with the civilian agencies, the military establishment 
devised the Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs). ADTs were developed in 
2007 as ‘an idea to deploy soldiers with agricultural expertise and organic  security 
capabilities to Afghanistan’.73 They consisted of US infantry units, such as the 
Missouri Army National Guard, which was deployed to Afghanistan’s Nangarhar 
province. According to the DoD, the Nangarhar ADT provided ‘a complete array 
of expertise in agriculture, horticulture, pest management hydrology, soil science 
agricultural processing, and veterinary science’.74 One would have assumed that 
the teams included agricultural experts from the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), development experts from USAID and planners from the 
State Department. But this was not the case, even though the military argued that 
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ADT projects were undertaken in close coordination with USAID and USDA.75 
There was no evidence to support that assertion.76
Through the ADTs, the military establishment unilaterally pursued another 
nation-building task to complement its counter-insurgency strategy. Nonetheless, 
it resented the predicament that a lack of civilian capability had placed it in, as 
agriculture development projects were alien to its culture. But as the USDA, like 
USAID, was particularly ill-prepared for development in Afghanistan, the mili-
tary was compelled to pursue them to augment COIN. A Senior Defence Depart-
ment Oficial recalled that the USDA never met its quota of personnel and ‘those 
who they sent really weren’t agricultural experts at all in the sense of being farm-
ers’. Rather, ‘they were bureaucrats from the foreign agricultural service who 
knew how to move papers, but they didn’t know how to plant anything’.77
As a result of this perception, projects were conducted exclusively by soldiers. 
According to senior military oficials, the US National Guard, which took the 
lead on most ADT projects, brought civilian skills to the table. Civilian oficials, 
however, claimed that the guard was unfamiliar with the theoretical and practical 
dimensions of Afghanistan’s agricultural equation.78 Accounts of the activities 
undertaken by ADTs generally supported the latter group, although the ADT’s 
effectiveness varied dramatically.
ADTs continued to operate in the most conlict-ridden provinces in order to 
best complement the military’s interest in combating the Taliban-led insurgency. 
As these performed the dual purpose of combat units and agricultural develop-
ment vessels, there was no place for civilians. Soldiers, like their superiors at the 
Pentagon, perceived the military to be more experienced than USDA or USAID 
oficials, and believed that they had suficient expertise to manage the agricul-
ture sector programming without their assistance. The ADT commanders were 
a higher authority than the civilian oficials and, according to USDA oficials, 
overturned decisions made by civilian oficials.79
Lt Colonel Beckley, who headed one ADT, stated that ‘there is no army or air 
force skill for agriculture’, so they looked for soldiers who had farming experi-
ence. The Pentagon placed its faith in military reserves who came from farming 
states like Iowa and Nebraska and were thus more likely to help Afghan farm-
ers improve their crop production. The ‘major accomplishment’ of Beckley’s 
ADT, however, was the development of a ive year agricultural plan, which was 
hauntingly reminiscent of the Soviet attempts to reform Afghanistan’s agricul-
tural system. This simply added to the plethora of ideas on how best to develop 
Afghanistan’s rural environment, while ignoring Afghanistan’s traditional land 
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rights and tenure. Beckley admitted that the primary focus of his ADT had become 
‘government-building’, not development. By involving local bureaucrats in the 
projects, the ADTs pursued the counter-insurgency strategy of winning ‘hearts 
and minds’, rather than the most appropriate avenue toward an improvement in 
Afghanistan’s agricultural productivity.80
Education did not receive as much attention as road-building and agriculture, 
but was considered to be the inal piece of the developmental triangle by parts 
of the US government. President Bush was inluence by his wife’s crusade in 
Afghanistan for women’s rights, so when he spoke of education he was always 
careful to link this to the empowerment of women. He placed school-building 
near the top of the US nation-building agenda. Congress, meanwhile, was quick 
to approve funds for school-building projects, and impatient to see evidence that 
Afghanistan was progressing from an illiterate backwater to an advanced demo-
cratic country.81
The Pentagon considered the construction of schools to be a primary indica-
tor of the advancement of Afghanistan’s education programme. It also perceived 
school-building to be an activity that could lure young Afghan males away from 
joining extremist madrassas in Pakistan. For this reason, David Kilcullen, a  senior 
advisor to General Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the Combined Forces 
in Afghanistan from 2009 to 2010, stated that ‘local education is critical’.82 School- 
building projects undertaken by the military were usually done at the request of 
favoured Afghan tribal chiefs, and were built quickly and eficiently. USAID ofi-
cials, however, said that these projects were in violation of the best principles 
of development practice, and failed to account for factors such as the number 
of children in Afghan schools, the proportion of girls in the student body, the 
number of textbooks in the classrooms, and the number of trained teachers being 
paid and reporting for work.83 With these considerations in mind, USAID insisted 
that school-building proposals were vetted with community groups and linked to 
building the Afghan Ministry of Education’s capacity to staff, equip, and meet the 
recurrent costs of the education system. But the Pentagon did not share USAID’s 
development philosophy, and dismissed those conditions as needlessly time con-
suming. Military oficials, both in the ield and in Washington, branded the agency 
as ‘an incompetent, liberal organization that didn’t know what they were doing’.84
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Unfortunately, USAID’s record only strengthened these accusations. Despite 
the call to prioritize education projects from the State Department and the Penta-
gon, in 2007 USAID devoted only 5 per cent of its budget to improving Afghani-
stan’s education system. As a consequence, of the 286 schools that were planned 
for refurbishment by the end of 2004, less than half had been completed by 2007. 
Problems with school-building projects continued after this. The construction of 
one school took ive years to complete and still had, according to SIGAR, ‘a leak-
ing roof, defective electrical wiring, and an improperly sloped terrace roof’.85
Regulation and Oversight
Anthony Cordesman, from the Center of Strategic and International Studies, 
became a spokesperson in Washington for the problem of squandered funds in 
Afghanistan. In a congressional hearing in 2007, he stated that ‘we are spending 
money without accomplishing things’. ‘We have people who are performing sym-
bolic projects at local levels that do not reach the country’, Cordesman argued. 
This amounted to ‘showpiece projects in a few isolated areas’ rather than ‘a cam-
paign or systematic effort’.86 The indings of this chapter lend credence to these 
accusations. Cordesman’s admonishment of the US development programme also 
appealed to the counter-bureaucracy and Congress, albeit for different reasons.
Due to the increased spending that was prompted by the emergence of the 
 Taliban-led insurgency, the Ofice of Management and Budget (OMB), the Gov-
ernment Accountability Ofice (GAO), the Ofice of the Special Inspector General 
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and Congress, began to take an active 
interest in infrastructure development in Afghanistan. Washington’s regulatory 
bodies and various Congressional committees drew the same conclusions: that 
the US reconstruction effort was wasteful and mismanaged, and that spending for 
infrastructure projects lacked effective oversight.87
The OMB was stringently opposed to any projects that could not produce 
immediate, noticeable results. It was determined to cut costs, without further 
deliberation on how this would impact on Afghanistan’s development. It endeav-
oured to limit funds for infrastructure projects and, in 2006, decided that money 
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22/01/2014).
86 Committee on Armed Services, Assessment of Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Develop-
ment in US Strategy and Operations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress 
Hearing, February 13, 2007.
87 Michael Thibault and Christopher Shays, At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Afghani-
stan and Iraq: Preliminary Findings, Conlict Management, Commission on Wartime Contracting 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, April 2010, 20–28; Government Accountability Ofice, Actions Needed 
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for both roads and electricity did not qualify as emergency aid.88 Other bureau-
cratic barriers, such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation System, aligned with 
the OMB’s culture. Indeed, it appeared that infrastructure projects were diametri-
cally opposed to the appropriations and regulatory process, which reinforced the 
interests of the OMB at the expense of nation-building in Afghanistan.
The OMB expected US agencies to do more with less. Requests for additional 
funding by the State Department and USAID were continuously rejected under 
the rationale that, as Neumann put it, ‘the money in the pipeline was suficient for 
our needs’. That mentality was espoused by iscally minded oficials at the OMB. 
Their perception of nation-building was neither based on an accurate assessment 
of Afghanistan’s needs, nor a consideration of the opinions of each agency. More-
over, the OMB did not consult with US oficials in Afghanistan before making 
its decisions. Neumann argues that this circumscribed his ability to implement 
infrastructure projects. He explained his frustration at the road-block the OMB 
erected against the State Department’s plans:
I argued the urgency of the situation. They replied with explanations of 
budget procedures. To my mind we were dealing with a war and that ought to 
demand a different kind of consideration. The answers I received seemed to 
focus on the rules governing ‘normal’ economic development.89
Neumann encouraged Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, to inter-
vene and approve the funding he requested, but she ignored his advice.90 Rice, it 
seemed, was beholden to the OMB, rather than the State Department’s foremost 
representative in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a lack of effective communication 
between Kabul and Washington combined with competing spheres of authority 
within the State Department, and conlict between it and USAID, to strengthen 
the more united, and thus powerful, OMB’s hold over funding for infrastructure 
projects in Afghanistan.
The OMB also encroached on the military establishment’s infrastructure devel-
opment programme. A Pentagon Oficial dismissed the GAO and SIGAR, but he 
claims that the OMB proved to be a signiicant road-block for funding: ‘The OMB 
was the not just a problem, but the problem’, he contended.91 Despite the fact that 
the CERP program had become what one US auditor describes as a ‘sacred cow’ 
in Washington, the OMB criticized it and other Pentagon-driven infrastructure 
development projects.92
88 An interview with Richard Armitage, PRISM, 1:1, 107.
89 Neumann, The Other War: Winning and Losing Afghanistan.
90 Ibid.
91 Author Interview with a Senior Defence Department Oficial, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, 
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Although the various agencies in Afghanistan failed to agree on most issues, 
they were all equally resentful of the OMB’s attitude toward infrastructure devel-
opment. Oficials at the State Department, USAID and the Pentagon were united 
in their hostility toward the OMB, which created unnecessary road blocks and 
made it dificult to move ahead with all kinds of operations. A Senior Defence 
Department Oficial recalls that it ‘became an independent power centre that with-
held reconstruction funds for reasons many of us still don’t understand’.93
Much like the OMB, the GAO and SIGAR judged US agencies on how fast 
and eficiently they spent money and produced results, rather than the long-term 
beneits the reconstruction projects may have had.94 They highlighted staff short-
ages and inconsistent inancing to determine that US infrastructure development 
projects suffered from a lack of oversight. Neither of them possessed the power 
of the OMB, but they were still able to pressure US agencies by taking their 
indings to Congressional Committees. SIGAR’s anti-corruption initiative, for 
example, which was launched in 2010, focused primarily on assessing the US 
government’s funds and their effective use. Backed by Congress, it pressured US 
agencies to allocate money immediately to prove that it was engaging eficiently 
in reconstruction.95
There were similar examples of this behaviour from the GAO. Multiple reports 
by the Government Accountability Ofice criticized the lack of monitoring and 
oversight by the military establishment. In July 2004, the GAO argued that the 
Pentagon did not have an adequate number of personnel to supervise its infra-
structure development projects. Two years later, it highlighted the same problem 
and stated that without a suficient number of oversight personnel the DoD could 
not monitor its contractors. Subsequent reports argued that the monitoring of mili-
tary projects stopped once they had been completed, complaining that the military 
establishment was not interested in how such projects were maintained.96
The DoD Contracting Oficer’s Representatives (COR) were, ‘responsible for 
insuring that contractors meet the requirements set forth in the contract’. But the 
GAO discovered that only a small number of them had any background in con-
tracting or oversight, and that all of them were under-trained, but overworked. 
Most CORs, moreover, could only oversee contracts in their spare time as the 
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other duties they performed for the military were perceived to be more important. 
In response to the GAO’s criticism, the Pentagon simply stated that it did not 
have the information to provide an answer. CERP guidelines were reviewed and 
revised in December 2009, but there was still no requirement for US troops to 
inspect projects once they had been transferred to Afghan control.97
Although the GAO and SIGAR’s analysis of the situation in Afghanistan was 
more detailed, sophisticated and credible that the OMB’s, therefore, they had 
less power to inluence the behaviour of US agencies – especially the military 
establishment. In the opinion of oficials from USAID, the State Department and 
the military establishment, the methods chosen for assessment by the GAO and 
SIGAR were naïve and inappropriate. The GAO and SIGAR, they argued, warped 
many programmes so that money was thrown about haphazardly to produce sta-
tistics that would placate the counter-bureaucracy and its allies in Congress.98
Congress
As the previous section suggests, the interests of some elements in Congress mir-
rored those of the counter-bureaucracy, while others propounded unique develop-
ment initiatives. The interests of most congressmen and women in infrastructure 
projects were centred on Afghanistan’s drug problem, the Taliban-led insurgency, 
or both. Curbing illicit crop production was perceived to be an urgent priority, and 
the US House of Representatives voted to implement a pilot programme ‘regard-
less of the level of success’. Congress also latched on to initiatives that had been 
successful elsewhere in the world, such as the Roots of Peace project, which took 
out landmines and replaced them with trees, an idea that one State Department 
oficial dismissed as little more than a light of fancy.99
Duncan Hunter, a member of the Committee on Armed Services, railed against 
the programmes of US agencies, instead suggesting ‘substituting orchards for 
poppies’, and ‘tough old practical farmers’ in order to ‘replace a legion of our 
bureaucracy personnel’.100 Orchards, in principle, seemed like a viable sugges-
tion. US government agencies in the ield, however, were aware that the idea was 
an oversimpliication of a complex and dificult problem, and that such strategies 
were unsuited to the barren environment that characterized Afghanistan’s south-
ern poppy-ridden provinces. Hunter’s perception that such a programme could 
work in an arid environment seemed viable from his seat at Congress in the US 
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Capital, but would undoubtedly have changed had he experienced the political, 
security and ecological conditions in those provinces irsthand.
In other areas of infrastructure development, Richard Armitage, the Deputy 
Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005, lamented Congress’s want of ‘feel good’ 
items that proved that the US was engaged in development, such as medical clin-
ics and schools. He contrasted this sharply with the legislative branch’s aversion 
to less glamorous infrastructure development programmes, such as sewerage 
plants and electricity grids, and highlighted the dificulty that the State Depart-
ment faced in Afghanistan when trying to balance practical solutions with con-
gressional musings.101 This was a valid point but, as we have discovered, the State 
Department and the military establishment were also guilty of promoting their 
interests to prioritize road-building, agriculture and education over less desirable 
infrastructure projects.
Conclusion
Different interests, cultures, perceptions and power between and within agencies 
determined that for the United States, a united, inter-agency approach to infra-
structure development was never realized. The military establishment, with its vast 
resources, inluence and manpower, dismissed the civilian branches as impotent 
and unqualiied. Instead of supplementing their efforts, it approached reconstruc-
tion unilaterally and contrived to adapt its culture to incorporate a developmental 
mandate. The US military conducted combat missions with clarity and cohesion, 
but such uniformity was not so easily transferred to its infrastructure development 
programme.
The civilian agencies, meanwhile, resented the military’s domineering approach 
to reconstruction. USAID, especially, considered its tactics to be inappropriate 
and unfeasible. USAID’s approach to development, however, was no better for 
nation-building. Within the foreign policy bureaucracy the agency remained a 
minnow, but the prominence of its activities in Afghanistan drew the attention 
of the State Department and the military establishment. USAID thus faced a 
dilemma: it could adhere to its cultural traditions and pursue a distinctive devel-
opment strategy, or it could adjust its approach to relect the interests of the State 
Department, the military establishment, or both. This chapter has demonstrated 
that although USAID sometimes asserted its independence, more often than 
not it demurred and accepted the preferences of the more powerful bureaucratic 
forces. But regardless, USAID’s lack of capacity meant that it was incapable of 
conducting the quick-impact projects that the State Department, the military and 
other factions in Washington desired. This combined with the agency’s inability 
to control or monitor its contractors, which further tarnished its reputation in the 
eyes of other branches of government. Even its attempts to pursue the small-scale 
long-term projects that it was more accustomed to, were plagued by mistakes and 
101 Interview with Richard Armitage, PRISM, No.1, 107.
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poor judgement, and the agency was criticized just as much for this as it was for 
its other failures.
The machinations of the foreign policy bureaucracy prevented the US from 
constructing a sustainable road network, an economically beneicial agricultural 
programme or an effective education system. Other, arguably more suitable areas 
of development, such as sewerage and electricity, remained a less attractive pros-
pect. Although the agencies tasked with reconstruction were uncoordinated and 
disorganized, they coalesced to resist the encroachment of the OMB. An igno-
rance of the situation in Afghanistan did nothing to temper the OMB’s determina-
tion to intervene in the US development programme, which added another strand 
to an already complicated web of competing bureaucratic factions. The GAO and 
SIGAR, meanwhile, proved to be more of an irritation than a hindrance to the 
other agencies. Despite rhetorical platitudes to the contrary, they endeavoured 
to ignore the GAO and SIGAR’s recommendations, even when it was obvious 
that they may have improved the US approach to infrastructure development. 
The interests of Congress, meanwhile, were mercurial; at times it sided with the 
 counter-bureaucracy, at other times it reinforced policies that prioritized road-
building and agriculture. It also put forward its own divergent initiates. Given 
all this, it is little wonder that nation-building in Afghanistan encountered the 
problems that it did.
Counter-narcotics, law and governance constitute the inal three nation-building 
issues examined in this book. These are all related and interconnected, but the 
US generally approached them separately and haphazardly, with damaging conse-
quences. Of particular concern for US government oficials was the heroin trade. 
After 2001, Afghanistan regained its former position as the world’s largest global 
supplier of heroin. Funds from the sale of heroin were used to bolster the position of 
autocratic igures, drug barons and, by some accounts, the Taliban-led insurgency.1
While Afghanistan’s drug trade thrived, the country’s legal system was still-
born. In 2007, according to the World Bank, Afghanistan ranked in the top 99.5 
per cent of ineffective and corrupt justice systems worldwide, and ranked 172 out 
of 179 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Index.2 Mechanisms 
to promote democratic government fared little better. Elections were character-
ized by violence, corruption and intimidation, and were unrelective of the will 
of the people at both the local and national level. The 2004 Afghan Constitution, 
moreover, was a vague document that formally empowered the President, while 
being ignored by Afghanistan’s ubiquitous tribal rulers and religious authori-
ties beyond Kabul.3 The Karzai government did little to ingratiate itself with the 
Afghan people. Karzai himself, although charismatic, was perceived to be incom-
petent and dishonest.4
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This chapter reveals the impact that US policy and bureaucratic politics had on ena-
bling such circumstances. First, it examines the US’s approach to combating Afghan-
istan’s drug trade (counter-narcotics), which centred on eradication and interdiction. 
Second, it assesses US efforts to construct Afghanistan’s legal system. Finally, there 
is a discussion of the vexed issue of democracy promotion in Afghanistan, which 
includes US attempts to facilitate a centralized model of national governance.
Counter-Narcotics Programme
Narcotics have been a signiicant presence in Afghanistan since the 1500s.5 Inse-
curity, favourable geography, poor economic circumstances and a weak state 
combined to facilitate a lucrative drug trade.6 The cultivation of opium poppy pro-
liferated when the Soviet Union ravaged the Afghan countryside during the 1980s, 
destroying crops and irrigation channels in an attempt to force the rural population 
into urban centres, in order to expose and defeat the Mujahedeen-led insurgency. 
This tactic, coupled with the Soviets’ ill-conceived land-reforms, crippled Afghani-
stan’s agricultural infrastructure. A tough and drought-resistant crop, opium poppy 
became a popular alternative to licit farming. Afghanistan’s porous borders also 
made it easy for narcotics trafickers to move their product, and for drug syndicates 
to develop a lasting presence in the country. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became 
the world’s largest opium producer, until it banned poppy farming in 2001.7
In 2002, despite a ban on the cultivation and trade of opium from the nascent 
Karzai government, the opium trade expanded exponentially. Poppy production 
involved vast networks, which stretched from the individual farmer to the upper 
echelons of government. Warlords, corrupt government oficials, tribal authority 
igures and drug barons established a ‘thriving criminal layer’ which coerced the 
rural population to grow, store and process drugs. Often, however, farmers did not 
need to be forced to grow poppy. Without desirable agricultural alternatives they 
coveted the lucrative proits poppy farming ensured. On a more basic level, as a 
majority of the population lived below the poverty line, opium poppy provided a 
stable and reliable source of income.8
The scale of Afghanistan’s drug problem in the twenty-irst century is well-
known: ‘no other country had such a dominant position in the global supply of 
Foreign Affairs, 90 (20110, 43. Mills, Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle 
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Opiates’.9 The export of opium surpassed 8,000 tons in 2006, with a value of 
$3.1 billion. Opium poppy directly provided income for more than 2.3 million 
Afghans, with a third of the population employed in some part of the drug indus-
try. By 2010, Afghanistan produced over 90 per cent of the world’s heroin, and the 
drug trade pumped $2.8 billion dollars into its economy, which equated to more 
than 30 per cent of GDP.10
How had this occurred under the auspices of the US-led nation-building mis-
sion? To be sure, the drug trade was an entrenched feature of the Afghan envi-
ronment prior to the arrival of US and NATO troops. As such, it was perhaps 
beyond the capacity of any external force to completely repress. The Afghan 
State’s attempts to address the problem were lacklustre. The Karzai government’s 
 counter-narcotics strategy has been heavily criticized, and corrupt government 
oficials were often a conduit for the drug trade. The Afghan National Police, 
furthermore, did not have the capacity to win the ‘war on drugs’, because it suf-
fered from corruption and drug addiction that were exacerbated by the ineffective 
US training programme. The United Nations Ofice on Drugs and Crime Task 
Force lacked suficient resources to implement comprehensive prevention mecha-
nisms. Countries within the NATO alliance, as well as other parties such as Rus-
sia, also failed to undertake a coordinated approach. The British, who were placed 
in charge of counter-narcotics as a result of the Bonn Process, had neither the 
expertise nor the inluence to successfully spearhead the international response, 
and their eradication and buy-back strategies were an abject failure.11
The United States, however, must also share a portion of the blame for Afghan-
istan’s drug problem, due to its inappropriate and defective counter-narcotics 
strategy. Three US agencies were involved in counter-narcotics: the military 
establishment, the State Department and the Justice Department. Additionally, 
two organs within State and Justice, the Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), functioned as relatively independent power centres. Each of these factions 
had a different perception of how to approach Afghanistan’s drug problem, which 
was somewhat dictated by their area of interest and their culture. Additionally, the 
perceptions of certain oficials within the US bureaucracy muddied the waters of 
US counter-narcotics policy.
Unfortunately, the military establishment did not react to the revival of opium 
production immediately after the fall of the Taliban, at a time ‘when the target 
 9 Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace?”
10 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004; UNODC, Afghanistan Farmer’s Intentions Survey 
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May 24, 2006.
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was small and the signal sent would have been effective’.12 Doug Feith, the 
Under Secretary of Defence from 2001 to 2005, contended that Afghanistan’s 
opium production was not a serious concern for the United States. Rumsfeld had 
informed his senior staff that the drug issue was an unwelcome distraction from 
capturing the remnants of Al Qaeda’s leadership. Even as the Taliban-led insur-
gency worsened, the Pentagon dismissed the idea of military involvement in drug 
prevention, as it feared that this would compromise its war-ighting mission.13
In the ield, US commanders such as Karl Eikenberry, the Commander of the 
Combined Forces from 2005 to 2007, made no attempt to mobilize the military 
for counter-narcotics, nor did he aid the civilian agencies in their efforts. As one 
senior oficial observed, ‘Eikenberry was adamant that the (military) command 
didn’t do counter-narcotics, so it died away’.14 An insider contends that much the 
same mentality aflicted senior Defence Department oficials:
When I was there, the military were not particularly prominent in drug pre-
vention. We weren’t particularly effective, [and] the Defence Department had 
no idea what the Department of Justice, the Department of State or USAID 
were doing.15
Part of the reason behind the military establishment’s reluctance to engage in 
counter-narcotics was that it believed that such activities compromised its inter-
ests, which centred on combat operations. The Pentagon assumed that a force-
ful counter-narcotics drive would alienate potential informants, many of whom 
were embroiled in the opium trade, but who also provided credible intelligence 
on the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Indeed, military oficials often met with individu-
als who were known as the godfathers of drug-traficking. As Risen observes, 
‘for Afghanistan’s drug lords, business was very good under the United States 
Central Command’.16 In addition, the military establishment argued that counter-
narcotics would compromise the safety of US soldiers. In Jalalabad, for example, 
a strongman named Hazrat Ali sheltered US troops in his area of control, ‘under 
the understanding that they left his drug business intact’.17
As the opium trade escalated during the second term of the Bush Administra-
tion, however, voices within the US government called for immediate, compre-
hensive prevention measures. By 2007, drugs had become an important issue for 
both Congress and the media. This prompted Defence Secretary Robert Gates to 
acknowledge that ‘the drug trade continues to threaten the foundations of Afghan 
12 Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 249.
13 James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: 
Free Press, 2006), 157–158.
14 Yodsampa, No-one in Charge, 203.
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society and [the] young government [of Afghanistan]’.18 General James Jones, 
the Commander of the United States European Command, claimed that the drug 
trade was extremely harmful to nation-building and worried that Afghanistan was 
on the brink of becoming a narco-state. In 2008, General David Petraeus, the 
Commander of the United States Central Command, described drug money as 
‘the oxygen in the air’ that helped the Taliban-led insurgency to prosper.19 Not-
withstanding this rhetoric, no action was initially taken by the military, which 
prompted Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Paki-
stan from 2009 to 2010, to criticize the ‘strict limits’ imposed by the Pentagon on 
a US drug-prevention role. Without a change in US policy, he warned, Afghani-
stan would be held to ransom by its rampant drug barons.20 But the Pentagon 
assumed a commitment to counter-narcotics would inculcate “mission creep” and 
compromise COIN and thus remained opposed to the commitment of any signii-
cant military resources toward the endeavour. A Congressional Committee report 
revealed that even by 2010, ‘the correlation between the war effort and counter-
narcotics effort was not fully recognized’.21
The State Department was more concerned than the military with the threat 
that opium poppy production presented. It was attuned to the opinions of West-
ern Europe, Russia and the United Nations, who worried about the impact that 
Afghanistan’s poppy production would have on Europe’s heroin trade. From 2003, 
US oficials at the Embassy in Kabul and in Washington viewed opium production 
as a nation-building issue, which required a comprehensive and far-reaching solu-
tion. This perspective gained momentum as Afghanistan’s drug trade increased. 
Thomas Schweich, the Coordinator for Counter-narcotics and Justice Reform in 
Afghanistan, averred that ‘it’s all related . . . It’s no longer just a drug problem. It 
is an economic problem, a political problem and a security problem’.22 According 
to a 2006 State Department report to Congress, ‘Afghanistan’s huge drug trade 
severely impacts efforts to rebuild the economy, [and] develop a strong demo-
cratic government based on the rule of law’.23 A DoD oficial stated that whereas 
the US military was not interested in the broader implications of the drug trade, 
the State Department ‘pushed hard for a comprehensive counter-narcotics plan’.24
The INL proved to be the most active faction within the State Department. In 
2002, a prescient report conducted by the Bureau argued that there was ‘virtually 
18 Department of Defence, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June, 
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no counter-narcotics enforcement in Afghanistan’, predicting that ‘the drug trade 
will continue to lourish in the absence of concerted enforcement efforts’.25 When 
it came to counter-narcotics, the INL considered itself the most powerful and 
experienced agency within the US government. With this in mind, it believed that 
the remainder of the government should not only support its actions, but should 
also follow its lead. One US Military Commander says this left little room for 
amiable collaboration with other agencies: ‘The military had some pretty bright 
lines that we couldn’t go too far into that particular arena as it was viewed as an 
INL mission’, he recalls.26 It was not until 2010 that the INL inally realized that 
the narcotics trade required an inter-agency strategy.
The Justice Department’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was 
another faction that considered counter-narcotics in Afghanistan to it within its 
range of interests, which were ‘to disrupt and dismantle the most signiicant drug 
traficking organizations posing the greatest threat to the United States’.27 From 
2004, the DEA had small teams embedded in US military bases, but became 
frustrated when the security situation in many provinces prevented such teams 
from fulilling their mandate. Much like the State Department, the DEA promoted 
a comprehensive programme that included tracking narcotics activity, training 
counter-narcotics police, and deploying teams that conducted counter-narcotics 
operations to destroy opium crops and processing labs.28 To successfully pursue 
these activities, it advocated involvement on the part of the military establish-
ment. For Doug Wankel, the DEA’s Chief of Operations in Afghanistan, combat-
ing Afghanistan’s drug problem required the coordination of counter-narcotics 
and counter-insurgency to provide a suitable and sustainable long-term solution. 
The DEA nonetheless operated with relative autonomy from other government 
agencies, and did not actively seek to foster a whole-of-government strategy.29
In much the same fashion as the INL, the DEA’s culture meant that it portrayed 
itself as the US government’s lagship agency for counter-narcotics. It wished to 
deine the US strategy in Afghanistan, rather than act as a component within a 
broader effort.30 While the INL may have marked counter-narcotics as its turf, the 
DEA did not acknowledge that claim. Its Drug Flow Attack Strategy and Special 
Operation Division were independent programmes and they essentially cloned 
previous drug strategies in Mexico and Columbia. However, because those 
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27 Statement of James Capra, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, Caucus on 
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States Senate Hearing, January 15, 2014, 1.
28 Ali Jalali, Robert Oakley and Zoe Hunter, Combating Opium in Afghanistan, Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, National Defence University, November 2006, 3; John Glaze, Opium in Afghan-
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29 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 18, 2012.
30 Capra, “Future US Counter-Narcotics Efforts in Afghanistan”.
144 US Nation-Building in Afghanistan
programmes relied on the resources of the military establishment, it proved dif-
icult for them to have a substantial impact.
Inluential voices in Congress, meanwhile, claimed that ‘the success of the 
military effort in Afghanistan depends on the success of the counter-narcotics 
strategy’.31 These same voices identiied the Taliban as the world’s most eminent 
and dangerous drug cartel, even though this judgment went against the opinion of 
most experts, who claimed that the connection was ‘rather murky’.32 Indeed, the 
UNODC estimated that of the $3 billion generated by Afghanistan’s drug industry 
in 2010, only $90–160 million was used to support the insurgency.33
Instead of promoting clarity, Congressional interest only complicated the mat-
ter of how to pursue a strategy against drugs in Afghanistan. Prominent congress-
men criticized the US government’s inability to coordinate a comprehensive 
plan to tackle the drug problem through ‘practical initiatives to target major drug 
kingpins and warlords’.34 In the wake of a Congressional search for tangible results – 
which had been supported by many State and DoD oficials in Washington – 
long-term solutions advocated by those in the ield were ignored. A former 
US Ambassador to Afghanistan viewed Congressional pressure as a signiicant 
problem, which spurred a quick-ix solution where, ‘you get this screaming pres-
sure that something must be done about this and you have to solve the problem 
now’.35 Yet there was no concerted effort to get to the heart of the drug issue by tar-
geting trafickers and the corrupt oficials they were associated with, nor was there 
a chain linking the drug problem to education, security, law and development.
Clearly, the US approach to counter-narcotics was complex and disorganized. 
But an overarching programme did emerge in 2005. It revolved around ive main 
elements: judicial reform, public awareness campaigns, poppy eradication, drug 
interdiction and agricultural development. On initial impressions this ‘pillared 
approach’ embraced a comprehensive, multilayered strategy. But this proved to 
be an illusion: ‘The failure had been in implementation rather than conceptual-
ization’, Neumann states.36 Only in 2007 did an inter-agency plan for counter- 
insurgency and counter-narcotics become manifest. However engagement through 
bodies such as the Eradication Working Group, Counter-Narcotics Sync Group in 
Kabul, and Interagency Counter-narcotics Working Group in Washington, did not 
overcome the entrenched problems of agency culture and interests: ‘When we 
31 Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, US Counter-Narcotics Strategy in 
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started developing this interagency plan, everybody knew the narcotics numbers 
would be bad’ a sceptical Pentagon oficial groused.37
There was no move by the US government to conduct drug demand reduction 
programmes that targeted the ANP. Neither the State Department nor the military 
establishment had attempted to cooperate toward that end. When the GAO urged 
the two agencies to do so, the Department of Defence rejected this suggestion. 
‘The scope of mission does not include branching into drug rehabilitation pro-
grammes, nor do we believe that we have the expertise in DoD to take on such an 
additional mission’, Michael Vickers the Assistant Secretary for Defence claimed 
in 2010. The DoD instead requested that the civilian agencies take responsibility 
for such a programme. Although the State Department was more willing to pay 
the idea lip-service, its posture was practically identical to the military’s.38
Given the reluctance of the DoD and the State Department to cooperate on a 
whole-of-government approach to counter-narcotics, it is little wonder that the 
blunt instruments of eradication and interdiction remained the most important 
pillars of the US’s counter-narcotics strategy. From 2005 to 2010, the US spent 
a total of $2,504 million on counter-narcotics. Of this money, $992 million was 
spent on eradication and $966 million on interdiction, thereby eclipsing all other 
areas of counter-narcotics prevention.
Eradication was the more controversial of the two strategies. Afghans across 
the country complained of its pernicious impact on their livestock and health. 
Studies also found that by decreasing supply relative to demand, eradication 
functioned as ‘a price- support program that beneits traders’. Both Goodhand 
and  Felbab-Brown described eradication in Afghanistan as counter-productive 
because it targeted farmers and undermined the capacity of the State vis-à-vis 
strongmen, warlords and the Taliban. Eradication, for these two critics was a 
myopic solution to a complicated problem.39
Within the US government, heated debate arose as to whether eradication 
was appropriate or effective. Civilian oficials in the ield, who had experienced 
Afghanistan’s political and environmental nuances, were less inclined to support 
the strategy. Many at the US Embassy in Kabul were convinced that eradica-
tion fuelled Taliban propaganda and destroyed food crops. Even if one were to 
ignore these harmful effects, some oficials made the more basic point that all evi-
dence suggested that eradication simply did not work. Ambassador Neumann, for 
37 New York Times, “Pentagon Sees Aggressive Antidrug Effort in Afghanistan”, March 25, 2005.
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example, described it as ‘like trying to ill up a bucket by spitting in it, it was just 
not going to inherently produce results people wanted’. He wrote a cable oppos-
ing the eradication and argued that it ‘will make narcotics worse . . . and make 
the Taliban’s role easier’. Similarly, once DEA oficials gained an understanding 
of the situation in Afghanistan their perception changed. Afghan drug trafickers, 
they realized, collaborated with the population often to the beneit of the latter: 
‘They’ll share land. They’ll share labs and chemists. It was surprising to those of 
us who came from areas where that was a problem’, one DEA oficial remarked.40
The INL, meanwhile, favoured the more tangible results that eradication prom-
ised. Bobby Charles, the Associate Secretary of State for International Narcotics 
and Law enforcement, believed that the US had the ability to destroy much of 
Afghanistan’s opium production capacity if it focused on eradication. Charles’s 
perceptions and opinions were shaped by his agency’s culture. For him, the DEA’s 
experiences in Mexico and Colombia showed that ‘you can’t win against terror-
ism funded by an indigenous drug trade’ and that ‘heroin was the fuel running 
the engine of Taliban terrorism’.41 The INL was supported by some members of 
Congress and a number of White House oficials, who perceived the use of herbi-
cide to be critical to the prevention of poppy production. As these powerful forces 
coalesced, eradication became a central component of the State Department’s 
interests in Afghanistan.
Following the departure of Colin Powell the INL faced a power struggle with 
his replacement as Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, who openly challenged 
the Bureau on the importance of eradication. In response to this encroachment, 
Charles, who spearheaded the State Department’s eradication strategy, moved 
outside of his department and exhorted Congress to intervene. In his opinion, the 
INL needed to have an even stronger mandate to head a comprehensive eradica-
tion campaign, which required further Congressional support. A turf-conscious 
State Department, however, took issue with this apparently seditious approach 
and this forced his resignation. Even without Charles, the INL and its supporters 
continued to fund eradication initiatives based upon the agency’s previous experi-
ence with cartels in Colombia and Southeast Asia. But when applied to Afghani-
stan, these programmes targeted poor farmers, rather than the drug barons and 
actually drove many farmers to support the Taliban.
The INL also had a powerful supporter in Kabul. William Wood, Ambassa-
dor to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009, was unpopular outside the INL due to 
his interest in poppy eradication. Wood relied on the INL, which drew the ire of 
other factions within the State Department, and the military. The new Secretary 
of Defence, Robert Gates, concluded that ‘spraying is not a long-term strategy’. 
40 Neumann, The Other War: Winning and Losing Afghanistan; Ernesto Londoño, “As US With-
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Instead, Gates advocated two plans. The irst of these provided Afghan farmers 
with alternatives to poppy production, which was embodied in the Alternative 
Livelihoods Program (ALP), and the second centred on preventing corruption, in 
partnership with the Department of Justice. Spraying in Colombia failed to dimin-
ish the low of drugs there, he argued.42 Ambassador Wood saw it differently. He 
was heavily inluenced by his previous experience as Ambassador to Columbia, 
where he had been exposed to the INL’s unique culture. According to a surprised 
United States Embassy oficial in Kabul, he even offered to bathe in the chemicals 
used for spraying in order to prove their safety. This resulted in his staff adopting 
the moniker ‘Chemical Bill’ to describe their superior.43
Wood circumvented normal State Department channels and employed pri-
vate contractors such as AmorGroup to undertake eradication missions. He also 
avoided collaboration with the DEA. The latter claimed that Wood’s stance under-
mined inter-governmental programmes that mentored specialist ANP units and 
trained Afghan lawyers and judges in prosecuting narcotics cases – both of which 
had shown tentative progress. Finally, notwithstanding some minor exceptions, 
the military establishment believed that Wood’s eradication plan deeply alienated 
rural Afghans who depended on poppy production for their families’ subsistence. 
The US Ambassador nonetheless stepped up his campaign, even as the military 
distanced itself from destroying poppy crops.44
When Richard Holbrooke became aware of this he acted on the matter. A dip-
lomat of the more traditional mould, he did not perceive eradication to be an 
appropriate solution to Afghanistan’s drug problem. In 2009, the Special Envoy to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan campaigned against eradication: ‘Eradication is a waste 
of money’, he argued, ‘it might destroy some acreage, but it didn’t reduce the 
amount of money the Taliban got by one dollar. It just helped the Taliban. So we’re 
going to phase out eradication’.45 Holbrooke’s inluence would subsequently help 
to redirect counter-narcotics more toward interdiction and the ALP. But despite 
his powerful position, eradication continued to be a feature of State Department 
policy. In 2009, $237 million was spent on eradication, considerably more than 
the previous three years. In 2010, the INL sustained a Poppy Eradication Force 
that consisted of over 600 ANP oficers.46 The matter of eradication, therefore, 
was yet another illustration of parochial divisions within the State Department, 
deepened by factional interests, cultural predispositions and personal experience.
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In contrast to the ambivalence of the civilian agencies, eradication was some-
thing that the military establishment refused to countenance. A more powerful 
force in Washington than its civilian counterparts, the military weathered criti-
cism from Congress, the media and the White House that it had observed poppy 
production and opium sales from the sidelines, thereby emboldening participants 
in the trade. Despite the criticisms, the military continued to eschew involvement 
in the State Department’s eradication strategy. This was because of its cultural 
aversion to a task outside of its traditional role, but also because its experiences in 
Afghanistan had exposed the laws of eradication.
The gulf of understanding between soldiers and commanders that emerged with 
regard to infrastructure development was absent around the issue of eradication. 
In an impressive display of solidarity, senior military and DoD oficials supported 
the opinions of US soldiers and vice versa: ‘This is not about burning crops or 
destroying labs. Eventually it is about inding a better option for Afghans who 
have to feed their families’, a Pentagon oficial declared.47 A US General agreed:
I thought eradication was hugely counter-productive because it put the entire 
weight of the counter-narcotics effort on the farmers – the people you’re try-
ing to get on your side and secure from the enemy. Folks that had only that 
single line of interest were oblivious to that.48
Despite protests from the INL and other civilian factions, eradication never 
featured as a part of US military operations. As Jeffery Eggers, a senior military 
commander in Afghanistan remarked after a mission in Marja: ‘we don’t trample 
the livelihood of those we’re trying to win over’.49 Beyond 2010, the military 
instead protected poppy ields from the Taliban. When images of this improbable 
scenario generated media attention, more controversy in Washington ensued: ‘It’s 
kind of weird’, Lt Adam Lynch, a soldier serving in Afghanistan, states, ‘we’re 
coming over here to ight the Taliban. We see this. We know it’s bad. But at the 
same time we know it’s the only way locals can make money’.50
Given the division within the State Department, and between it and the mili-
tary, it was hardly surprising that a Senate Committee on International Narcotics 
control discovered a lack of clarity regarding the US government’s policy on erad-
ication.51 But rather than taking on board the opposition from the military estab-
lishment, and the growing realization by State and Justice Department oficials of 
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eradication’s ineffectiveness, Congress continued to argue that ‘crop eradication 
is a viable tool for narcotics suppression, and as such, should be incorporated into 
the overall counter-narcotics strategy’.52
There was considerably less controversy surrounding the viability of interdic-
tion, but the strategy still generated its own bureaucratic problems. The DEA was 
considered to be primarily responsible for interdiction operations and the gradual 
expansion of its presence in Afghanistan was directed toward that purpose.53 The 
DEA collaborated with local law enforcement, usually the Counter-Narcotics 
Police where it trained and monitored a National Interdiction Unit. The DEA, 
however, lacked air assets and therefore did not have the capacity to conduct 
the helicopter lifts that were crucial for drug raids. This was compounded by the 
fact that it had little understanding of operational procedures or collaborative 
mechanisms that would have helped it to obtain such assets from other agencies. 
Instead, it called for its own helicopter leet, under the justiication that, according 
to one DEA oficial, missions were ‘routinely delayed’ without ‘organic helicop-
ter assets’.54 This preference to operate autonomously was widely dismissed as 
unrealistic, unsustainable and costly. The DEA gradually realized the necessity to 
rely logistically on the military, but there was still dificulty obtaining its support. 
Much of this was due to poor organization and complicated bureaucratic mecha-
nisms, which hampered cooperation. But as a wing of the Justice Department the 
DEA also stood outside the broader nation-building mission, and the military did 
not consider the facilitation of DEA-led interdiction operations to be a priority.55
The State Department was more united in its support for interdiction than eradi-
cation. Embassy oficials and those in Washington continuously advocated the 
bombing of drug labs in Afghanistan. Holbrooke, whilst strongly against eradi-
cation, encouraged aggressive interdiction. The INL and DEA both maintained 
that US combat units needed to destroy narcotics labs and that the full weight 
of military resources should be applied to that task.56 Yet capturing high-level 
drug trafickers proved dificult, as the State Department, whose interests still cen-
tred on diplomacy, was reluctant to pressure Afghan oficials linked to the Karzai 
government. This, combined with a different understanding of how to approach 
drug trafickers between the DEA and INL, precluded any agreement on how to 
establish criteria for low-, mid- and high-level targets. When questioned on the 
matter, the State Department was reluctant to take the leadership role and instead 
deferred to the Department of Justice. The GAO rejected this position, arguing 
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that ‘State holds the primary responsibility for ensuring that measures to gauge 
progress exist’.57 Still, the State Department had forged strong diplomatic ties 
with the Karzai regime and it perceived this relationship to be more important 
than the GAO’s demands.
While the military establishment did not actively oppose interdiction, it was 
still reluctant to embrace it. US forces often did not destroy drugs when they were 
uncovered, and opium shipments were overlooked if they were attributed to be 
the property of domestic allies in the War on Terror. Soldiers were criticized for 
turning a blind eye to drug production.58 The main drivers of such a policy were 
Pentagon and CIA oficials, who had embraced the ‘warlord strategy’.
In 2005, the military was charged with providing what one Pentagon ofi-
cial described as ‘transportation, planning assistance, intelligence and targeting 
packages’ for the DEA. But in drug-ridden provinces such as Helmand, counter-
insurgency was inevitably prioritized over support for interdiction. The INL also 
engaged in interdiction operations. But according to one Pentagon source, the 
military was disinclined to engage with that agency due to its posture toward 
eradication.59
By 2007, the military had formally acknowledged the link between counter-
narcotics and counter-insurgency, but the Pentagon took no signiicant measures 
to enable interdiction. It was only during an October 2008 meeting that the DoD 
identiied opium traders as military targets, thus strategically linking the insur-
gency to the drug trade. US forces subsequently engaged with the DEA in joint-
operations, although even then military personnel were ordered not to directly 
participate in arrests. The establishment of the Combined Joint Interagency Task 
Force-Nexus in Kandahar in 2009 was an organ to coordinate military support 
for DEA interdiction missions. It too failed to produce a more comprehensive 
attempt to facilitate a whole-of-government interdiction plan that was linked to an 
overarching counter-narcotics strategy. By the end of 2010, no inter-agency plan 
for interdiction existed, which as the Pentagon admitted, created dificulties and 
compromised mission objectives.60
In summary, counter-narcotics stood outside the area of the military establish-
ment’s interests, while the efforts of the civilian branches were disorganized and 
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lacked cohesion. Within the US government there were voices of reason who 
advocated the implementation of a comprehensive strategy to combat the drug 
problem, but due to rivalry and parochialism within the State Department, pres-
sure from Congress, and the military establishment’s unwillingness to become 
involved, priorities for the counter-narcotics strategy were varied and coordina-
tion was largely absent. Many of the same problems reproduced themselves in 
efforts to create a functional legal system.
The Legal System
Without a functioning justice system, individuals and groups take matters into 
their own hands, which leads to chaos and violence that is redolent of Thomas 
Hobbes’s state of nature.61 Much of the reason behind the stability of the Taliban 
government was its ability to promote and enforce order. Based on an interpre-
tation of Sharia law that fused Pushtun tribal traditions with a fundamentalist 
Islamic creed, the Taliban imposed a brutal but effective form of justice.62
In 2002, an appropriate, functioning legal apparatus may have enhanced the 
ability of the international community to facilitate a peaceful transition to stable 
governance in Afghanistan. Achieving this required planning, mentoring, over-
sight, vetting and training judges and lawyers, constructing legal infrastructure, 
and providing equipment and expertise. Even then, much like the other nation-
building issue areas that have been discussed, an overhaul of Afghanistan’s legal 
system needed to overcome embedded challenges. Afghanistan’s judicial tradi-
tions bear little resemble to western conceptions of Jurisprudence. They have 
been characterized by a conservative interpretation of Islam that is dispensed at 
the local level. Religion and justice, although intertwined, still differ between 
ethnicities (Pushtuns, Harazas, Uzbeks, and Turkmen) and also between tribes.63 
Consequently, previous efforts to form an equitable justice system could not be 
harmonized with Afghan tribal practices and religious beliefs. Attempts to enforce 
a western-style justice system have tended to accentuate conlict rather than over-
come it, because they ignored customary traditions and Islamic principles.64
This had little bearing on the Bonn Agreement, through which Italy assumed 
responsibility for the construction of a new, western-style legal order in Afghani-
stan. But the Italians lacked experience, expertise and resources, which coalesced 
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with other problems to create formidable obstacles to the creation of an effective 
legal system. These problems included the inluence of powerful religious factions 
within the Karzai regime, the relative ignorance of the international community 
about the distinctive challenges within Afghanistan, and ‘pitfalls and contradic-
tions’ of the 2004 constitution. As a result, Afghanistan’s legal system adopted a 
fundamentalist bent, embodied by the conservative Supreme Court and antitheti-
cal to the international community’s aspirations of freedom and equality.65
In the absence of suitable legal mechanisms, much of the populace relied on 
local power brokers, tribal authorities and, increasingly from 2005, the Taliban: 
‘There is no government to deal with cases. The judges, even the lowest civil serv-
ants, are corrupt and they want bribes. People go to the Taliban and tribal elders 
instead to sort out their problems’, a farmer from Wardak stated. A foreign aid 
worker situated in Kandahar agreed, claiming that it was ‘no surprise that ordinary 
people began to seek out the sharia courts of the Taliban rather than those estab-
lished by the Kabul regime’.66
A popular embracing of the Taliban was exactly what the US feared. So why 
had it not prioritized the construction of Afghanistan’s legal system? The US 
commitment, both in terms of money and labour, compared poorly to the other 
issues addressed in this book. A 2008 report conducted by the GAO claimed that 
the justice system ‘lagged behind’ other US nation-building efforts, while a 2010 
report by the DoD admitted that there had been ‘little enduring progress despite 
signiicant investment toward reform, infrastructure and training’. The Justice 
Sector Support Program, the largest Rule of Law (ROL) initiative, was allocated 
$47.3 million in 2010, which was much less than projects in other nation-building 
areas. Other projects, such as the Anti-Corruption and Bribery Ofice (ACBO), 
were severely understaffed. After two years of operation the ACBO failed to 
achieve a single conviction. US projects to build suitable detention facilities were 
lacklustre and Afghanistan’s prisons remained drastically over-crowded. In 2010, 
most were illed to over four-times their capacity and some as much as ten-times.67
The US agencies most involved in the construction of Afghanistan’s legal 
system were the Department of Justice, USAID, the State Department (primar-
ily through the INL), and the military establishment. Unlike the drug issue, 
which dominated media headlines and was the subject of various governmental 
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committees, Afghanistan’s legal system was essentially ignored in Washington. 
Although Congress and the White House were aware of the problems that a legal 
vacuum raised, they put it near the bottom of their list of priorities.
National Security Presidential Directive 44 tasked the Secretaries of State and 
Defence with coordinating justice sector reform. But the various agencies oper-
ating in Afghanistan were placed under no signiicant pressure to actually initi-
ate rule of law projects. Agency neglect arose from the fact that the construction 
of a legal system did not sit within the area of expertise of any of the agencies 
involved, nor was it in their interests to lead the US ROL programme, given the 
array of other responsibilities that they had already accepted.
Reports by various parties within the US bureaucracy associated ROL projects 
with a broader nation-building programme. A 2006 report, for example, described 
the justice system as ‘critical to the success of implementing rule of law, pro-
tecting human rights, and gaining public conidence in government’. But four 
years later there remained no estimate of the cost or method by which to develop 
Afghanistan’s legal system, and no signiicant attempts to coordinate a cohesive 
approach.68
Afghanistan’s security forces were tied to the legal system in a 2009 by the 
United States Institute for Peace, which stated that ‘the best trained police are of 
minimal utility in securing public safety if the attorney general’s ofice and judi-
ciary are not adequately functional’.69 Chapter 4 showed that the Pentagon and 
the State Department dedicated signiicant resources, man-power and money to the 
ANP. It is astounding, therefore, that neither agency perceived a link between 
their efforts to strengthen the ANP, on the one hand, and the need to develop an 
appropriate legal system on the other. Such obliviousness is a testament to the 
impact that agency culture can have on the behaviour of its oficials, and more 
speciically their inability to integrate an unfamiliar issue within a broader policy 
framework.70
Simply identifying which agency had been allocated funding proved to be 
extremely dificult due to blurred lines of authority and disorganization, both 
within the civilian realm and between the civilian branches and the military 
establishment. In 2008, the State Department’s Ofice of the Inspector General 
lamented that ‘there is currently no way to readily identify ROL funding and 
subsequently identify duplicate programs, overlapping programs, or programs 
conlicting with each other’. Funding estimates differed between agencies and the 
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military, and no faction within the US bureaucracy could provide ‘a clear picture’ 
of US expenditures.71
In contrast to other areas such as security, infrastructure development and 
 counter-narcotics, moreover, there was no self-evaluation by the agencies 
involved in justice sector reform. The State Department, Department of Justice 
and Department of Defence failed to conduct formally documented performance 
evaluations of Afghanistan’s justice programme. According to the GAO, a lack 
of data or exchange of information between agencies prevented projects such as 
the Justice Oficials Tribunal, Criminal Task Force and the Justice Center from 
achieving their, admittedly vague, goals.72
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimated that spending for ROL 
projects by civilian agencies increased from $7 million in 2002, to $411 in 2010. 
Overall, the CRS found that the State Department and USAID had access to 
$904 million in funds for these purposes from 2002 to 2010. A number of bureau-
cratic factions were involved in a fractious assortment of initiatives. The INL was 
allocated the lion’s share of the money, $684 million, for justice system and cor-
rections system development.73 Although these two areas were purported to be its 
main focus, the INL was also involved in enterprises such as the United Nations’ 
Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force and the Afghan Central Narcotics Tribunal. 
These two projects were more compatible with its culture, which, as we have 
learned, centred on combating the international narcotics trade while placing the 
rule of law as a secondary concern.
The INL’s devotion to counter-narcotics helped to sway the US decision to 
construct the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which opened in 2009, at 
the cost of $11 million. The CNJC was monitored by the State Department and the 
Department of Justice and it housed Afghanistan’s Criminal Justice Task Force. 
Despite forming a united front when the CNJC was criticized by the US media,74 
the INL and the Justice Department bickered over its effectiveness. INL oficials 
argued that its detention centre was illed with low proile drug criminals, who 
were irrelevant characters who had no connection to the international operations 
of Afghanistan’s drug barons. Alternatively the Department of Justice claimed 
71 Francis Ward, Deputy Assistance Inspector General for Inspections, Oversight of US Efforts to 
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that low-level drug trafickers would help the United States gain access to higher 
value targets.75
Setting this bickering aside, the Department of Justice prima facie seemed to 
be the more appropriate agency to spearhead the development of Afghanistan’s 
new legal order. But it was unsuitable for that assignment for three reasons. First, 
it had no access to separate funds. Second, constructing an entire legal system 
in an alien environment was something for which the Department of Justice was 
unprepared. Third, as the case of the CNJC exempliies, when it comes to over-
seas activities, the DEA is the most prominent force within the department, and its 
interests centre on combating illicit drug production and traficking, and prosecut-
ing criminals and drug gangs, rather than ROL projects.76
Unlike the Department of Justice, USAID did have access to separate fund-
ing, which it used to pursue its own Rule of Law Project from 2004 to 2009. 
In total, USAID spent approximately $67 million on justice reform, but its pro-
jects overlapped with those conducted by the INL. Other enterprises such as the 
High Ofice of Oversight and the Anti-Corruption, Control and Audit Ofice, and 
the Major Crimes Task Force, were loosely supported by a complex and varying 
amalgam of agencies, which included the INL, USAID, State Department, Jus-
tice Department, the Department of Treasury and the FBI. These and other ROL 
programmes were coordinated in Kabul through a Special Committee on the Rule 
of Law, and in Washington by the Afghanistan Justice Coordination group. But 
each of the two bodies had different mission platforms and goals. Thus neither 
functioned as an overarching coordination mechanism: ‘Our plunge into judicial 
assistance was chaotic’, Neumann states; ‘USAID ran some programs through 
contractors, State had its own contracts but was also paying for several experi-
enced prosecutors on loan from the Department of Justice, who often seemed to 
operate independently’.77 One Senior State Department Oficial was quite candid 
in his admission that the State Department had mishandled the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan’s legal system and acknowledged that it had other interests that took 
priority:
In fairness to others, it took me a while to understand I could not supervise 
this myself. Even when I had some ideas and knew where I wanted to be and 
where I wanted to go, I was constantly drawn off by a military crisis, a drug 
crisis, or a political crisis, and so supervision would lapse for a period of time 
until I could come back to it.78
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Eventually, he overcame the problem by appointing someone to control and 
oversee the justice programme, which integrated the State Department’s activities 
in Kabul, but did nothing to address the blurred lines of authority between it and 
other agencies. Realistically, the appointment had no power outside of the US 
Ambassador’s narrow sphere of authority. From an idea initially conceptualized 
by Neumann, the position of Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law 
Enforcement evolved in 2010. But there is little evidence that the position carried 
weight outside of the State Department.79
A inal problem with the civilian approach to legal reform in Afghanistan was 
that civilian advisors were corralled in Kabul, because their agencies did not have 
the power or capability to reliably operate outside of Afghanistan’s capital. The 
Assistant Secretary of State, David Johnson, admitted that justice sector reform 
outside Kabul was in 2008 ‘fairly rudimentary’. Thus civilian ROL oficials were 
absent from approximately 90 per cent of Afghanistan.80
The amount of funding that the military dedicated to ROL projects proved to 
be even more dificult to ascertain than the expenditures of the civilian branch. 
A 2008 OIG report, for example, contended that there was ‘no way to determine 
what the many different elements of the DoD were spending speciically on 
ROL’.81 In contrast to civilian efforts, which were restricted to Kabul, the military 
took an approach that focused on ROL projects in Afghanistan’s conlict-ridden 
southern provinces. Naturally, it did this in adherence to the all-encompassing 
strategy of COIN. CERP funds were used to construct judicial systems at the 
provincial and local level, while another programme centred on securing transport 
for judges and prosecutors in dangerous areas. The military establishment looked 
to the Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAG) to organize many of these projects, 
but JAG oficers had no experience in constructing a legal system and they were 
deployed ‘without guidance or training’.82
Notwithstanding the fact that it incorporated ROL projects within the aus-
pices of COIN, however, the military proclaimed that it was unsuited to justice 
sector reform because its culture was, according to a report conducted by the US 
Army, ‘different from the rest of the interagency’. ‘The military skill sets’, the 
report argued, were ‘better suited to restore economic and industrial power’. An 
Army Handbook, meanwhile, argued that creating a secure environment ‘may 
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be the only real contribution that US forces can make towards implementing the 
rule of law’.83
Despite recognizing that it was unqualiied, and indeed uninterested, in con-
ducting justice sector reform outside of the parameters of COIN, the military 
claimed that civilian agencies would not accept military leadership and that the 
civilian branches had no perception of how to operate under unity of command. 
This incompatibility determined that coordination among elements was weak and 
relations were strained. Even more so than with counter-narcotics, the military 
and civilian spheres operated in separation.84
An example of this disharmony was the construction of the Counter-Narcotics 
Justice Center. The project was used as an illustration of effective civilian- military 
collaboration,85 but upon closer inspection this was not the case. The State Depart-
ment had contracted the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to 
construct the CNJC. But the USACE refused to conduct the recommended util-
ity upgrades, because ‘funds provided under the interagency agreement were no 
longer valid’. The State Department assured the USACE that the funding was 
indeed still valid, but they would not listen.86 We can speculate that the USACE 
was frustrated by the slowness of the State Department to act, which highlights 
the incompatibility of the two agencies’ procedural norms.
The ight against the Taliban-led insurgency had a pernicious effect on all 
attempts to construct a fair and equitable legal order. US combat operations, 
according to a long-standing tenet established irst in FM31–15, must be ‘con-
ducted in consonance with speciied civil rights, liberties, and objectives’.87 
A legal void, however, existed within the orbit of combat operations, as the mili-
tary establishment ferociously pursued a war-ighting mandate. In prosecuting the 
GWOT, the Pentagon and the CIA blatantly ignored Afghanistan’s laws. Although 
civilians were often targeted, tortured and killed, US troops were not called to 
account for their actions. Afghan prisoners were perceived to be military property, 
while US citizens who committed crimes in Afghanistan did so with impunity. 
83 United States Army, Leader Challenges: Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, December 2005, 18; United 
States Army, Rule of Law Handbook: A Practitioners Guide for Judge Advocates (Virginia: Center 
for Law and Military Operations, 2010), 12.
84 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 18, 2012; Author 
Interview with a Senior Defence Department Oficial, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, July 15, 
2013.
85 Government Accountability Ofice, Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress 
Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed, 6
86 Special Inspector General, Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Action Needed to Resolve Con-
struction Delays at the Counter-narcotics Center, SIGAR Report, August 27, 2009, 3–4.
87 FM 31–15, Operations Against Irregular Forces, Department of the Army, May, 1961, 4. This was 
then implanted as part of COIN in Afghanistan in October 2006; United States Army, Southern 
Afghanistan COIN Operations Handbook: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Center for Army 
Lessons Learned, October, 2006, 24.
158 US Nation-Building in Afghanistan
One report found that ‘despite several homicides by US oficials and contractors 
. . . none of the guilty have received signiicant sanctions’.88
Interrogations were conducted at Bagram airbase. One such interrogation 
resulted in an Afghan prisoner being brutally beaten to death by a CIA operative. 
Other prisoners were subject to noise torture. An Afghan translator revealed that 
US Special Forces ‘punish those who would not confess with a very terrible kind 
of “music” ’. As the military’s primary focus was on defeating the enemy, Bagram 
and other military bases across Afghanistan became ‘ransomed by bounty  hunters 
seeking compensation or by personal foes who, pursuing vendettas unrelated to 
real crimes, denounced them to the Americans as “al-Qaeda” and “Taliban” ’.89 
Thus, although the US military had not deliberately set out to topple Afghanistan’s 
justice system, its actions contributed to the failure to build a functioning legal 
system in Afghanistan. This alienated many of the hearts and minds the Pentagon 
claimed to be cultivating.
Governance
Along with a legal system, governments are required for a functioning society and 
are essential for order, and, ultimately, prosperity. But since the misadventures 
of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan has been wrecked by institutional illegitimacy, 
fractured community trust, and a depletion of social capital. Nation-building in 
2001 was supposedly a panacea for these problems, ‘a short-cut to the Weberian 
state’, that skips the ‘long, conlictual and often brutal evolution that historically 
underlies the formation of states’.90
The responsibility for constructing a new political order in Afghanistan was 
irmly in the hands of the United States and its allies. The US, above all, had 
the power to shape the country’s government, institutions and bureaucracy into 
a form that would be beneicial for the Afghan people. When asked what the 
US role in Afghanistan would be after the invasion, however, Donald Rumsfeld 
responded with: ‘I don’t think that leaves us with a responsibility to try to igure 
out what kind of government that country ought to have’. Rumsfeld, a staunch 
realist, was not convinced that a ‘democratic tsunami’ could engulf Afghanistan.91 
Yet others within the Bush Administration had ambitions to transform the country 
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into a thriving liberal state, to buttress its quest for global democracy: ‘Liberating 
the suffering people of Afghanistan was necessary and just’ rejoiced President 
George W. Bush, who claimed that he was ‘overjoyed by the scenes of liberation’ 
in Afghanistan, and that the United States was committed to ‘helping a demo-
cratic government emerge’. Dick Cheney, the Vice President, also emphasized the 
US commitment: ‘in this journey of freedom and progress, they will continue to 
have the full support of America’. The President’s wife, Laura Bush, on a 2005 
visit to Afghanistan was convinced ‘that tyranny has been replaced by a young 
democracy and the power of freedom is on display’. Recently appointed Secretary 
of State, Condoleezza Rice, made a similar observation during her visit to the 
country in March 2006, concluding that there was ‘no better story of democratic 
development’.92
The tsunami, however, was mostly in the form of rhetoric, rather than practical 
commitment. Some US sources criticized the US approach as myopic, and called 
for a systematic overhaul to relect disparate tribal power structures in Afghani-
stan.93 But the White House was unmoved, and continued to support centralized 
government justiied by some sort of vague democratic mandate. This ignored the 
fact that Afghanistan had formidable cultural, political, geographical and histori-
cal barriers to the crystallization of democracy. As Johnson and Jolyom state, the 
country was not ‘a blank canvas on which the outside world could paint the colors 
of its choice’.94 Diverse tribal hierarchies jostled for power in Afghanistan’s 
 nebulous political landscape, and the hostility between Pushtuns and Afghans of 
other ethnic stripes continued unabated.
Traditionally, the State Department’s interests centre on diplomacy. It was the 
logical choice, therefore, to help establish and subsequently interact with the 
Afghan government. The State Department dominated US involvement in Afghan 
politics at the national level, which left little room for USAID and other civil-
ian agencies to accrue favour with, or inluence the behaviour of, Afghanistan’s 
government. The military, meanwhile, allowed the State Department this power, 
under the condition that it pressured the Afghan government to maintain constant 
support for the war effort.
The US approach to governance was deeply problematic from the outset. Zahir 
Shah, the former Afghan monarch, was sidelined from the political process to 
perform a ceremonial role. Instead it was pro-US Afghan exiles who were brought 
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into government with US support. Foremost among these igures was Hamid Kar-
zai, Afghanistan’s long-standing President (2004–2014). Karzai was in many 
respects a US puppet, of the same breed as the Afghan rulers whom the British 
and Soviets had placed on the throne in Kabul. The State Department convinced 
Afghan delegates at the Bonn Conference to vote for Karzai, despite the fact that 
many of them had never heard of him.95
Following an attempt on his life, the Afghan President was placed under con-
stant guard by American Special Forces. He was perceived by his countrymen 
to be ‘just the mayor of ISAF-policed Kabul, nothing more’.96 Karzai’s inluence 
never stretched much beyond Kabul, and although Afghanistan’s capital was 
depicted by the State Department as a beacon for democracy, it was, at best, a 
lighthouse in a storm.97 Conditions in Kabul bore no relection of the political con-
lict and turmoil that roiled beyond its outer limits.
The weight of the State Department’s power over Karzai’s regime was rein-
forced by the fact that Zalmay Khalizad, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 
2003 to 2005, was often described as the second President of Afghanistan. The 
country’s ‘irst President’ often submitted to the US Ambassador while other State 
Department oficials were even responsible for structuring his major speeches.98 
Within the State Department, however, there were rumblings indicating that sup-
port for Karzai was not unanimous. An internal memo in May 2005 warned that 
part of the reason behind the growth of Afghanistan’s heroin trade was that Kar-
zai ‘has been unwilling to assert strong leadership’. By contrast, State Depart-
ment spokesman Richard A. Boucher described the Afghan President as ‘a strong 
partner’, saying ‘we have every conidence in him’ to correctly address the drug 
problem in concert with the US. For the most part, therefore, the State Department 
presented a united front to the public and was reluctant to defy the White House, 
which had given it clear orders to support the Karzai government, regardless of 
its many laws.99
The rampant corruption embedded within the Afghan national government was 
thus tolerated by the United States. Karzai functioned as ‘a nineteenth-century 
Durrani nobleman, reined by the warlord ethics of the late twentieth century’.100 
His relatives won most of the lucrative infrastructure development contracts that 
they applied for, and the President’s inner circle was widely considered to be 
crooked and autocratic. In 2007, Craig Murray, Britain’s Ambassador to Uzbeki-
stan from 2002 to 2004, contended that ‘the four largest players in the heroin 
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business are all senior members of the Afghan government’. There is evidence to 
suggest that the United States was well aware of Karzai’s corruption, but it still 
failed to take substantive action besides sporadic rhetorical pressure.101
In the eyes of many Afghans, the Karzai government and the US were one and 
the same. ‘The Americans are very powerful and they can control the government . . . 
but if the people don’t like them, they will have to leave’, one Afghan observed 
during an anti-government protest. In 2007, protests became more emotive, with 
frustrated Afghans throwing rocks at the police and chanting, ‘Death to America! 
Death to Karzai!’102 The military establishment was oblivious to the fact that the 
unpopularity of the Afghan government directly contributed to the strength of the 
Taliban-led insurgency, which provided the only substantive domestic alternative 
to Karzai’s incorrigible ruling clique.
The military establishment was elated by its swift victory over the Taliban 
in 2001, which prompted Tommy Franks, the Commander of US Central Com-
mand from 2000 to 2003, to claim that the US had ‘liberated not conquered their 
nation’.103 But once victory had been achieved the US military was nonplussed 
as to the form of government that was erected. Ryan Crocker, the interim chargé 
d’affaires to the government of Afghanistan from 2002 to 2004, highlighted the 
different interests between the State Department and the Pentagon:
We were asking how can central authority be established . . . The Pentagon’s 
view was our job is done and let’s get out of here. We got rid of the evil and 
we should not get stuck.104
While the State Department held sway over US policy in Kabul, the military was 
the only actor with a signiicant presence throughout the remainder of the country. 
It alone within the US foreign policy bureaucracy, therefore, had the power to 
inluence the shape and nature of governance in Afghanistan’s rural sphere.
Once the Taliban-led insurgency emerged to challenge the Karzai regime in 
2004, the US military presence in Afghanistan strengthened and its attitude seem-
ingly shifted. Eikenberry acknowledged that ‘the longer term threat is the loss of 
legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan’, arguing that ‘we need more urgency 
to build Afghan government capacity and help connect it to the Afghan people’. 
A DoD report in 2008 stated that ‘effective governance is crucial to achieving US 
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objectives in Afghanistan and facilitating the country’s independence’.105 Many 
US soldiers seemed attuned to the importance of governance for nation-building: 
‘Victory, however you deine it, will come when the Afghan government is capa-
ble of providing security and some semblance of prosperity and welfare for the 
people’, Lt Benjamin Tupper stated.106 Another soldier astutely recognized why 
government is important, in a New York Times opinion piece:
When ordinary people lose their faith in their government, then they also lose 
faith in the foreigners who prop it up. The day that happens across Afghani-
stan is the day we lose the war.107
Such awareness did not translate into a nationwide policy that encouraged grass-
roots, popular governance. As with each other nation-building issue discussed in 
this book, the Pentagon based its approach on how Afghanistan’s political envi-
ronment would affect its combat operations and complement COIN. It failed to 
prevent corruption at the provincial and local level if the corrupted supported, or 
at least pretended to support, the war against the Taliban-led insurgency, and did 
little to assist US soldiers in the ield who attempted to do more. In Kandahar, 
public ofice was for sale to the highest bidder, who then quickly became rich 
thanks to bribes and other criminal activities. District and provincial governors, 
moreover, were often able to convince the US military to attack their rivals. In 
mid-2006, when ighting broke out between Rashid Dostum and Abdul Malik, 
two of the most notorious warlords, they continued to be treated as ‘linchpins of 
local security’.108 An unwillingness to mediate this and other conlicts directly 
contradicted the pretence of ‘winning hearts and minds’, and lent further weight 
to the hypothesis that the military was far more interested in war-ighting than 
genuine nation-building. The military also failed to recognize how its tolerance 
of corruption and violence from pro-US authority igures hampered infrastructure 
development. As one Afghan civil society representative expostulated: ‘schools 
or clinics are useless if people hate the district level administration. What can you 
build so that a community will accept a corrupt or brutal leader?’109 At the same 
time as turning its back on good governance at the provincial and local level, 
however, the military establishment hypocritically supported elections.
Elections are perhaps the most signiicant hallmark of democracy. Pei and 
Kasper, however, view elections as ‘a challenge beyond the capacity of even 
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the most well-intentioned and determined outsiders’, while Maley considers 
them to be ‘logistically the most complicated events that can be undertaken in 
peacetime’.110 Nonetheless, in Afghanistan the US argued that Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections were the presuppositions for democracy and all of the 
beneicial effects that low from it. For the White House, which neglected other 
nation-building issues, elections were the main nation-building priority. In the 
lead-up to the irst Presidential elections in 2004, it pressured USAID contractors 
to push ahead with nation-building projects, notwithstanding that they required 
more time or reassessment. Patrick Fine, USAID’s Mission Director from 2004 
to 2005, experienced ‘intense pressure to get work underway immediately and to 
deliver inished school proper to the scheduled June (2004) presidential election’. 
‘It was a political timeline’, one contractor noted, ‘that has created all of the prob-
lems’. The 2004 presidential elections were hailed by President Bush as a demo-
cratic milestone. Yet the support of the White House did not relect a US interest 
in Afghanistan’s political future, but rather a way to erect a chimera that presented 
the country as a success story to domestic US constituents and the US media.111
Parliamentary elections, which were slated by the Bonn Agreement to coin-
cide with the Presidential elections, were not held until mid-September 2005. The 
Afghan people’s discontent was more conspicuous than during the Presidential 
elections, and so was the intimidation of those that chose to participate. On 25 
June, 2004, 16 recently returned refugees were killed by the Taliban for carrying 
voter registration cards. Many Afghans simply did not turn out to vote. One vil-
lage elder said that if he were to vote, ‘I won’t stay alive for very long’, remark-
ing to American soldiers that ‘you guys are very nice, but you only come around 
once in a while. The Taliban will come here as soon as you are gone’.112 Without 
a reliable security presence, candidates relied on militias and armed assistance to 
rise to power.
Once again, the White House was concerned that the Parliamentary elections 
progressed smoothly, and ignored both the security problems and a lack of faith 
from Afghans in the ability of the elections to produce candidates who relected 
the will of their constituents. During her visit to Afghanistan, Rice’s main concern 
was to prevent the elections from being further delayed. She remained staunchly 
unwilling to criticize the Afghan government, instead parroting the narrow mes-
sage of her administration that presented elections as the embodiment of democ-
racy. Similarly, General Barno claimed that COIN was having ‘positive and 
dramatic’ results because it helped to ensure that Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections were held.113 The US perspective, however, is described by Fitz and 
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Gould as ‘a frightening self-delusion’ and many Afghans perceived the results of 
the two elections to be ‘a negative symbol of US inluence’.114
Female politicians, who according to US rhetoric had been empowered by 
Afghanistan’s new democratic order, remained impotent and beset by prejudice. 
One female MP claimed that she had almost become a prisoner in her own home 
again, and stated that ‘for all this I blame America’. ‘Equal rights for women 
[were] illusory . . . a polite feel-good iction that helped to sell the American enter-
prise at home’, Jones observes.115
The Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in 2009, and the Parlia-
mentary elections in 2010, were similarly problematic. Violence and the dis-
content of the Afghan people increased, and vote tampering was common. But 
US support for the elections, and by extension the Karzai regime, remained 
the same. The most tangible indication of US involvement in the 2009 and 
2010 elections was USAID’s Afghanistan Presidential and Provincial Elections 
Observation Program. USAID – with the help of the International Foundation 
for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Consortium for Election and Political 
Process Strengthening (CEPPS) – engaged in civil education, anti-fraud and 
electoral observation. Although the agency claimed it had spent $124.5 million 
in total from 2008 to 2011, this number is misleading. Half of the funds were 
contracted to outside parties, while another portion of the funds were man-
aged by the IFES. Again, we can see that USAID’s culture and lack of power 
prompted it to outsource, and once again it failed to conduct contractor perfor-
mance reviews. The agency argued that ‘the lack of security was the greatest 
challenge to observing these elections’, but this precipitated no attempt to col-
laborate with the military establishment to overcome that problem.116 For these 
reasons, USAID’s leeting commitment to electoral monitoring and reform had 
little impact on the elections, which caused destabilization, reactivated or exac-
erbated tribal and ethnic grievances, and reinforced the authority of regional 
and local autocrats.117
Although they were few and far between, there were other mechanisms to pro-
mote governance devised by the US, based around civil servant training and local 
governance and community development. These were promoted through district 
community councils, in order to ‘improve basic governance and public service 
114 Fitzgerald and Gould, Invisible History, 273; Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 140.
115 Chris Sands, “Chaos Central”, in Nick Turse (ed.), The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
68; Jones, In the graveyard of Empires, 97.
116 Ofice of the Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Support to the Electoral Process 
and Support for Increased Electoral Participation in Afghanistan’s Programs, Kabul, June 19, 
2011, 1–11; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Quarterly 
Report the United States Congress, 69.
117 Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan, Elections in an Unstable 
Political Landscape (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
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delivery’.118 But because they lacked the capacity to operate in rural Afghanistan, 
the civilian agencies outsourced the projects and often lacked the power or will 
to monitor them. Robert Finn, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2002 to 
2003, also points to fundamentally different interests between the State Depart-
ment and USAID in respect of the importance of governance for nation-building:
I was trying to get USAID to train civil servants, but . . . USAID was focused 
on building schools, not training Afghans how to manage the system to build 
the school . . . They said they couldn’t do both . . . USAID said, ‘We don’t do 
physical construction, we do long-term projects like irrigation’ . . . But long-
term didn’t mean training bureaucrats.119
This observation supports the indings of the previous two chapters, which dem-
onstrated that USAID’s interests, culture and perceptions were far removed from 
those of the State Department.
Conclusion
An examination of counter-narcotics and the justice system both revealed divi-
sions within the US foreign policy bureaucracy. While there was not as much 
conlict as there was in respect to security and infrastructure development, 
 counter-narcotics still provoked debate over the appropriate policy. Eradication 
was considered to be the most attractive strategy by the INL and some individuals 
within the State Department. The military, however, did not share that assessment 
and refused to participate in US-driven eradication. The Pentagon showed similar 
reluctance to engage in interdiction, while the DEA struggled to implement its 
policies and programmes, primarily due to a lack of resources and inluence, both 
in Washington and Afghanistan. The justice system, meanwhile, was essentially 
ignored by all of the relevant US agencies because it sat well beyond their areas of 
interest and expertise. The military also refused to adapt its behaviour to conform 
to Afghanistan’s laws, and no US agency could unite the elements of the bureau-
cracy to construct an overarching policy platform for legal reform.
What separates the US approach to governance from all of the other nation-
building issues discussed was the interest of the White House. The executive 
branch, led by President George W. Bush, insisted that democracy, and by exten-
sion, elections, were the main priority of the US in Afghanistan. The ambitions 
of the White House were presented as a means to ensure better circumstances 
for the Afghan people, but were more realistically a cloak to hide a more base 
118 Department of Defence, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 34. 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report the United States 
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interest – presenting the country as a successful case of US intervention, in con-
trast to Iraq. A centralized model of governance and elections failed to promote 
stability and egalitarianism, despite the more genuine, but perhaps similarly 
deluded, efforts of the United Nations. Ironically, while the US was considered to 
be the veritable power behind the throne, it left most of the practical preparation 
for elections, and other mechanisms of governance, to the rest of the international 
community. There was little in the way of inter-agency conlict due to the fact that 
the State Department dominated diplomatic relations with the Afghan regime, and 
developed a rapport with Afghan President Karzai. Outside of the capital, however, 
the State department was essentially non-existent and the military’s approach to 
provincial and local government centred on the myopic understanding that auto-
cratic igures promoted stability. The more practical endeavours of constructing 
a civil service, mechanisms for local governance and anti-corruption initiatives 
were given much less attention, even at the height of COIN.120 Counter-narcotics, 
justice sector reform and governance, therefore, joined security and infrastructure 
development as failed aspects of US nation-building in Afghanistan.
120 Ernesto Londoño, “Survey of Afghans Points to Rampant Corruption in Government”, Wash-
ington Post, July 8, 2011; T.S. Allen, “Addressing an Ignored Imperative, Rural Corruption in 
Afghanistan”, Small Wars Journal, February 19, 2013.
Part III
Avenues for Inter-Agency 
Cooperation

Part II of this book examined the ways in which inter- and intra-agency disorder 
was spread across multiple areas of nation-building in Afghanistan. This arose 
from the failings of political leadership on the one hand, and differences in bureau-
cratic interests, perception, culture and power, on the other. Part III now turns to the 
mechanisms that were devised to bridge divisions between and within agencies, and 
assesses their effectiveness. As we have seen in some of the earlier examples, US 
agencies, and indeed factions within agencies, are aggressively territorial and resist-
ant to change. Consequently, any institutional mechanisms designed to improve 
cooperation were always going to struggle to impact upon ingrained norms and 
behaviour. As Wilson observes, ‘no agency head is willing to subordinate his or her 
organization to a procedure that allows other agencies to deine its tasks or allocate 
its resources’.1 This statement distils one of the central problems confronting US 
nation-building in Afghanistan, and relates to one of the main reasons for institu-
tional innovations that sought to overcome bureaucratic incoherence and discord.2
This chapter examines these collaborative mechanisms, which were contrived 
to promote a whole-of-government approach. I commence with a consideration 
of US government attempts to institutionalize cooperation through programmes 
within agencies and by empowering individuals. The impact of a less formalized 
instrument for collaboration – personal relationships – is also assessed. This is 
followed by a comparison of ideas drawn from academic articles and think-tanks 
with those devised by the US government. Finally, I discuss an issue that has 
often been overlooked when analysing the reasons for nation-building failings in 
Afghanistan – the shortness of staff postings in Afghanistan. By discussing these 
issues in their totality, a more complete picture emerges of the problems associ-
ated with establishing functional mechanisms to overcome bureaucratic hurdles.
Government-Based Mechanisms for Cooperation
As the disorganization of US nation-building in Afghanistan received increased 
scrutiny from Congress, the Media and the White House, agencies were 
1 Wilson, Bureaucracy, What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, 266 and 269.
2 Drezner. “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy”, 737.
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encouraged to explore mechanisms for facilitating a whole-of-government 
approach. Ironically, the initiatives that resulted were typically hatched in bureau-
cratic isolation. The State Department, USAID, the military establishment, the 
counter- bureaucracy and the National Security Council (NSC) all developed their 
own solutions to the problems of inter-agency incoherence. But the ‘solutions’ 
proffered simply expressed and exacerbated the original problem, as becomes 
clear when considering a few of the more notable examples.
Arguably, the most promising hub for the promotion of bureaucratic cohesion 
was the Ofice of Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/
CRS was established in 2004 when the Bush administration became frustrated 
with the inability of civilian agencies to mobilize and organize nation-building 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was mandated to provide streamlined 
civilian expertise while overcoming the bureaucratic divisions. Positioning the 
new ofice within the State Department, however, severely restricted its capac-
ity to inluence other agencies and turf-conscious factions within the department 
itself. Although S/CRS put forward a number of innovative solutions for intra- 
governmental cooperation – such as the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) and the 
Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group – these and other ideas did not 
transcend the conines of its small ofice in Washington. Its mandated authority, 
therefore, was juxtaposed with what Stewart describes as ‘a beleaguered, under-
staffed and under-resourced entity operating from a single government depart-
ment’. S/CRS lacked power and credibility, which relegated it to ‘offering conlict 
management consultancy services to skeptical regional bureaus’.3 In 2007, oppo-
sition from within the State Department resulted in the S/CRS administrator being 
demoted to the position of Deputy Director of Foreign Assistance, which further 
marginalized the ofice within the department’s ‘turf-conscious bureaucracy’.4 
A Senior Defence Department Oficial explained the regulatory and funding prob-
lems associated with its location:
S/CRS turned out not to be very successful, partly because they couldn’t get 
resources from the Hill and partly because they couldn’t build up the cadre of 
folks that they wanted to build up. I think that the reason for these problems 
was that it was formed in the wrong place. It shouldn’t have been at State, 
it should have been at the White House level. Or, if it had to have been at 
State, it should have had a direct reporting capability to the White House. The 
National Security Council and the Ofice of Management and Budget should 
3 Patrick Stewart, “The US Response to Precarious States: Tentative Progress and Remaining Obsta-
cles to Coherence”, in Stefani Weiss (ed.), International Responses to Precarious States: A Com-
parative Analysis of International Strategies with Recommendations for Action by European 
Institutions and Member States (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2007), 7; Miles, 
“The State Department, USAID, and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction”, 
40; Stewart and Brown, Greater than the Sum of its Parts?, 39.
4 Bowen, “No More Adhocracies Reforming the Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations”.
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have had a stake. A higher level would have helped get resources from the 
Hill. It just didn’t work out of State. The State Department interacted with the 
Foreign Relations and Foreign Operations Committees and those guys didn’t 
give S/CRS a lot of money.5
USAID, meanwhile, viewed S/CRS as an attempt by the State Department to 
overrule its decisions. A Senior USAID Oficial was candid in his response to 
such an encroachment: ‘I told them to go screw themselves, I don’t want them 
telling me what to do’. In explaining his response he said, ‘We didn’t want another 
layer of oversight, because more oversight actually slows everything down – eve-
rything, it doesn’t improve things’.6 Although S/CRS had no association with the 
counter-bureaucracy, USAID asserted its independence where it could. USAID 
may not have been able to shake off the encroachments of the OMB, State Depart-
ment or the military establishment, but it easily dismissed the nascent S/CRS.
The military establishment was more accommodating of S/CRS programmes, 
and indeed can be seen as a supporter. Ambassador John Herbst, the Coordina-
tor for Reconstruction and Stabilization, who headed S/CRS in 2006, claimed 
that the military establishment was in fact a ‘big’ supporter of his ofice. At the 
request of the Pentagon in 2007, S/CRS put together civil operational plans for 
US Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. The plan drew a 
favourable response from the military, all the way up to Defence Secretary Robert 
Gates and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Michael Mullen. The reason 
for the military’s support was because PRTs (which we will examine in more 
detail in the next chapter) were designed as quick-impact units that aligned with 
COIN. PRTs were successfully implemented when other S/CRS initiatives were 
not, principally because of the military’s involvement. Herbst argued that if the 
civil operational plans had come from S/CRS alone, the State Department and 
USAID would have simply dismissed them. Notwithstanding the PRTs and other 
small projects, nation-building in Afghanistan was too large an operation for S/
CRS to inluence. S/CRS staff members admitted that the role it played there was 
minor.7
In 2011, S/CRS was replaced by the Bureau for Conlict and Stabilization 
Operations (CSO). Essentially the same ofice with a different name, CSO inher-
ited its predecessor’s limitations. Again, the most damage occurred with the deci-
sion to shackle CSO to the State Department, which crippled the new Bureau’s 
capacity to function autonomously. According to a report by the Commission on 
Wartime Contracting, stove-piping, and other internal machinations within State, 
prevented it from gaining ‘suficient authority or bureaucratic heft to enforce 
accountability’. Ambassador Inderfurth adds that CSO was never well funded nor 
5 Author Interview with a Senior Defence Department Oficial, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, 
July 15, 2013.
6 Author Interview with a Senior USAID Oficial, Washington DC, April 19, 2012.
7 Author interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 30, 2012.
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was it given adequate attention.8 Both these enterprising initiatives, therefore, 
came off second best in the US’s bureaucratic turf wars.
Another initiative that attempted to empower the State Department was the 
National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). In 2005, NSPD-44 
made the Secretary of State responsible for coordinating the inter-agency pro-
cess. The Secretary was directed to lead inter-agency efforts, mitigate conlict 
between agencies, and develop integrated plans that wedded civilian and military 
programmes. NSPD-44 was subject to signiicant delays, however, and failed to 
impact on nation-building in Afghanistan. According to a report by the US House 
of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, it provided ‘unclear and incon-
sistent guidance’ on agency roles and responsibilities.9 The directive, moreover, 
was disconnected from other inter-agency strategies, such as S/CRS and CSO, and 
it failed to clarify how the military establishment would support civilian efforts.
After becoming Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice tried another approach. 
She highlighted the importance of improving civilian capacity for nation-building 
and advocated ‘Transformational Diplomacy’ that would facilitate discussion 
between US agencies.10 Transformational Diplomacy emphasized democracy 
through development and gave the USAID director full authority to manage the 
State Department’s foreign aid programme. Predictably, USAID supported it, but 
Rice’s commitment to democratic governance through nation-building proved to 
be neither effective nor long lasting. The strategy suffered from many of the same 
aflictions as NSPD-44 and was quickly overturned when the Obama Adminis-
tration came to power. USAID’s new powers were usurped by Hillary Clinton’s 
State Department, and the agency’s autonomy became compromised when a Dep-
uty Secretary of State was appointed to manage its budget.
USAID fared no better in its relatively insigniicant attempts to promote 
cooperation. The agency’s previously mentioned marginalization, which partly 
resulted from its unique interests and culture, made it less likely that other agen-
cies would embrace its proposals. The Ofice of budgeting and personnel systems 
and programming was created to address state fragility and failure.11 Similarly, 
the Ofice of Military Affairs was created to enhance cooperation with the Penta-
gon. Realistically, however, they functioned as a loudspeaker for incorporating a 
particular conception of development into a whole-of-government strategy. Both 
initiatives were the brainchild of Natsios when he was USAID administrator.12 
 8 Commission on Wartime Contracting, An Urgent Need: Coordinating Reconstruction and Sta-
bilization in Contingency Operations (Washington DC: 2010); Assessment of US Strategy and 
Operations in Afghanistan and the Way Ahead, Committee on Armed Services, House Of Repre-
sentatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress Hearing, January 23, 2008, 23.
 9 House of Representatives, Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, United States House of Representatives 
Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, April 2008, 41.
10 “Bush a Convert to Nation-building”, Washington Times, April 7, 2008.
11 Natsios, “USAID in the Post-Cold War World”, 21.
12 Natsios, The Clash of the Counter-Bureaucracy and Development, 43.
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Each of them made perfect sense from his standpoint, but their narrow develop-
mental premise was antithetical to the interests of the rest of the US government. 
More generally, while USAID believed its voice resonated with experience and 
skill, oficials at the Pentagon and State Department perceived the agency’s pro-
posals to be unrealistic and inappropriate.13
Meanwhile, the military’s mechanisms for cooperation revolved around warp-
ing the agenda of other agencies to suit its interest in counter-insurgency. The 
2004 Counter-insurgency Strategy for Afghanistan was hailed by its advocates 
as ‘a powerful tool for explaining the basics of our strategy to civilians’. It was 
‘circulated down to the very lowest tactical levels’ in the hope of facilitating both 
inter- and intra-agency cohesion.14 The more frequently cited Counter Insurgency 
Doctrine (COIN) was described by Lieutenant Colonel John Nagal as promoting 
‘economic development, good governance, and the provision of essential services, 
all occurring within a matrix of effective information operations’. According to a 
new breed of military leadership, led by David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, 
this mantra ‘displaced ire and maneuver atop the pyramid of soldierly priori-
ties’.15 Petraeus, in particular, was credited with successfully applying COIN Iraq, 
and his counter-insurgency-based solutions were embraced by the military estab-
lishment in Afghanistan as a panacea for agency divisions within the US nation-
building mission.
The wealth of resources and manpower at the disposal of the military establish-
ment, however, did not ensure a better chance of success.16 It failed to balance 
the interests and cultures of the various agencies involved in nation-building, nor 
was the COIN strategy as well funded as the comparable effort in Iraq. While the 
United States Army Field Manual 3–24 made brief allusions to inter- governmental 
cooperation, it encouraged military forces to perform tasks traditionally allocated 
to civilian agencies, the consequence of which was to drive a wedge between the 
military and civilian agencies.
Programmes such as CERP, the PRT’s J-10 and Army Civil Affairs Teams 
buttressed the military’s interests in counter-insurgency, rather than incorporat-
ing  counter-insurgency into complementing a wider nation-building strategy that 
blended military resources with civilian expertise. The ability of these programmes 
to operate outside the counter-insurgency bubble relied on the military command-
er’s ability to overcome embedded cultural norms. But more often than not military 
commanders were unable to divorce themselves from preconceived perceptions 
about nation-building that permeated the military. This may explain why some US 
Army Civil Affairs Teams were considered ‘refreshingly enterprising and practical’, 
13 Author Interview with a Senior Defence Department Oficial, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, 
July 15, 2013.
14 Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’ ”, 34.
15 John Nagal, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xix; 
Bacevich, Washington Rules, 188.
16 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq (Lon-
don: Penguin, 2009).
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while most were marked as ineffective.17 Other initiatives by the military seemed 
to be platitudes that proved to Washington that it was providing an inter-agency 
platform. The Civilian Management Crisis Corps, Joint Coordination Groups, 
Combatant Commanders Integrated Collaboration Team, the Government Coun-
terinsurgency Guide and the Center for Complex Operations, were neglected or 
ignored. Meanwhile, the State Department’s major attempt to embrace COIN, the 
Government Counterinsurgency Guide, reached across various government agen-
cies, creating a set of broad principles for nation-building. Yet the guide, Cohen 
states, ‘languished in relative obscurity with little apparent impact on interagency 
planning, strategy, or operations in Iraq and Afghanistan or elsewhere’.18
While agencies claimed to support the Center for Complex Operations, attempts 
to disseminate data were stiled by the bureaucracy. Indeed, the various agencies 
involved struggled even to fulil requirements ‘for sharing personal data, protect-
ing the identity of the personnel who provide information, competing claims on 
the ownership of the information itself, and appropriately using and disseminating 
interview data’.19 The Center’s move from the DoD to the National Defence Uni-
versity in less than a year signiied the minimal impact it had had on inluencing 
nation-building operations.
Solutions were also proffered by iscally minded oficials in Washington, who 
perceived the State Department to be the most suitable agency to allocate, manage 
and monitor nation-building enterprises. Those who illed the ranks of the War-
time Contracting opined that, ‘without good planning, visibility, and coordination 
among agencies and nations, the risk of waste, unwanted duplication or unsustain-
able projects is high’.20 The Ofice of Foreign Assistance (OFA) was formed to 
track, classify and monitor foreign assistance, but as it was jointly managed by the 
State Department and USAID, it developed close to 1,000 complex and confusing 
indicators for such a purpose. The OFA was criticized for adding a new layer of 
obfuscation similar to that created by the OMB. From the perspective of many US 
developmental professionals, State oficials and military commanders, instead of 
streamlining operations it had had the opposite effect.21
Similar ideas did not go beyond the planning stages. Stuart Bowen, the former 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), advocated the creation 
of a US Ofice for Contingency Operations (UOCO) to oversee nation-building 
and allow ‘many of the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan to be applied 
vigorously’. He offered UOCO as an ‘executive authority below the President 
to ensure the effectiveness of contingency relief and reconstruction operations’, 
17 Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue, 150.
18 Raphael Cohen, “A Tale of Two Manuals”, PRISM, 2:1 (2010), 87.
19 Melanne Civic and Bernard Carreau, “Building a Civilian Lessons Learned System”, PRISM, 1:2 
(2010), 138–139.
20 Commission on Wartime Contracting, An Urgent Need: Coordinating Reconstruction and Stabili-
zation in Contingency Operations, 3–5.
21 Natsios, “The Clash of the Counter-Bureaucracy and Development”, 33; Author Interview with a 
Senior Defence Department Oficial, Washington DC April 18, 2012.
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which would avoid waste and provide ‘effective oversight through audits and 
investigations of all funds’. However even the fundamental question of UOCO’s 
location could not be determined. National Security Council Advisor Brent Scow-
croft claimed that UOCO should be independent; Dobbins said it should be placed 
within USAID; and former US Central Command General Anthony Zinni wanted 
it stationed within the DoD. None, however, wanted UOCO to be run through 
the OMB.22 This lack of agreement, underpinned by the incompatible interests of 
the various oficials, determined that the UOCO never effectively performed the 
functions for which it was intended.
Finally, collaboration was encouraged by the National Security Council (NSC). 
Since it was created in 1947 by President Truman, the NSC has been utilized on an 
ad hoc basis. Fashioned to advise the President on how best to integrate domestic, 
foreign, and military policies relating to national security, the NSC is considered 
by some to be the most powerful committee in the world. That power is often able 
to breach institutional barriers and facilitate inter-agency cooperation. But it is 
as famous for its failures as it has been for its successes. The oficials who make 
up the NSC, moreover, all carry the baggage of interests, perceptions and agency 
culture to the negotiating table, which compromise their ability to transcend paro-
chial boundaries and construct a whole-of-government response.23
The NSC was hugely inluential in determining the shape and nature of the 
GWOT, but less involved in organizing agencies for nation-building in Afghani-
stan. Nonetheless, in March 2007, the NSC-initiated Interagency Management 
System (IMS) was created in coordination with S/CRS to ‘provide policy-makers 
in Washington, Chiefs of Mission, and military commanders with lexible tools 
to achieve integrated planning processes for uniied US government strategic and 
implementation plans, including: funding requests, joint-interagency ield deploy-
ment, and a joint civilian operations capacity’.24 It included the Advanced Civil-
ian Teams and Integration Planning Cell. As these initiatives were implemented 
by S/CRS rather than the NSC itself, however, they had little impact on the behav-
iour of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Furthermore, the IMS was ignored by the 
Pentagon, most likely because it did not include a military representative as a co-
chair. The lack of attention devoted by NSC to Afghanistan meant that it played a 
relatively minor role in nation-building.25
22 Bowen, “No More Adhocracies: Reforming the Management of Stabilization and Reconstruction 
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Individuals as a Conduit for Cooperation
The other approach for overcoming inter-agency obstacles to nation-building pro-
grammes involved the empowerment of particular individuals. The Afghanistan 
Freedom and Security Support Act, 2007, adopted by the US House of Represent-
atives, was offered by Congress as a solution to Afghanistan’s much publicized 
drug problem. The act presented a coordinated US counter-narcotics strategy, but 
had more general implications for the nation-building mission. It required the 
President to appoint ‘a coordinator’ whose duty was ‘to work across all United 
States government departments and agencies’. This coordinator was to ensure 
‘interagency policy coordination on assistance and counter-narcotics activities’, 
by resolving inter-agency disputes and ‘coordinating interagency implementation 
and oversight assistance’.26
But the empowerment of some sort of inter-agency overseer was also fraught 
with problems. It failed to consider where the coordinator would have come from – 
the civilian or military realm – or what authority the position would have had with 
respect to various agencies and their respective leaders. Prima facie, there did not 
seem to be any means of compelling any of the agencies to obey this mysterious 
igure. The ‘counter-narcotics chief’ would have been simply another layer of 
bureaucracy that added to an already confusing network of competing hierarchies. 
A senior State Department oficial lambasts the suggestion as ‘a pipe dream’:
You are asking for a second President. I’m very skeptical. We don’t coordi-
nate well, but is the coordinator going to be able to order the resources of the 
Secretary of Defence and Secretary of State? Are they going to roll over and 
say yes sir? Dubious. And then when you try to apply it to the Afghan experi-
ence it’s total bull and ignores the huge systemic barriers.
Other congressional attempts to apply new strands of authority to Afghanistan 
were similarly delusional, because they failed to understand the human element 
or how individuals interact with the bureaucratic machine.27 Congress’s distance 
from and inexperience of the bureaucratic machine that oversaw nation-building 
in Afghanistan predisposed it to provide simplistic solutions to complex prob-
lems. In so doing, its ‘solutions’ were typically abject failures.
While Congress’s plans never came to fruition, a White House plan for a new 
position of authority did see the light of day. In January 2009, career diplomat 
and international statesman Richard Holbrooke was appointed as the US Spe-
cial Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan. He thereby gained nominal authority 
over the US mission. Placed outside of the direct chain of command, Holbrooke 
derived his authority from new President Barack Obama, and was mandated with 
26 Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007, May 30, 2007, Report 110–170, 
Section 106.
27 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 18, 2012.
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the power to act on his behalf. His position was similar to that which Nelson 
Rockefeller had proposed in 1960 when he had called for a ‘First Secretary of the 
Government’. Holbrooke’s position, however, was exclusively to deal with the 
problems of nation-building in Afghanistan. He would be ‘a special agent who 
does not have commitments to a particular bureaucratic organization and is free 
to cut across the concerns of various departments’.28 The position that he would 
occupy would elevate ‘one oficial above factious departments’, as Destler puts it. 
Nevertheless, it would also create ‘a welter of internal political problems for those 
above him and those below, even if the job he is supposed to do clearly needs 
doing’. Wilson claims that this is due to the fact that ‘our form of government, to 
say nothing of our political culture, does not lend itself to czars’.29
Before accepting the position, Holbrooke was a prominent igure within the State 
Department and the US Democratic Party. His Foreign Policy article ‘The Machine 
That Fails’, displayed an acute awareness of how bureaucratic problems can prevent 
the US government from uniting behind an agreed plan.30 Decades later, one of Hol-
brooke’s staff argued that he still understood the ‘daunting complexity of Washing-
ton’. He also recognized the long-term implications of the conlict in Afghanistan 
before others within the US government. He claimed that it would be ‘far more 
costly and much, much longer than Americans realize . . . This war, already in its 
seventh year, will eventually become the longest in American history’.31
Holbrooke – who was praised as an exemplary civil servant, skilled statesman 
and ‘a model for aspiring diplomats’ – stepped into the breach with typical vigour, 
ready to implement immediate reforms. He appointed young oficials who were 
comparable with McNamara’s ‘whiz kids’ or those whom Bundy and Kissinger 
recruited to the White House. These and others members of his team compared 
their ofice to an Internet start-up, where each person was treated as an equal part-
ner.32 Such a new and innovative approach, however, was not welcomed within 
the State Department, which had deep cultural traditions and established hierar-
chies that resisted Holbrooke’s innovations.
Factions within State resented what they viewed as his somewhat arbitrary 
appointments, because they circumvented established procedural norms. Many 
State Department oficials, moreover, were confused as to whether the US 
Embassy in Afghanistan was under the control of Holbrooke and his team or the 
US Ambassador. An additional problem was that he only had budget authority 
28 Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1974, 287).
29 Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, 26 and 39; Wilson, Bureaucracy, What Gov-
ernment Agencies Do and Why They Do It, 272.
30 Holbrooke, “The Machine That Fails”.
31 David Rohde, “Richard Holbrooke’s Last Mission in Afghanistan”, The Daily Beast, Novem-
ber 26, 2011; George Packer, “The Last Mission: Richard Holbrooke’s Plan to Avoid the Mistakes 
of Vietnam and Afghanistan”, The New Yorker, September 28, 2009.
32 David Rohde, “The Lost Mission”, in Derek Challet and Samantha Power, The Unquiet American 
(New York: Perseus Books, 2011), 282–296.
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over State and USAID funds, which left almost half of US foreign assistance 
outside of his purview.33
Holbrooke’s attitude only fortiied bureaucratic resistance and ‘his rivals in 
Washington looked for the slightest indication of his famed ego or misbehaviour’. 
He had a reputation for competitiveness and speaking out against perceived threats. 
Even Hillary Clinton, his ardent supporter, acknowledged Holbrooke’s ‘lair for 
the dramatic’. He was perceived by others to be bullying, abrasive, ego-centric 
and confrontational, which found expression in the nickname of ‘Bulldozer’. All 
of these characteristics compounded to form a problematic personality, which 
alienated many of those around him, so that his ‘enemies nearly outnumbered 
his friends’.34 Douglas Lute, the White House ‘war czar’, for example, shared 
Holbrooke’s opinion on the need to ‘ix’ US nation-building in Afghanistan, but 
personal animosity prevented the two from cooperating: ‘Lute found Holbrooke 
too much of a block on creative thinking, while Holbrooke thought Lute’s ideas 
were not grounded in reality’, a Washington oficial observed.35
The twin issues of position and personality combined to alienate many person-
nel in USAID, who resented the contrarian policies emanating from Holbrooke’s 
ofice. He railed against USAID oficials and soldiers engaged in programmes that 
failed to involve local actors, believing that these programmes created a ‘destruc-
tive dependency . . . that delegitimizes local government’.36 As a result, his poli-
cies were viewed by USAID oficials as arbitrary, capricious and exclusionary, and 
Holbrooke’s staff were dismissed as having no knowledge of development prac-
tices. Holbrooke’s chief of staff, for example, had no diplomatic or developmental 
experience, while others were young and untested. Overall, USAID believed that 
Holbrooke’s policies would be disastrous for development in Afghanistan.
In particular, USAID Director Andrew Natsios considered Holbrooke’s agri-
cultural policies, ‘illegal, stupid from a developmental standpoint and a mas-
sive waste of money’. Dubbed ‘farmer Holbrooke’ by Hillary Clinton, due to his 
intense interest in US agricultural projects in Afghanistan, he increased funding to 
the Pushtun areas in the South and East by 80 per cent, which was perceived by 
one USAID oficial as a political stunt: ‘how can you spend 2 billion dollars for 
2 million people in remote areas who don’t want to be developed?’37  According to 
33 Jodi Kandor, “Hoolbrooke: A Larger Than Life Statesman”, World Security Network, February 19, 
2009, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/United-States-Afghanistan/Kantor-Jodi/Holbrooke-
A-larger-than-life-statesman (accessed 22/05/2013); Stewart and Brown, Greater than the Sum of 
its Parts?, 52.
34 Packer, “The Last Mission: Richard Holbrooke’s Plan to Avoid the Mistakes of Vietnam and 
Afghanistan”; Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the Launch of the Asia Society’s Series of Richard C. 
Holbrooke Memorial Addresses, New York, February 18, 2010; “Richard Holbrooke, Bullish and 
Bullying: The Rise of an American Diplomat”, The Economist, December 3, 2011”.
35 Julian Borger, “New Direction for US in Afghanistan Following Richard Holbrooke Death”, The 
Guardian, December 15, 2010.
36 Rohde, “Richard Holbrooke’s Last Mission in Afghanistan”.
37 Author Interview with a Senior USAID Oficial, Washington DC, April 19, 2012.
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Chandrasekaran, Holbrooke provided a ‘tsunami of money’ for agriculture in Hel-
mand even though the funds were not sustainable. As a result, teachers in Nawa 
stopped showing up to schools, because digging ditches for agriculture projects 
paid more money. Animosity between USAID and Holbrooke’s staff reached such 
heights that there was purportedly a physical istight between Holbrooke and a 
senior USAID oficial. The proposition that his personality spurred such conlict is 
supported by the fate of his successor, Mark Grossman, who developed a rapport 
with USAID and assuaged their past grievances.38
Holbrooke’s appointment was also resented by many at the military establish-
ment, and his staff had dificulty convincing more seasoned Pentagon oficials of 
the merit of their plans. He opposed the military surge and was deeply sceptical 
about the suitability of the NATO campaign in Afghanistan. Instead, he advo-
cated a peace deal with the Taliban. Vali Nasr, a member of Holbrooke’s staff, 
claimed that ‘he understood from his experience that every conlict has to end at 
the negotiating table’.39 With this in mind, his team secretly engaged in talks with 
prominent igures linked to the Taliban, outside of oficial diplomatic channels.
To make matters worse, Holbrooke was more than willing to point out the power 
asymmetry between the civilian and military realms. When he was described as 
the civilian counterpart to General David Petraeus, for example, he laughed and 
quipped that ‘he has more airplanes than I have telephones’. On another occasion, 
Holbrooke exclaimed to the media that he was bemused at the juxtaposition of his 
arrival to a 2010 meeting in a taxi with that of Petraeus, by then the Commander 
of the Combined Forces in Afghanistan, who was escorted by a battalion of aides. 
During the meeting he linched when Petraeus referred to him as his ‘wingman’. 
While the military commander may have meant this as a compliment, Hoolbrooke 
perceived it as inferring that the civilian side of the US government was simply 
an adjunct to the military establishment, even in the realm of diplomacy.40 Addi-
tionally, he was quoted as saying that Karzai was impossible to work with, which 
drew further ire from the military. As one of McChrystal’s aides remarked, his 
errant behaviour ‘undercuts our ability to work with him’. McChrystal’s team 
also described the Special Envoy as ‘a wounded animal; terriied of losing his 
job, ready to lash out and screw up the entire plan’.41 Gates and Petraeus, who 
continued to move forward with the counter-insurgency drive regardless, inter-
preted Holbrooke’s behaviour as seditious and damaging, allegedly calling for 
his removal. Although Clinton supported the military’s strategy, she continued to 
protect him out of respect for his loyalty to her during the presidential primary 
38 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 
2013); Author Interview with a Senior USAID Oficial, Washington DC, April 19, 2012.
39 Nicholas Kristof, “What Holbrooke Knew”, New York Times, May 14, 2001.
40 Packer, “The Last Mission: Richard Holbrooke’s Plan to Avoid the Mistakes of Vietnam and 
Afghanistan”.
41 Michael Hastings, The Operators, The Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America’s War in 
Afghanistan (London: Orion Books, 2012), 5–34.
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campaign. Holbrooke’s tragic death during a meeting in December 2010 put a 
premature end to a brilliant, but controversial, diplomatic career.
An examination of Holbrooke’s role in Afghanistan points to the importance of 
relationship-building. Lieutenant General Frank Kearney, a former Deputy Com-
mander of US Special Operations Command, went so far as to say that ‘it’s about 
trust and relationships. It has nothing to do with knowledge’. In the ield, US ofi-
cials, both military and civilian, considered outside-the-box thinking beneicial, 
and observed that certain personalities were better adapted to the unprecedented 
situations that arose in nation-building.42 This is borne out when comparing and 
contrasting the relationships between different combinations of US Ambassadors 
and Commanders of the Combined Forces in Afghanistan.
In late 2003, the appointment of David Barno and Zalmay Khalilzad to the 
posts of US Commander of the Armed forces and US Ambassador respectively, 
was emblematic of an enhanced US commitment in Afghanistan. Both men rec-
ognized the need to do something to buttress the US mission though a realignment 
of tactics and resources, a large part of which involved the promotion of better 
relations within the US government. Barno insisted that change must emanate 
from senior staff, who ‘have got to ask those hard questions and have got to dig 
to get to the answers and not take the pabulum that’s going to be pushed up by the 
bureaucracy’. In achieving this, relationships were,
. . . hugely important in bridging divisions. You can have all the doctrine, 
rules, procedures and processes in the world, but if the two people in charge 
of the two elements of policy don’t get along, none of these are going to work 
or make any difference.
When senior igures develop a fraternal relationship, he argues, bureaucratic 
obstacles and inertia can be overcome. Barno applied this thinking to forge a 
strong bond with Khalilzad that helped bind the civilian and military realms 
together. Both men realized that personality matters and that their personal rela-
tionship would ‘set the tone for embassy and military teams across Afghanistan’.43 
The rapport they cultivated was considered by senior US oficials from a number 
of different agencies to be unequivocally beneicial to the nation-building mis-
sion.44 With Barno at the helm, the military often stepped outside the conines of 
a war-ighting role. While military forces continued to be the largest US presence 
in Afghanistan, Khalilzad and Barno’s relationship encouraged a more level play-
ing ield. Common policy objectives and a joint deployment of resources ensured 
that the military, at least in the ield, used its vastly superior resources to augment 
civilian capacity. The Embassy Interagency Planning Group was created to funnel 
military assets into under-resourced sections of the US Embassy, and to provide 
teams of strategic planners and military oficers to supplement civilian ofices in 
42 Markel et al., Developing US Army Oficers’, 30–34.
43 Author Interview with a US Military Commander, Washington DC, April 29, 2012.
44 This was conirmed during interviews with a number of US oficials.
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Kabul. Unlike previous efforts, which had involved ‘pulling the rope in different 
directions, one team was using resources for the overall policy effort’. According 
to Lloyd Austin, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force, Barno and Khal-
ilzad were ‘very close’ and ‘complemented each other’. ‘I’m not sure they could 
have worked better together’, he avers.45
Small and seemingly obvious changes were applied that had eluded their prede-
cessors. Barno stood down the three-star headquarters in Bagram and re-erected it 
in Kabul. He and Khalilzad had adjacent ofices and both resided at the Embassy 
compound: ‘I had an ofice twenty feet from his ofice’, Barno states. The Ambas-
sador and Commander were in constant communication and country-team and 
core security group meetings were held daily, where they ‘very much saw each 
other as an interagency team’.46 The duo attended over 300 country team meet-
ings, which included senior oficials from the State Department, USAID, the 
DoD and the Armed Forces. David Lamm, Barno’s chief of staff, recalls a ‘tight 
knit’ community, which presented Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his Cabi-
net with a united governmental front and prevented those Machiavellian Afghan 
politicians from exploiting divergent agency cultures in Afghanistan. One mili-
tary oficial who served under them noted that the military’s command apparatus 
became fully integrated with the US Embassy, which meant that no cable left the 
Embassy without review or comment from the military. As Crocker and Petraeus 
did with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Barno and Khalilzad almost always 
saw Karzai together. When they did meet with him alone they briefed each other 
before and after. When conlict erupted between two rival powerbrokers in Herat, 
Barno and Khalilzad synchronized a combined military and diplomatic response 
to prevent hostilities from intensifying.47
To augment their harmonious relationship, Khalilzad’s reputation in Wash-
ington streamlined funding. Moulded from the same intellectual and philosophi-
cal bent as prominent igures within the Bush administration, he used personal 
connections to obtain funding for the nation-building mission in Afghanistan. 
The Ambassador was often able to inluence normally reticent oficials, such as 
Donald Rumsfeld, to overcome governmental hurdles and work outside of the 
formal institutional structures. When combined with a united military/civilian 
front, this helped Khalilzad and Barno to raise US assistance to $2.2 billion in 
2004. Upon inishing their tours of duty the two men expressed satisfaction and 
believed a ‘close personal relationship . . . cemented the unity of our effort’ and 
paid ‘immense dividends’.48
45 Barno, “Fighting “The Other War”, Counter-insurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005”, 37; 
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But following their departure the bureaucracy regained its natural rhythm. 
While relations between Barno and Khalilzad’s successors, Karl Eikenberry 
and Ronald Neumann were not openly hostile, each retained separate spheres 
of authority. Neumann acknowledged that the cumbersome bureaucracy needed 
to be challenged by ‘a person who really wants to make decisions’.49 Neumann, 
however, was unable to inluence Eikenberry to adopt a similar attitude. A sen-
ior military oficial observed that inter-agency relations deteriorated under their 
partnership and that much progress was lost: Eikenberry ‘put new ingerprints 
[on the mission] and changed things right away’. The Commander of the Armed 
Forces immediately moved his operational headquarters from the Embassy at 
Kabul back to Bagram airbase, and appointed a deputy to represent him in Kabul. 
Additionally, both the Interagency Planning Group and the Interagency Resources 
Cell were marginalized and then phased out. This represented a startling shift, 
which unshackled the military from the rest of the government and, as Colonel 
Lamm said, fostered the impression that ‘the US military was going its own way’: 
‘Eikenberry didn’t seem to want to spend as much time at the Embassy’, one State 
Department oficial said, while another noted that there was ‘a bad relationship 
between Eikenberry and everybody who wasn’t wearing a green uniform’.50
Each man had strong opinions about the various aspects of nation-building, but 
although there was a common understanding that their jurisdictions overlapped, 
rarely did they pursue common goals together. Realistically, cooperation between 
Neumann and Eikenberry was never more than ‘strong discussions on either side 
of the fence’, which often resulted in a ‘refusal to reach agreement’.51 Personality 
prevented the two from taking steps to surmount systemic obstacles by forging an 
informal bond. Although neither man actively set out to erect barriers between the 
civilian and military realms, their reversion to standard practices and procedures 
meant that those barriers were re-erected. Eikenberry, especially, was keenly 
aware of his agency’s interests in Afghanistan as the insurgency intensiied. He 
considered the US mission in Afghanistan to revolve around ‘the defeat of al 
Qaeda and their Taliban militant allies’ and to prevent international terrorism from 
inding ‘support and sanctuary’ within the country’s borders. He often referred to 
State Department oficials as his ‘teammates’, but that team was not wearing the 
same coloured jerseys.52
Instead, Eikenberry approached policy separately from Neumann who had a 
different opinion on operational military strategy and other matters. Eikenberry 
had an obsession with one aspect of reconstruction: roads. He was convinced 
that ‘where the roads ended the insurgency begins’. This resulted in almost 70 
per cent of CERP funding being directed to road building projects. One senior 
49 Interview with Jim Webb, PRISM, 1:2 (2010); Author Interview with Ronald Neumann.
50 Motlagh, “$5 Billion in Afghanistan still Unspent”; Yodsampa, No One in Charge, 214–216.
51 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 18, 2012.
52 Committee on Armed Services, Assessment of Security and Stability in Afghanistan and Develop-
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military oficial revealed that this far exceeded the capacity of the Army Corps 
of Engineers, and resulted in an 18-month backlog. As he continued to prior-
itize roads, Eikenberry’s relationship with USAID’s acting administrator James 
Kunder became strained. For example, he remarked before a House Armed Ser-
vice Committee meeting that roads had created better access to markets and more 
income for Afghan farmers. This was disputed by Kunder who said that roads 
did not help farmers as no suficient markets had been developed for them to sell 
their goods. Neumann and Eikenberry’s relationship is comparable to that of Dan 
McNeil, the Commander of the Combined Forces from 2002 to 2003, and Robert 
Finn, the US Ambassador at the time. When McNeil arrived and proposed a coop-
erative partnership, Finn informed him that he [McNeil] was there to ight a war: 
‘If we collaborated on anything that looked like US policy other than building the 
ANA, I can’t recall it’, McNeil remembers.53
Eikenberry’s role in Afghanistan was not inished when he stepped down as 
Commander of the Armed Forces. Following the disastrous appointment of Wil-
liam Wood, he returned to the country as US Ambassador. He was partnered with 
Stanley McChrystal, a close associate of David Petraeus, the aforementioned 
brains behind the surge in Iraq. McChrystal’s appointment had its own controver-
sies, which centred on the abrupt dismissal of his predecessor, David McKiernan.
A meeting in March 2009 with Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, and Gates was claimed to be the catalyst for McKiernan’s sacking. 
One military oficial, however, disagreed. He said that Gates and Mullen’s deci-
sion was based on his personality: ‘he wasn’t high energy . . . McKiernan had 
some of the right concepts, but he didn’t have the creativity and energy’. There 
seemed to be no other reason for McKiernan’s fall from grace. Strategically, polit-
ically and diplomatically he made no errors. Indeed, suggestions that he was slow 
to adapt and failed to understand the counter-insurgency drive was considered by 
another senior military oficial to be ‘laughable’. ‘McKiernan did his best – he 
was just the wrong guy’, added military analyst Ralph Peters.54
Gates’s justiication for ‘fresh eyes’ and ‘fresh thinking’, was based on a politi-
cal and personal rationalization. He and Mullen wished for more favourable media 
headlines in addition to which McChrystal was well liked by David Petraeus, 
the mastermind behind the counter-insurgency strategy. Although Petraeus was 
absent when Gates and Mullen ‘wielded the knife’, it was no secret that he and 
McKiernan did not get along and he most likely played a part in the decision.55 
‘The issue’, Hastings observed, ‘was not ability but rather likability, and being 
connected to the right people . . . it’s bureaucratic inighting and ofice politics’.56 
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That, combined with his Special Forces pedigree, made him the ‘right man’ to 
spearhead COIN in Afghanistan.
It was expected that Eikenberry and McChrystal could re-create the partnership 
that Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker had leading the mission in Iraq. 
In August 2009, they implemented the Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan 
(ICCP) – ironically, almost a carbon copy of the mechanism devised by Barno 
and Khalilzad, which Eikenberry had removed during his time as Commander of 
the Combined Forces. The ICCP attempted to develop a model for civil–military 
relations. Through that initiative and other methods, ‘I think that both of us are 
very proud of the degree of civil–military integration we’ve been able to achieve’, 
Eikenberry asserted.57 But this was misleading. The two men did not get along and 
their relationship was marked by controversy and conlict.
Eikenberry was far from the career diplomat that his predecessors Khalilzad 
and Neumann had been. Rather, he was a prominent igure in the competitive mil-
itary establishment, and thus found it dificult to adapt to the set of interests and 
culture that he was confronted with at the State Department. Placed opposite him 
was a similarly ambitious military counterpart, McChrystal, who had a particular 
perception of how the military’s interests were best served. Tensions between the 
two had previously become evident in Afghanistan. In 2005, one of McChrys-
tal’s task forces angered Eikenberry. This resulted in McChrystal and Eikenberry 
exchanging heated words that expressed mutual mistrust. State Department and 
military oficials found that this led to ‘unnecessary clashes and battles of ego’: 
‘You have two generals of similar rank who don’t agree on the policy, who appar-
ently don’t like each other. It makes for a dificult relationship’, remarked Deputy 
UN Special Representative for Afghanistan, Robert Galbraith. Crocker advised at 
the time that ‘they need to resolve any differences among themselves or take it 
back to Washington because the stakes in Afghanistan are too great not to have a 
uniied effort’.58
Yet his advice went unheeded and the two men attempted to do all they could 
to prevent each other’s plans from coming to fruition. McChrystal’s platform for 
nation-building rested on a counter-insurgency drive and the rapid deployment 
of additional troops. He overhauled the US war strategy, but much of the legacy 
he was undoing was Eikenberry’s. According to government sources at the time, 
Eikenberry ‘can’t stand that his former subordinate is now calling the shots’. In 
November he contributed to the policy debate through two reports in which he 
argued against McChrystal’s counter-insurgency strategy: ‘Sending additional 
forces will delay the day when Afghans will take over, and make it dificult, if 
not impossible, to bring our people home on a reasonable timetable’, Eikenberry 
57 Joshua Partlow, “Tensions Between Eikenberry, McChrystal will be Focus of their Washington 
Visit”, Washington Post, May 9, 2010.
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wrote. It was no surprise, therefore, that when Eikenberry sought the role of 
NATO’s senior civilian representative, in addition to Ambassador, McChrys-
tal recommended against it. Eikenberry was furious that McChrystal refused 
to support him and many considered it to be ‘a move that effectively increased 
McChrystal’s inluence over diplomacy by shutting out a powerful rival’. Mean-
while, Karzai exploited their troubled relationship by forging a close bond with 
McChrystal while ignoring Eikenberry.59
Matters worsened when diplomatic cables were leaked to the New York Times. 
This correspondence derided McChrystal’s counter-insurgency plan and revealed 
that Eikenberry believed the mission in Afghanistan ‘cannot be won by military 
means’. Deploying additional US soldiers involved ‘astronomical costs’, tens of 
billions of dollars, he stated on one of those cables: ‘We will become more deeply 
engaged here with no way to extricate ourselves, short of allowing the country to 
descend again into lawlessness and chaos’.60
In a subsequent House Armed Services Committee Hearing, Eikenberry 
expressed full support for McChrystal and the move to send extra troops, stating 
that he was ‘unequivocally in support of this mission’ and was ‘moving forward 
now to vigorously implement the assigned mission’. During the hearing the two 
described themselves as ‘old friends’. But their appearance before Congress, ‘was 
one of the most awkward in recent years’, according to one observer.61 Following 
the hearing, Embassy spokeswoman, Caitlin M. Hayden, claimed that the Ambas-
sador and military commander were united in their approach to Afghanistan. But 
McChrystal’s staff members were particularly irked by the fact that they were 
not made aware of Eikenberry’s position before he sent the cables. McChrys-
tal himself blamed Eikenberry for ‘betraying’ him by subversively attempting to 
inluence policy by leaking information.62 These and other revelations of inter-
governmental disunity were uncovered in an article in Rolling Stone magazine, 
which resulted in McChrystal’s resignation, thus ending a dramatic relationship 
more beitting of soap opera than the management of US foreign policy.
Non-Governmental Ideas on Inter-Agency  
Collaboration in Afghanistan
An interest in promoting intra-governmental collaboration was not restricted to 
the US government. Spurred on by the GWOT, academics and think-tanks put for-
ward their own models. Some dismissed oficial attempts to assuage inter-agency 
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tensions because of the gulf between rhetoric and action, while others argued that 
government-based solutions failed to acknowledge the divergent interests of the 
agencies involved.63 Solutions to overcome these and other problems stemmed 
from a variety of sources, and ranged from the theoretical to the practical. Often 
drawn from literature that focused on best practice in corporations, a disparate 
collection of terms was applied to produce a lexicon for collaboration during 
nation-building. This included ‘harmonization’, ‘coherence’, ‘policy integration’, 
‘synergistic engagement’, ‘whole-of-government approaches’, ‘team-building’, 
‘multi-sectorial strategies’, ‘unity of effort’, ’3-D (Development, Diplomacy, 
and Defence) approaches’, ‘strategic planning’, ‘resource mobilization’, ‘main-
taining workable relations’, ‘uniied leadership’ and ‘common accountability 
frameworks’.
Some commentators considered a change in methodology pivotal for US agen-
cies to ‘improve the way their efforts link up and support peace’. They argued 
that planning and execution mechanisms were outdated and required major revi-
sion, and that shared objectives promoted unity.64 Broad themes such as harmony, 
understanding and trust were identiied as cornerstones for cooperation. Stewart, 
for example, maintained that a lack of coherence could be addressed through the 
promotion of harmony within government. However, he promoted the same max-
ims as the US bureaucrats he criticized, such as ‘Clarify Interagency Roles and 
Coordination in Washington and in the Field’, ‘Agree on a Common Strategic 
Vision’ and ‘Improve Civil-Military Planning and Coordination’.65 Baumann, 
who dismissed the viability of a cure-all, nonetheless suggested a strategy focused 
on the need for ‘mutual understanding of the different meanings that different 
organizations attach to commonly employed terms’ in order ‘to integrate an 
understanding of cultural differences’.66 A number of other commentators insisted 
that fostering trust was the key to unlocking intra-governmental collaboration.67
Some suggestions involved comparative analysis. Orton and Lamb, for exam-
ple, created ten overarching principles that included ‘team empowerment’, ‘team 
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support’ and ‘team structure’. They argued that ‘imposing some deinitional rigor, 
methodological clarity, and plausible categorization on the literature’ provided ‘a 
solid platform for interagency team research’ that produced immediate beneits. 
Previous success stories were cited to enhance the credibility of their idea. But 
Orton and Lamb’s assertion – that certain principles for cooperation can be uni-
versally applied – is questionable. Nation-building in Afghanistan was far more 
complex than domestic cardio surgical teams, national parks ire-ighting teams or 
anti-narcotics operations in Columbia.68
Mirroring the US government, think-tanks posited that a central processing hub 
was required.69 A National Defence University (NDU) report advocated the crea-
tion of a National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group, which would 
incorporate representatives from all the relevant agencies, in order to provide 
‘strategic guidance’, ‘coordinate planning’ and ‘review lessons learned’. This 
included the creation of two joint ‘stability and reconstruction divisions’ (S&R 
divisions), which functioned as ‘substantial assets in such categories as military 
police, construction engineers and civil affairs’. These assets were essentially the 
same as PRTs, and contained little in the way of intergovernmental collabora-
tion. Moreover, they required, as the NDU report itself admitted, a signiicant 
and abrupt shift in military culture.70 NDU’s publication PRISM was a sound-
ing board for dramatic reorganizational theories. In one volume, for example, 
Baker acknowledged the lack of an ‘institutional home for developing a US strat-
egy for fragile states’, which determined that there was ‘no shared methodol-
ogy, conceptual framework or analytical approach that integrates lessons’. She 
canvassed a ‘Directorate for Conlict Prevention and Sustainable Security’ as a 
conceptual foundation to unite the agencies in a way that was ‘predictable, repeat-
able and eficient’, in order to facilitate ‘operational principles and procedures for 
a  whole-of-society approach’.71 Burke, meanwhile, argued that civilians should 
have ‘unequivocal authority’ in nation-building. He promoted the virtues of a 
‘single civil-military agency with a pooled budget to take a clear lead on humani-
tarian aid and reconstruction in the areas worst affected by insurgency’.72 But how 
the two initiatives could have succeeded, where similar government programmes 
failed, was not explained by either of the authors.
Jorgensen, on the other hand, advocated a reorganization of the executive 
branch ‘in order to put the “inter” into interagency’. He believed that this could 
be achieved with a ‘statutory, structural, operational and human adjustment’ 
through legislation. This involved birthing Regional Interagency Directorates 
(RIDs) to ‘build a common global operating picture’. Speciically, using a military 
68 James Douglas Orton and Christopher Lamb, “Interagency National Security Teams: Can Social 
Science Contribute?” PRISM, 2:2 (2010).
69 Commission on Wartime Contracting, An Urgent Need: Coordinating Reconstruction and Stabili-
zation in Contingency Operations, 2.
70 Binnendijk and Johnson, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 110.
71 Baker, “Forging a US Policy Toward Fragile States”, 72–80.
72 Burke, “Leaving the Civilians behind: The Soldier-diplomat in Afghanistan and Iraq”, 42.
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command model, a ‘vertical reorganization’ would facilitate the ‘reinvention of 
the Cabinet’ by connecting RIDs to the President. He even invented a ‘President’s 
Security Council’ and positions such as the ‘Senior Secretary of Domestic Policy’ 
and ‘a Department of Foreign Policy’, as a vanguard for his reforms.73 Ironically, 
his ambitious plan was constructed at precisely the same time that Holbrooke was 
struggling to make any headway in a similar role that included authority over just 
one of the two nation-building fronts.
Instead of pursuing a top-down approach, some tackled the issue at the ground 
level. Etzioni dismissed the viability of cooperation efforts in alien environments, 
advocating a Spartan response centred on small-scale projects at the local level, 
such as roads and other practical programmes, which he claimed had a low on 
effects. Yet Etzioni failed to account for the inherent fragmentation of the US 
government. For example, while he argued that security sector reform should be 
prioritized by all agencies, he failed to account for the fact that this precipitated 
military domination, which as Part II showed, was resisted by the civilian branch-
es.74 Olson and Gregorian suggested that mechanisms should have been applied 
to prevent NGO agendas from being warped by the military.75 This may have 
been valid in an international context, but when applied to the United States it 
ignored both the problem of inter-agency machinations and more speciically the 
gulf between Washington and the ield.
Part of the reason for the broad and sweeping assumptions that permeated aca-
demia was the lack of quantitative data. Surveys that identiied bureaucratic fail-
ures and successes were, for the most part, inadequate in size and scope. Those 
that did draw on more than just a few irst-hand accounts were usually restricted 
to one department. RAND’s 2011 study on the army’s role in inter-agency opera-
tions, for example, surveyed approximately 100 individuals, only 16 of whom 
were civilian oficials. The study asked military men about their developmental 
experience and skills, but that was hardly a useful gauge for enhancing intra- 
governmental cooperation. The designers of the survey admitted as much them-
selves, cautioning against using their indings, and even questioning its ability to 
predict clear trends and results.76
Overall, the recipes for harmonizing agency priorities and actions were not 
realistic given the structural impediments that any such plans faced. This led Kap-
stein to argue that rather than hanging to the false hope that objectives can be 
harmonized, it would be better to simply speak in ‘the hard language of priorities, 
requirements, trade-offs and limitations’. As Cohen summarizes, ‘no matter how 
73 Eric Jorgensen, “Greater than the Sum of its Parts: Putting Inter into inter-agency”, PRISM, 2:2 
(2011), 29–41.
74 Amitai Etzioni, “A Self-Restrained Approach to Nation-Building By Foreign Powers”, Interna-
tional Affairs, 80:1 (2004).
75 Olson and Gregorian, “Civil-Military Coordination: Challenges and Opportunities in Afghanistan 
and Beyond”, 28.
76 Markel et al., Developing US Army Oficers’ Capabilities for Joint Interagency, Intergovernmen-
tal, and Multinational Environments, 7–8.
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much guidance is given and how many documents are published . . . reforming 
the interagency process to account for these operations has proven even more 
challenging’.77
The Shortness of Staff Postings
A inal matter that hampered the capacity of mechanisms and individuals to 
organize nation-building was the shortness staff postings to Afghanistan. The 
US foreign policy bureaucracy ensures that military and civilian oficials move 
through a conveyer-belt system of appointments. From 2001 to 2012 there were 
10 US military commanders and 7 different ambassadors, which compromised the 
potential for a united leadership.78 More generally, civilian deployments usually 
lasted from three to six months, and although military tours of duty were longer 
they were nomadic. Neither of these two situations was satisfactory for fostering 
inter-agency relations that could overcome entrenched behavioural norms.
The fact that the experiences of each oficial who served in Afghanistan were 
not captured is a connected problem. One insider claimed that it ‘was almost 
impossible to have a learning organization when you change people all the time’. 
Short tours were endemic to all Embassy staff, which resulted in an ‘institutional 
frontal lobotomy of lost experience’.79 In order to operate effectively in an envi-
ronment like Afghanistan, another US oficial contended, time was required to 
familiarize oneself with the local culture and environment. But once that was 
achieved civilian oficials were already set for rotation. US oficials, from Ambas-
sadors to USAID contractors, left assignments before their successor arrived. 
There was no established transition period, nor was there debrieing upon rotation. 
As a consequence, gaps were left after each departure and ‘people’s experience 
travelled with them’.80 When Ambassador Finn left his posting in July 2003, for 
example, the deputy chief of mission became acting Ambassador for four months. 
Meanwhile, Finn’s successor, Zalmay Khalilzad, moved sporadically between 
Kabul and Washington. After Khalilzad left, the disconnect between him and his 
successors was responsible for a number of high-proile projects, such as an agri-
cultural school, languishing or being cancelled.
‘There wasn’t a learning curve’, a Senior Defence Department Oficial 
explained. Three problems resulted. In the ield the learning curve had to begin 
again each time as did personal relationships. By the time an oficial developed 
an understanding of how divergent agency interests and culture could be har-
monized they were rotated. Moreover, military commanders in Afghanistan had 
‘an endemic habit that “well I’m doing something different to the previous guy”. 
77 Ethan B. Kapstein, “Do Three D’s Make An F?: The Limits of Defence, Diplomacy and Develop-
ment”, PRISM, 1:3 (2010), 22; Cohen, “A Tale of Two Manuals”, 93.
78 Author Interview with a US Military Commander, Washington DC, April 29, 2012.
79 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 18, 2012.
80 Author Interview with a Senior USAID Oficial, Washington DC, April 23, 2012.
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So each time you’d get a shift in emphasis’.81 Another Senior State Department 
Oficial shared the opinion of his colleague from the Department of Defence, but 
centred his analysis of staff appointments on the President. Bush had the ability to 
effect staff appointments, but an absence of effort made it dificult for Dobbins to 
obtain even a skeletal staff cadre. As a consequence of ‘the system not being ener-
gized from the top’, moving 15 staff members from existing jobs was successfully 
resisted by the hierarchical State Department bureaucracy. He cited this as another 
example in which White House neglect facilitated bureaucratic torpor.82
Measures were undertaken to prevent the loss of experience, but they crashed 
against the cliffs of the bureaucracy in Washington. Reforming the staff rotation 
system was Sisyphean: ‘at the fundamental level you’re trying to get a piece of 
the bureaucracy to move in a direction that is antithetical to the way the rest of the 
bureaucracy is moving’.83 When Dobbins attempted the smaller task of increas-
ing the number of staff at the US Embassy, he still ‘waged a losing battle against 
bureaucratic inertia’.84 Moreover, oficials who expressed a willingness to extend 
a tour in Afghanistan provoked resistance from agencies that proved unwilling 
to accommodate such a move, which supposedly would circumvent its cultural 
traditions and standard procedures. For that reason, USDA oficials were unable 
to prolong their commitment beyond a year.
The leeting nature of such deployments also heightened tension between the 
civilian and military realms. Civilian oficials typically undertook four separate 
tours, often moving between Afghanistan and Iraq within the space of a year. This 
resulted in a dichotomous inlux and exodus that frustrated military commanders: 
‘Washington sent State and USAID oficers where they were most needed and 
left other positions empty’, but those empty positions ‘helped fuel the military’s 
perception that the civilian branches were emaciated and disorganized’.85 Alter-
natively, one USAID staffer remained in Helmand province for 3.5 years, mak-
ing him the longest-serving civilian oficial in Afghanistan. He was respected by 
military and civilian oficials alike for his rapport with the locals and his ability 
to understand the best way forward for US reconstruction projects. But this was 
an exception rather than the norm. In 2009, 40 per cent of civilian oficials in 
Helmand stayed for less than 6 months.86
Within the military establishment, meanwhile, US soldiers were rotated at the 
very moment that they came to understand the intricacies of local politics and 
culture. New troops, who were prepared for war-ighting and little else, would 
then ‘come in and start making the same dumb mistakes and doing the same 
81 Author Interview with a Senior Defence Department Oficial, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, 
July 15, 2013.
82 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 15, 2012.
83 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 18, 2012.
84 Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan.
85 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington DC, April 18, 2012.
86 Rohde, “Little America: An Afghan Town, an American Dream and the Folly of For-Proit War”; 
Hersh, “Afghanistan: The Long and Winding Roads”.
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dumb things’. Nor was the problem limited to the experiences of regular soldiers. 
Regional headquarters moved on a full block rotation model so when the lag 
left so did all senior staff, who were replaced by a different unit with completely 
new oficers: ‘It was the irst day of school for everyone all the time’. Moreover, 
the rotation of troops on such a swift basis was a catalyst for domestic Afghan 
opportunists to behave capriciously without repercussion. Each month, ‘a lot of 
players started to change their bets on the table’.87 As staff rotated and collabora-
tion between US agencies dissipated, strongmen and tribal leaders exploited the 
ensuing disorganization, at the expense of the Afghan State and its people. Civil-
ian projects that did continue were hampered by the constant rotation of military 
units, which forced State Department and USAID oficials to explain the merits 
of their projects anew every few months.
Conclusion
Discordant approaches to nation-building in Afghanistan resulted in the prolifera-
tion of many mechanisms that were devised to facilitate cooperation. Agencies 
such as the State Department, USAID and the military establishment were, at var-
ious times, empowered to steer governmental cooperation. Another strategy cen-
tred on the creation of new authority igures to bridge divisions, while a less formal 
avenue involved personal relations between the US Ambassador to Afghanistan 
and the Commander of the Combined Forces. None of these efforts was effective 
in overcoming dysfunctions within the US foreign policy bureaucracy.
S/CRS, in theory, seemed an appropriate solution to the intra-governmental 
problems created by the ambiguities of nation-building, but it underestimated 
the tenacity of different agency interests, culture, perceptions and power. S/CRS 
and the other mechanisms devised by the US government were fragmented and 
over-lapping. Many were warped to suit a speciic agency’s interests, while others 
relected a certain agency’s culture. Proposals from academics and think-tanks 
were, for the most part, similarly delusional because they ignored the behavioural 
nuances of agencies, factions and individuals, and the realities of structured divi-
sions between agencies.
Meanwhile, individuals such as Holbrooke and Eikenberry maintained particu-
lar perceptions of how to approach nation-building in Afghanistan. Holbrooke, 
who was tasked with the overarching responsibility of organizing the nation-
building mission, was derided as an oficial who embodied State Department 
interests and exempliied its culture. At the same time he faced opposition within 
the State Department for attempting to construct a power-base that threatened 
established procedures and factions. Despite his credentials, experience and 
expertise, therefore, Holbrooke failed to surmount the bureaucratic obstacles that 
prevented a whole-of-government approach. Eikenberry, meanwhile, could not 
form a perception that sat outside the narrow agenda of the military establishment, 
87 Author Interview with a US Military Commander, Washington DC, April 29, 2012.
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even when he was US Ambassador to Afghanistan. Alternatively, the amiable 
relationship between Barno and Khalilzad offers a sliver of hope that commitment 
and empathy between two powerful igures can overcome bureaucratic problems. 
But although the two men worked together in Kabul, factions from State and 
the military in Washington remained at loggerheads. Even though personal rela-
tions could overcome formalized procedures and entrenched behavioural norms, 
moreover, the issue of staff terms proves that any progress made is lost once US 
oficials and soldiers rotate. With this in mind, we will now turn to what has been 
perceived to be the most successful vessel for a whole-of-government approach to 
nation-building in Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
9 Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams
A Microcosm of US  
Nation-Building in Afghanistan*
Following the fall of the Taliban regime, the US created Coalition Humanitar-
ian Liaison Cells (CHLC), consisting of ive to twelve soldiers who engaged in 
small-scale state-building activity. Some early success encouraged the expansion 
of CHLCs into PRTs, which represented a nimbler alternative to an International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) presence outside Kabul. PRTs implemented 
quick-impact projects to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Afghan populace, 
years before the trumpeted shift to such a strategy occurred.1 By the end of the 
Bush Administration’s second term, 12 US-led PRTs, mandated to promote secu-
rity, reconstruction and good governance, were in operation. PRTs implemented 
quick-impact projects, comprising business, agriculture, public health and infra-
structure. PRT commanders were responsible for security and inter-agency coor-
dination, and received policy guidance from an Executive Steering Committee 
based in Kabul. The State Department, USAID and the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) had leading civilian roles.2 In contrast to initiatives centred in Washing-
ton and ideas that were presented outside of the government, PRTs nominally 
involved practical cooperation between agencies in the ield.
PRTs married the military and security aspects with the civilian and develop-
ment aspects.3 Condoleezza Rice called them ‘a model of civil-military rela-
tions for the future’.4 The Department of Defence (DoD) stated that PRT’s 
1 Andrew Enterline, Emily Stull and Joseph Magagnoli, “Reversal of Fortune? Strategy Change and 
Counterinsurgency Success by Foreign Powers in the Twentieth Century”, International Studies 
Perspectives, 14:1 (2013), 176–198; Greg Mills and Ewen Mclay, “A Path to Peace in Afghanistan: 
Revitalizing Linkage in Development, Diplomacy and Security”, Orbis 55:4 (2011), 600–612.
2 Government Accountability Ofice, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
Washington, October 1, 2008.
3 Author Interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington, April 21, 2012.
4 Condoleezza Rice, “Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New World”, For-
eign Affairs, 87:4 (2008), 2–27.
* Some sections of Chapter 9 appeared in “Bureaucratic Politics, Role Conlict and the Inter-
nal Dynamics of US Provincial Reconstruction Teams”, Armed Forces and Society 42:1 (2016), 
99–118. Reprinted by permission of Sage publications – www.sagepublications.com.
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combined key features of US national power in support of nation-building, while 
a USAID report declared the programme ‘an effective tool for stabilization in 
Afghanistan’.5 In a word, PRTs were presented as a panacea for the inter-agency 
conlicts and inighting that had bedevilled nation-building in Afghanistan.
This chapter delves beneath this rhetoric to argue that PRTs, like all of the other 
proposed solutions to bureaucratic incoherence, were compromised by agency 
interests, culture, perceptions and power. In fact, they were nothing less than 
a microcosm of the US nation-building effort in Afghanistan. I proceed with a 
comparison of some laudatory and critical accounts of the programme and then 
continue with a comparative evaluation of military and civilian agency roles. 
Finally, I make some brief remarks about the relationship between the counter- 
bureaucracy and PRTs.
Praise and Critique
In some policymaking circles, PRTs were acclaimed as a ‘missing link’ that suc-
cessfully integrated the US agencies involved in Afghanistan. Several of these 
accounts depicted PRTs as a pioneering approach to intragovernmental coopera-
tion. Cobane argued that PRTs represented ‘a unique and successful solution’ to 
Afghanistan’s many problems. For McNerney, they fulilled a number of impor-
tant tasks such as school building, election support, security, reconstruction, com-
munity empowerment, disarmament and mediation. In government circles it was 
accepted that reconstruction projects beneited from the support of PRT units due 
to their capacity to conduct needs assessment, mobilization of local partners, and 
a comprehensive knowledge of localities in which they were stationed. A senior 
USAID oficial described PRTs as ‘an innovative response to an extremely chal-
lenging environment’.6
Others who witnessed them in action were also impressed. Dobbins described 
PRTs as ‘substantial organizations’ that successfully implemented development in 
rural areas. PRTs ‘had a signiicant effect’, symbolic and practical, by providing 
resources where there were major security challenges. At ground level, a lieu-
tenant experienced ‘a quality programme’. Another viewed PRTs as the ‘cutting 
edge of military transformation’.7 The nation-building credentials of speciic PRTs 
5 USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, Washing-
ton DC, June 2006; Department of Defence, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan, Washington DC June 2009.
6 Craig Cobane, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Security Assistance: Comments on an Evolv-
ing Concept”, Journal of International Security Assistance Management, 27:4, 2005, 91–98; 
Michael McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Mud-
dle?” Parameters, 35:4 (2006), 32–46; Author Interview with a Senior USAID Oficial, Washington 
DC, April 19, 2012; Author Interview with a Senior USAID Oficial Washington DC, April 23, 
2012.
7 Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan; Independent Task Force co-sponsored by 
the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society, “Are We Losing the Peace?” (New York: Council
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were applauded in Washington. PRT Gardez was praised on multiple occasions for 
implementing successful economic and social projects, enabled by collaboration 
between military and civilian members. Others were extolled for the reconstruc-
tion of schools and a university.8
Yet overall, the evidence relied upon to talk up PRTs was tenuous and selec-
tive. Assumptions about performance were sometimes based on the amount of 
money that had been spent. Complimentary descriptions were frequently broad 
and sweeping and ignored failings. While the concept of PRTs was lauded by 
the White House, USAID, the State Department and the Pentagon, their per-
formance in practice was beset with problems. According to Schirch, PRTs 
actually ‘inhibited development of military relationships with civil society’. 
Joel Hafvenstein, a USAID contractor, dismissed the idea that PRTs created a 
nucleus of security and development. The most useful thing that Hafvenstein 
witnessed was the PRTs’ provision of ice for his company’s drinks. Stapleton 
argued that PRTs functioned more as a political tool than an effective bridge 
between security and development. Luehrs found there was a failure to commu-
nicate and share information, exacerbated by the geographic distance between 
Washington and Afghanistan.9
US Government sources identiied similar problems. GAO reports recounted a 
fragmented approach where policy was divided up between agencies. According 
to the US House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, there was 
‘no clear deinition of the PRT mission, no concept of operations or doctrine, 
no standard operating procedures’. The committee uncovered ‘complicated, dis-
jointed and, at times, unclear chain(s) of command’ that received direction from 
multiple sources, which in turn resulted in a ‘confusing array of pots of money 
with differing authorities and limitations’.10
The US Military
For the PRTs, the presence of diverse – and divergent – interests, perceptions, 
culture and power hindered cooperation and exacerbated bureaucratic problems. 
There were various inluences on the goals and methods of these small joint-civil 
military teams, but because they were predominantly staffed by soldiers, PRTs 
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Rebuilding Teams”, Army Times, March 15, 2004.
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remained rigid units that adhered to the operational paradigm and lexicon of the 
military. Some considered that to be beneicial. In a conlict-ridden environment 
the ability to call upon combat units for ‘over-the-horizon irepower through the 
use of close air support and quick reaction forces’, was ‘used to good effect’.11 
However, on balance the pervasiveness of military culture and interests that were 
centred on counter-insurgency had a detrimental impact on intragovernmental 
collaboration and the implementation of projects.
The irst problem was the military’s emphasis on security. Security was a key 
pillar of PRT operations, but the priority given by the military to protecting them-
selves and their PRT contingent far exceeded that accorded to any interests of the 
Afghan populace or to development projects. Hafvenstein recalled that soldiers 
from the PRT in Helmand ‘spent their time behind their formidable walls and 
barbed wire moat on the outskirts of Lashkaragah’. Even on the rare occasions 
they did leave their base ‘it was in full body armour, riding Humvees with gun 
turrets’.12 In another example involving a meeting with local Afghan authority ig-
ures, the State Department’s PRT representative was accompanied by a group of 
16 soldiers in heavily armoured vehicles. Such a hostile party hardly conveyed the 
impression necessary to win the trust of sceptical tribal authorities with a history 
of animosity toward foreigners. In battleground regions, Special Forces operated 
out of PRT compounds, which they used as holding grounds for suspected terror-
ists or places to interrogate prisoners of war.
Military mentality also adversely affected reconstruction. Due to the resources 
at its disposal, the military was in charge of planning and executing PRT projects. 
But its command apparatus was not ideal for that purpose. PRTs reported directly 
to military task forces, which would then report to regional and central com-
mands. They received instructions from brigade headquarters and the PRT com-
mander dispersed funds. These were readily available through the Commanders’ 
Emergency Response Program (CERP), which, as we discovered in Chapter 5, 
enabled them to allocate funds ‘for the rapid implementation of small-scale pro-
jects, such as providing latrines for a school or a generator for a hospital’. CERP 
funds, however, were used without consulting the State Department, USAID or 
USDA, each of which had more experience and expertise in nation-building than 
their military counterparts.13 A senior military oficer contrasted the military’s 
objectives with those of USAID:
In almost every PRT, there is this friction that develops between folks from 
USAID who want to go into the big projects, ix things for the long term, 
11 Michael Dziedzic and Michael Seidl, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations 
with International and Non-governmental Organizations in Afghanistan (Washington DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 2005), 4.
12 Hafvenstein, Opium Season, 207; Stapleton, “A Means to an End?”, 43.
13 Government Accountability Ofice, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite some Progress, Deterio-
rating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of US Goals, Washington 
D.C., July 2005, 18; Rubin, Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition From Turmoil to Normalcy, 6.
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while the unit commanders are looking for things that can create conditions 
that provide immediate results.14
While the main currents of agency culture permeated military operations, there 
was some latitude for individual initiative. But the style and mentality of com-
manders relected military interests. Colonel Augustine, commander of the Hel-
mand PRT, for example, cajoled USAID contractors into operating in dangerous 
areas. He had no patience with the argument that this was unfeasible in the absence 
of cooperative local powerbrokers or a reliable police force. Fast spending and 
high visibility were prioritized to meet counter-insurgency objectives. The mili-
tary favoured endeavours that displayed tangible if transient indications of pro-
gress, even where these were unsustainable and not supported by the population.15
As with USAID’s approach to reconstruction projects, PRT commanders would 
outsource to contractors. A reluctance to leave the comfort zone of their bases to 
monitor activities contributed to funds being lost to fraud, neglect and human error. 
Schools were built without teachers, clinics without medics, and infrastructure 
projects had insuficient materiel or manpower. A soldier from Gardez described 
as ‘uniformly poor’ the results of a project in the Paktika provinces, where ‘you 
could put your feet through the sidewalk’.16 At most, PRTs conducted sporadic vis-
its to monitor project sites, but these were to collect photos and statistics, which 
were then presented to the Pentagon as evidence that they had delivered results. 
When a new PRT commander was appointed, he was usually unaware of what had 
been implemented by his predecessor. Consequently, each tried to reinvent the 
wheel at the beginning of their tour.
Some still lauded PRTs as a model for inter-agency collaboration involving 
equal levels of input. But as with the broader nation-building mission, PRTs dis-
played a power discrepancy, with the civilians having no independent funds until 
2004. Even after that, the military retained control over most resources and man-
power. The composition of PRTs conirms that they were essentially a creature of 
the military rather than an authentic fusion of governmental agencies. On average, 
only two civilian representatives were ensconced in a PRT at any time. Even the 
largest contained a mere three or four. By 2009, there were 1,021 military person-
nel in PRTs compared with 34 from the DoS, USAID and USDA combined. This 
equated to one civilian for every 30 military personnel. A Senior State Department 
Oficial lamented the asymmetry, noting ‘we had one AID oficer in each PRT 
with very little project money and with no local staff’.17
Many problems were directly linked to the differences in capacity between 
the military and civilian spheres. In most PRTs, the military eschewed guidance 
14 Yodsampa, No One in Charge, 144.
15 Hafvenstein, Opium Season, 207.
16 Stapleton, “A Means to an End?”, 24; Hafvenstein, Opium Season, 312.
17 GAO, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2; Author Interview with Ronald 
Neumann, Washington, April 18, 2012.
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from civilian representatives. An inter-agency assessment by USAID found that 
PRT commanders failed to incorporate non-military components into leadership 
decisions. A common complaint voiced by former civilian personnel was that 
they were treated like outsiders. In Gardez, the State Department representative 
requested that the PRT undertake police training assistance, but the military com-
mander dismissed his concerns. One former PRT member noted that ‘this also 
really confused Afghans and aid agencies who didn’t understand why the mili-
tary part of a PRT was building schools and clinics when the local police have 
no uniforms, vehicles or facilities’. Another opined that there had been ‘no real 
understanding of how civilians could contribute to the team’. A State Department 
oficial summarized the gulf of understanding caused by different cultural norms: 
‘there are a lot of acronyms that ly around and a lot of things that are just com-
mon language for everybody involved with the military and really alien for people 
who aren’t’.18
Frictions between civilian and military elements were exacerbated by the PRTs 
being answerable to numerous chains of command. A survey conducted on the 
experiences of USDA oficials found that this prevented some from fulilling 
their role as agricultural advisors. Relationships with task forces, brigades, and 
regional commanders were often disorganized or conlicting. Yet despite their 
subordination to military culture – virtually functioning as combat units under a 
different name – some military oficials perceived the PRTs to be interlopers, even 
dismissing them as civilian entities. Task Force Saber, for example, pursued its 
own political mandate and refused to cooperate with the local PRT. Saber’s com-
mander actively supported Ismael Khan, a local warlord widely considered to be 
brutal and corrupt. When PRT representatives informed the commander of this he 
blatantly ignored their counsel. Other reconstruction projects spearheaded by the 
military were undertaken without input from the local PRT.19
There was also a lack of coordination between the US Army National Guard’s 
Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) activities and PRT agriculture projects. 
ADTs operated separately from the PRT command structure and were considered 
by the military to be more experienced than USDA. Therefore, they tended to 
implement projects without drawing on USDA oficers for assistance or advice. 
From the perspective of USDA this was a sub-optimal way to approach agri-
cultural reform in Afghanistan. Oficials at the Pentagon, however, disagreed. 
They considered the USDA representatives to be ‘bureaucrats from the foreign 
18 Author Interview with a US Military Commander, Washington DC, April 29, 2012; USAID, Pro-
vincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment; McNerney, “Stabiliza-
tion and Reconstruction”, 36–40; Agency Stovepipes vs Agility, 22–73; Carlos Hernandorena, “US 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 2003–2006: Obstacles to Interagency Coopera-
tion”, in Joseph Cerami and Jay Boggs (eds), The Interagency Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stabil-
ity, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles (Washington DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 
2007), 121–171.
19 Bernard Carreua, “Lessons From USDA in Iraq and Afghanistan”, PRISM 1:3 (2010), 139–150; 
Robert Perito, “The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan”, United 
States Institute of Peace Special Report, No. 152, October, 2005, 8.
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agricultural service who knew how to move papers but that didn’t know how to 
plant anything’.20
Meanwhile, in Washington it was the regional bureau within the Ofice of the 
Under Secretary of Defence for Policy (USDP) that provided guidance for the 
military wing of the PRTs, rather than the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for Stability Operations Capabilities, a position created expressly with nation-
building in mind. DoD organs did not want the new Secretary to encroach on 
their traditional sphere of responsibility. But the bureau had little comprehension 
of how the PRTs should approach reconstruction. PRT Helmand greeted Afghan 
elders with PowerPoint presentations that advocated freedom of speech and dem-
onstrated plans for luxurious hotels and the establishment of a free press. These 
ideas were the brainchild of Pentagon bureaucrats who had no accurate concep-
tion of the wants and needs of a populace whose country had been devastated by 
more than three decades of war. They were alien to the tribal leaders. PRT com-
manders found it hard to articulate and justify their own policies, but adherence to 
the priority to obey orders determined that they did little to redress the problem.
Civilian Agencies
Military interests, perceptions and culture had a pervasive inluence on PRTs. But 
that did not entirely explain why civilian representatives were less effective than 
they could have been. The clash of agency cultures was one of a combination of fac-
tors including incompatible interests, personnel issues, bureaucratic delays and inad-
equate training. These issues not only widened the cleavage between civilian and 
military branches, but also exposed conlict and discord within the civilian realm.
The lack of coordination between the State Department, USAID and USDA 
manifested very different priorities. Civilian members were beholden to the DoD 
regional bureau or the Director of Foreign Assistance, who, confusingly, was also 
the Administrator of USAID in Kabul. Moreover, this ‘system’ undermined the 
State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS), an ofice that was 
created to mediate relations between departments. Instead, each agency pursued 
its own myopic strategy and oficials reported separately to their superiors at the 
US embassy. In Washington, competing visions of how best to organize the PRTs 
emerged from the DoS, USAID and USDA. As a result, the civilian element of 
Afghanistan’s PRTs comprised an incoherent assortment of diplomats, politi-
cal advisors, development advocates and agricultural experts. Deployment was 
approached arbitrarily and relected agency interests rather than the speciic needs 
of the individual PRTs, which operated in regions that presented their own unique 
challenges. But ‘because it was voluntary, you didn’t get the people you needed’.21
20 Carreua, “Lessons From USDA in Iraq and Afghanistan”, 145; Author Interview with a Senior 
Defence Department Oficial, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, July 15, 2013.
21 Author interview with a Senior State Department Oficial, Washington, April 30, 2012; Author 
Interview with a Senior Defence Department Oficial, via telephone, Sydney to Colorado, July 15, 
2013.
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In some instances, civilian PRT members had no knowledge of the expertise 
possessed by those outside their agency. An oficial stationed at the Parwan PRT 
said he had been given no operational instructions: ‘Nobody really gave me any 
guidance’, he remembered. ‘I was just basically cut loose and told, “Okay, you’re 
at the PRT” and that was about it. Nobody told me anything. I had no idea of my 
function, or what my role was going to be’. Another despaired that his PRT was 
akin to a ‘Sunday pick up team’ rather than ‘a cohesive unit’.22
Coordination problems were entwined with personnel issues. From the begin-
ning of 2007 until mid-2008, the number of civilian oficials serving in PRTs 
increased by just four and at the end of 2008 USAID had fewer personnel in 
Afghanistan PRTs than was authorized. Although there were nominally at least 
two USAID oficials in each PRT, due to the haphazard nature of the agency’s 
rotation system there was sometimes only one or none. Meagre civilian man-
power circumscribed the PRTs’ capacity to undertake projects because they ‘were 
limited by the availability of US government civilians’. The US military attrib-
uted this to issues within the State Department, USAID and USDA where there 
was ‘a tremendous tug of war to get those civilians out there and then keep the 
pipeline illed with those people and not have gas as time went on’. Similarly, 
State Department sources conirmed that it was a signiicant effort to provide 
even a small civilian presence for each PRT.23 Moreover, there were gaps between 
deployments. When civilians left it would often be months before they were 
replaced and each time a new person joined, the relationship-building process had 
to start again. One former commander remembered that ‘there was no consulta-
tion about which State oficers would be posted at what PRTs, and on what sched-
ule’, resulting in ‘gaps at critical times’. A member of the Herat PRT recalled that,
Every PRT is supposed to have one civilian each from the Department of 
State, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture . . . My PRT didn’t have 
any of those people, so USAID, in the absence of any of their employees, 
would delegate their duties to State, so the whole time I was there I was also 
wearing a USAID hat.24
Regular tours of duty lasted for a maximum of 6 months, and it was extremely 
dificult to ind civilians who were willing to spend more than the minimum 3 
months stationed with a PRT. A State Department representative who served two 
90-day tours in Tarin Kowt and Jalalabad said that he ‘basically went to places 
22 Carreua, “Lessons From USDA in Iraq and Afghanistan”, 145; Perito, The US Experience with 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, p. 11, Agency Stovepipes vs Agility, 73.
23 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Quarterly Report, p. 11, Author, January 2009, 10; Author Interview with 
a US Military Commander, Washington DC, April 29, 2012; Author Interview with a Senior State 
Department Oficial, Washington DC April 21, 2012.
24 Hernandorena, “US Provincial Reconstruction Teams”, 140; Perito, The US Experience with Pro-
vincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 14.
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that nobody else wanted to go’.25 Staff shortages were a major problem. Not only 
did that dificulty exacerbate tensions between soldiers and civilian oficials, it 
sowed discord between civilian branches of government. Other bureaucratic and 
funding issues were also divisive. USAID had access to the Quick Impact Pro-
gram (QIP) funding mechanism. Nominally, its personnel reported to USAID 
headquarters in Kabul on the viability of local infrastructure projects and collabo-
rated with NGOs, Army Civil Affairs teams and their fellow civilian representa-
tives. In comparison to the CERP, QIP funds were dificult to obtain, partly due to 
poor communication and disorganization within USAID’s skeletal staff structure.
The situation in Washington further complicated matters. While it was rela-
tively easy for the military to obtain funds from Congress, for civilian oficials 
it was dificult. Because the US was engaged in a counter-insurgency effort – 
rhetorically and practically – Congress determined that the military’s needs were 
more urgent and important. That could be interpreted as the victory of one party in 
an otherwise mundane bureaucratic power struggle over resources. But the grav-
ity of the situation where those resources were to be ultimately deployed affects 
the perspective. According to Michelle Parker, a former PRT representative, PRT 
commanders used ‘CERP funds to initiate projects, because they could obligate 
those funds quickly, while USAID would go through normal budget processes’. 
USAID’s people lamented delays and that they had little power when it came to 
decision-making. Everything had to be irst run by the mission headquarters in 
Kabul and then Washington. One oficial posted in a PRT said that during his 
deployment ‘not one red cent’ of QIP money was actually spent. Reforms were 
slow and it was not until 2009 that USAID oficers in PRTs received authoriza-
tion to spend up to $25,000, without approval from both Kabul and Washington.26
At least USAID had access to separate funding mechanisms; USDA did not. 
USAID exploited this advantage to overrule USDA when it came to project direc-
tion and implementation. Access to funding strengthened USAID’s own ‘we know 
best when it comes to development’ mindset. Rather than include other civilian 
oficials, USAID jealously guarded funds it had obtained and took the credit in 
Washington for completed projects. This behaviour was afirmed when PRTs 
came under scrutiny from congressional committees toward the end of the Bush 
administration’s second term. An additional consequence of USAID’s ‘power of 
the purse’ was that commanders paid greater attention to the opinions of USAID 
oficials than those of the DoS and USDA. One USDA representative recalled that 
his military superior ‘listened to USAID oficers because they had funding, but he 
barely tolerated USDA advisors’.27
25 Robert Perito, Oral Histories Project on Stability Operations: Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006).
26 Markel et al., Developing US Army Oficers’ Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovern-
mental and Multinational Environments (Washington DC: RAND, 2011), 36; GAO, Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, 11; USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 
Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, 5–16.
27 Carreua, “Lessons From USDA in Iraq and Afghanistan”, 144.
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While experience cannot be bought, a major factor hampering cooperation 
was the absence of a comprehensive training programme to prepare oficials for 
deployment. This was a massive omission as civilians had little understanding 
of the military’s culture, including functions, procedures and nomenclature. The 
State Department, USAID and USDA were intent on having their oficials par-
rot departmental policy and procedures. The three agencies’ inadequate training 
programmes made little attempt to promote solidarity, instead simply reinforcing 
predominant agency interests and cultural norms. Consequently, agency repre-
sentatives were often suspicious of anyone from ‘outside’. Nonetheless, junior 
oficials who had no experience in dealing with differing agency cultures were 
thrust into the ield, where they encountered commanders reluctant to take advice 
from these ledglings. Already wary of the civilian branches of government, com-
manders perceived these oficials to be more of a hindrance than a help, and hence 
excluded them from decision-making processes.28
The Counter-Bureaucracy, USDA and PRTs
Two further issues warrant some brief remarks. First is the impact on PRT opera-
tions of GAO, OMB and congressional committees, all of which had oversight 
mandates. What PRTs needed was performance-monitoring systems that meas-
ured effectiveness along with better management and clearly deined objectives. 
But Congress displayed a vague understanding of the details and seemed to think 
solutions to embedded problems would come fast and easy. The oversight agen-
cies fed off congressional interest. The GAO, OMB and SIGAR advocated more 
scrutiny in respect to funding used by PRTs, and detailed cost and data analysis. 
PRT members, who were frustrated at the amount of paperwork, resented that. 
Many questioned whether the metrics used were an appropriate determinant of 
performance.29 The implication was that Congress and Washington’s regulatory 
bodies caused further discord in an already fractious mission.
The second issue is USDA, the forgotten actor in the PRTs. Available data on 
the department’s involvement is scarce and it was neglected in intergovernmen-
tal and GAO reports, which focused on the State Department, USAID and the 
military. There is also little coverage of USDA in think-tank reports or academic 
studies. Carreua’s is the only article that focused exclusively on it. He revealed 
that USDA members believed they should deine the agricultural strategy within 
the PRTs, regardless of their lack of numbers. USDA’s approach was a relection 
of their departmental culture, which prioritized certain farming projects and meth-
ods and mirrored, in regard to agriculture rather than development, USAID’s ‘we 
know best’ attitude. Unfortunately for USDA, in the hierarchical structure of the 
PRTs the US military was on top, followed by USAID and the DoS, and USDA 
28 Hernandorena, “US Provincial Reconstruction Teams”, 144; McNerney, “Stabilization and Recon-
struction”, 39.
29 Government Accountability Ofice, Securing, Stabilizing and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key 
Issues for Congressional Oversight, Washington DC, May 2007, 22; Agency Stovepipes vs. Stra-
tegic Agility, 73.
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was relegated to the bottom. USDA advisors were perceived to be a burden and a 
nuisance and the small-scale projects they advocated clashed with both USAID’s 
and the military’s philosophies on agricultural development.30
Most accounts exploring the impact of PRTs in Afghanistan acknowledge that 
the programme required improvement. A clear and coherent strategy, better tar-
geted and deployed funding, and a substantial increase in civilian involvement 
and authority were considered necessary reforms. The most reasonable suggestion 
was that comprehensive inter-agency training was needed to overcome a lack of 
cohesion. There has been debate on how a training regime could be successfully 
directed. Hernandorena suggested that leadership opportunities for civilians could 
act as a balancing factor and that speciic guidelines combined with joint pre-
deployment training would be beneicial. Yodsampa was more speciic, outlining 
an inclusionary mechanism for co-location and methods to instil joint decision-
making. Carreua proposed that relationship-building between the civilian and 
military realms was the key to a more effective PRT programme, while Luehrs 
argued that the purpose of training must be to establish an effective chain of com-
mand, a view that was also expressed in US governmental reports.31
None of these proposals included a guide on how all reforms could be effec-
tively implemented to overcome entrenched behavioural norms. Past analysis on 
PRTs often correctly identiied a problem, but each solution would fail to bridge 
the substantial barriers of interests, perceptions, culture and power that the pro-
gramme in Afghanistan crashed against. PRT members supported this appraisal, 
with many believing their tours were not valued by their departments, and that 
they had a negative impact on career progression.
Conclusion
US PRTs in Afghanistan underperformed as the nation-building outits that some 
envisaged. Their generally positive reception in political terms was offset by 
practical problems, primarily due to conlicting agency interests, an imbalance of 
power and the differential perceptions of the soldiers and civilians that made up 
the PRTs, which aligned with their agencies’ behavioural norms rather than with 
an innovative, collaborative approach to nation-building. While there should be 
no excessive expectations about what PRTs could have achieved, serious short-
comings can be traced back to not getting things right at the start. No sui generis 
‘PRT culture’ evolved, or was allowed to evolve. Instead, rival agency cultures 
prevailed. For these reasons, PRTs were microcosms of the US experience in 
Afghanistan, which was characterized by military dominance, insuficient civil-
ian involvement, and blurred lines of responsibility.
30 Carreua, “Lessons From USDA in Iraq and Afghanistan”.
31 Hernandorena, “US Provincial Reconstruction Teams”, 144–147; Yodsampa, No One in Charge, 
172–80; Carreua, “Lessons From USDA in Iraq and Afghanistan”, 142; Luehrs, “Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams”, 95–97.
In mid-December 2001, US servicemen raised the Stars and Stripes over their new 
embassy in Kabul. James Dobbins, the US Special Envoy, remarked at the time 
that this ‘symbolizes the return, after more than a decade of absence, of the US to 
Afghanistan . . . we are here, and we are here to stay’.1 The euphoria generated by 
a successful invasion was short-lived. Liberal democracy, at least in the US sense, 
was always a fantasy, as it ignored Afghanistan’s cultural, religious and political 
traditions, each of which has a rich, albeit troubled, history. Yet there were some 
achievements. The Taliban had prevented girls from obtaining an education. After 
a decade of nation-building, 2.5 million were now enrolled in schools across the 
country. More broadly, the number of children who received some sort of tutelage 
dramatically increased, from 900,000 to seven million. Death rates among adult 
males halved and access to clean water has helped to curb disease and improve 
life expectancy.2
Still, given the considerable expenditure of the United States and the interna-
tional community, which by 2012 had reached $100 billion, nation-building in 
Afghanistan has unequivocally failed. The drug trade accounts for over half of 
the country’s GDP. While poppies abound, hunger is a constant concern and more 
than half of children under ive are malnourished. Corruption continues to deine 
politics at the national, provincial and local level. Afghanistan sits at the bottom of 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the Human Devel-
opment Index ranks it at 175 of 187 countries.3
Afghanistan’s Security Forces number close to 300,000, but still suffer from 
illiteracy, drug addiction and frequent desertion. Many Afghan soldiers and police-
men owe their loyalty to tribal authorities, drug barons and the Taliban rather than 
the Afghan State. The much-trumpeted emancipation of Afghan women belies 
1 “Embassies Raise Flags in Kabul”, BBC, December 17, 2001.
2 Kevin Sieff, “In Afghanistan, Underground Girls School Deies Taliban Edicts, Threats”, Washing-
ton Post, April 25, 2012.
3 Transparency International, Corruption Measurement Tools at http://www.transparency.org/
country#AFG, and United Nations Development Report, Afghanistan, United Nations, 2013, 2.
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reality; most live in constant fear and 90 per cent are subjected to domestic abuse.4 
Warlords continue to thrive and power is gained through violence and intimida-
tion. The Taliban, meanwhile, have been reinvigorated. They are received in parts 
of Afghanistan as the protectors of the populace, while the Afghan government is 
treated with disdain. With the withdrawal of international forces, Afghanistan is 
likely to revert back to the lawless, conlict-ridden landscape that existed follow-
ing the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. US-led nation-building will be remem-
bered as another tombstone in the graveyard of empires.
Domestic conditions, cleavages within the international alliance, and unrealis-
tic ambitions, among an array of other issues, contributed to Afghanistan’s current 
circumstances. But this study has revealed and examined another contributing 
factor – bureaucratic conlict and incoherence within those US agencies that were 
charged with nation-building. It is impossible to say just how much this internal 
division contributed to US failure in Afghanistan – even a completely united state 
machinery faced huge obstacles – but it was a certainly a signiicant factor.
Bureaucratic Politics and Nation-Building in Afghanistan
The impact of bureaucratic politics on US foreign policy has been a neglected area 
of research. This is particularly evident in the case of nation-building in Afghani-
stan, with most studies failing to emphasize the contribution of bureaucratic con-
lict to its failure. By revealing, in detail, the machinations of the US foreign 
policy establishment, therefore, this study ills a signiicant gap in the literature.
It began by showing that the US foreign policy bureaucracy – despite sharing a 
broad ideology that rationalized the rights and prerogatives of the US to intervene 
abroad in its execution of the GWOT – is made up of a number of agencies, fac-
tions and individuals with competing interests, goals and ambitions. To explore 
these differences and what they meant in practice, I developed a framework cen-
tred on differing agency interests, perceptions, culture and power. These four vari-
ables, it must be stressed, were mutually constitutive and overlapping. No single 
one of them stood above the others as a factor that determined behaviour at the 
inter- or intra-agency level. This framework was not so much a uniied theory as 
a set of conceptual tools for thinking about and examining the inner workings of 
the US foreign policy bureaucracy. By applying it to the case of nation-building in 
Afghanistan, I have demonstrated that the US and its foreign policy bureaucracy 
does not act as a monolithic, rational actor entity, but is instead internally differ-
entiated and often seemingly at war with itself. In particular, the dynamics driving 
policy implementation can be overwhelmingly internal. With this in mind, the 
model may be used to extrapolate the US bureaucracies’ impact on foreign policy 
outside of the paradigm of nation-building in Afghanistan.
4 Noorjahan Akbar, “Raped Afghan Women Have No Hope of Justice”, Al-Jazeera, July 8, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/07/2011751254689887.html (accessed 10/1/2014).
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The argument that the United States approached nation-building with a united 
will and purpose overlooks the fact that bureaucratic forces often deined its 
approach. Nation-building, a complex and equivocal process, lay outside the 
orthodox paradigm of any agency’s responsibility. The cumulative results of each 
chapter identiied an amalgam of agencies, factions and individuals with a very 
different understanding of what was required.
If a cohesive approach to nation-building was ever to be realized it would have 
to have been through the efforts of the President and other top decision-makers. 
There was little capacity within the relevant agencies to effectively pursue nation-
building without irm political guidance. Ironically, many of the constraints that 
US nation-building faced can be levelled at the disinterest of those who were 
purported to be its architects. The White House, for the most part, allowed the 
bureaucracy to run its own race. The one partial exception was in respect to gov-
ernance and democracy. President George W. Bush made it clear to the foreign 
policy bureaucracy that the ultimate goal of US nation-building was centralized, 
democratic governance based on elections. Aside from this objective, the White 
House offered little assistance to harmonize goals and ambitions, besides rhe-
torical platitudes. Bush himself completely neglected the management of inter- 
and intra-agency relations, which enabled the military establishment to dominate 
proceedings.
The overarching objective of the US military, at least from 2004 onwards, was 
to roll back the Taliban-led insurgency. It emphasized the extreme nature of the 
threat and contrived to situate nation-building within the paradigm of counter-
insurgency. Yet counter-insurgency was simply another method of warfare, albeit 
with a new twist, rather than an authentic attempt to reconstruct Afghanistan 
and assist its peoples. The military willingly subordinated infrastructure devel-
opment, counter-narcotics and legal reform to the exigencies of its interest in 
war-ighting. Although combating the insurgency was necessary for effective 
nation-building, a broader security mandate that stretched beyond simply the war 
against the Taliban would have better aided the Afghan people and helped pro-
mote cooperation with US civilian agencies. Projects such as the Commanders 
Emergency Response Program (CERP), the Agribusiness Development Teams 
(ADTs), and the military’s Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National 
Army (ANA) training programmes diverged from the rest of the government. 
Each of them blended military culture into nation-building activities – usually 
unsuccessfully. The Pentagon also attempted to use its power and inluence 
in Washington to warp the agenda of the civilian agencies to suit its interests, 
especially in respect of infrastructure development. Meanwhile, it ignored other 
initiatives, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), counter-
narcotics, and legal reform, because they were perceived to compromise, or 
neglect, war-ighting objectives.
Attempts to pursue a strategy that did not directly reinforce counter-insurgency 
were rejected as dangerous developments that were antithetical to military inter-
ests. This rationale led the Pentagon to throw its support behind the CIA’s warlord 
strategy, irrespective of the damage it did to Afghanistan’s political order. More 
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generally, the military’s tolerance of Afghan political igures was premised on 
their assistance with its vendetta against Al Qaeda and the Taliban-led insurgency. 
Clearly, the pretence of winning hearts and minds was disingenuous. It came sec-
ondary to predominant interests and embedded cultural norms.
The military’s attitude is emblematic of a severe imbalance of power between 
the military and civilian realms, which was a consistent theme that resonated 
throughout the years of occupation. The economic funds, manpower and other 
resources at the disposal of the military establishment dwarfed those available 
to the civilian branches. Civilian agencies, for the most part, were restricted to 
Kabul, while the military operated throughout the country.
Thus, the two sides of the foreign policy spectrum, military and civilian, were 
never equal partners. Although military dominance cast a veil of solidarity over 
the invasion, once nation-building began conlict erupted across a wide range 
of policies and projects. According to the considerably more powerful military 
establishment, the civilian branches were inept and disorganized. Comparatively, 
the civilian branches characterized the military as domineering and ignorant. In 
general, neither party could see past these perspectives. This diluted the potential 
of infrastructure development projects, eviscerated the ANP training programme, 
and compromised feasible nation-building objectives that pooled resources and 
expertise. Bureaucratic conlict was, however, by no means restricted to the civil/
military dichotomy.
The State Department, to a point, was united in its opposition to the abrasive 
approach taken by the military establishment. But it was similarly hostile to new 
authority igures, mechanisms and goals that were perceived to be incompatible 
with its cultural norms, which have produced complex hierarchies with long-
standing traditions of diplomacy and statesmanship. For this reason, organiza-
tions, such as S/CRS, and individuals, such as Richard Holbrooke, were treated as 
intruders. Consequently, they failed to surmount the hurdles that the State Depart-
ment bureaucracy presented.
Notwithstanding its overarching interest in diplomacy, the State Department 
is a complex, fragmented and factionalized organization. The US Embassy in 
Kabul and the Bureaus operated relatively autonomously from their headquar-
ters in Washington. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
(INL), for example, unshackled itself from the rest of the department to undertake 
a controversial counter-narcotics strategy based on eradication and interdiction. 
Such disunity obfuscated policy and made it dificult for the State Department to 
play an effective leadership role. Duplication, redundancy and other management 
problems combined to disrupt its policies and projects in Afghanistan.
Other civilian agencies, such as the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), received no coher-
ent guidance from the State Department. As a result, they were free to pursue 
their own agendas. In the USDA’s case, this relected a particular understand-
ing of agricultural best practice. The DEA, meanwhile, fashioned its approach to 
counter-narcotics and justice reform in alignment with its previous experiences. 
By adhering to their cultural traditions, the USDA and the DEA followed narrow 
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sectional interests that prevented collaboration. Instead, the two agencies continu-
ally clashed with the US Embassy and the INL over policy priorities.
USAID is technically under the purview of the State Department, but more 
realistically it functions as an independent agency with a unique culture that cen-
tres on long-term development. Its capacities have been eroded over the past dec-
ades, in terms of staff, resources and the less measurable, but equally important, 
considerations of inluence and prestige. In Afghanistan, there was a disconnect 
between the agency’s paltry staff-base and the vast funds it controlled. USAID’s 
interests in Afghanistan both shaped and relected its culture. The agency consist-
ently referred to its past experience with long-term, small-scale development in 
other countries around the world, in order to justify its approach to nation- building 
in Afghanistan. Despite some plausible ideas, a reliance on outsourcing and poor 
oversight negated any enthusiasm for its approach in Washington and Kabul.
The self-perception that it had a superior understanding of the right way to 
approach nation-building was criticized by the military establishment, the State 
Department and the counter-bureaucracy. These agencies desired immediate results. 
They coerced USAID to prioritize road-building and agriculture projects in certain 
regions of Afghanistan that were either the most prominent poppy producers and/
or where the insurgency was strongest. Congress added to the pressure placed upon 
USAID. It wanted the agency to plant orchards and build schools in Afghanistan’s 
most dangerous and drought-ridden provinces, Helmand and Kandahar. USAID 
yielded to the pressure of more powerful bureaucratic forces and grudgingly imple-
mented projects that it perceived to be cosmetic. The Kajaki Dam venture, mean-
while, best exempliies the agency’s inability to conduct large-scale nation-building. 
From the evidence cited in this study, therefore, it is clear that the contemporary 
USAID is in crisis. Worryingly, its ignominious performance in Afghanistan may 
well precipitate an even steeper quantitative and qualitative decline.
USAID’s reliance on outsourcing was particularly problematic. Contractors 
such as Berger and Chemtronics were more concerned with proits than best prac-
tice, and were entirely different creatures from the smaller, localized contractors 
that the agency employed elsewhere in the world. In Afghanistan, US contractors 
sat in a nebulous area between the private and public sphere. It was often unclear 
as to where the contractor ended and USAID began. The agency lacked the capac-
ity to control or even monitor the projects it outsourced, and the contractors, in 
turn, failed to manage their sub-contractors. Such blatant mismanagement left a 
graveyard of uninished infrastructure projects that stretched across all areas of 
nation-building.
USAID may have been the main culprit, but a reliance on contracting was not 
restricted to that agency alone. The State Department outsourced a signiicant 
portion of its funds, the most prominent example of which was its employment of 
Dyncorp. Dyncorp, like Berger, Chemtronics, and other US companies underper-
formed and the company drastically reduced the capacity of the ANP to function 
as an effective force. Even the military establishment, with its superior resources, 
expertise and manpower, employed contractors to implement ADT, CERP and 
PRT projects.
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Contractors are a legitimate aspect of nation-building, but they played an inordi-
nate part in shaping the US reconstruction programme. This was because each US 
agency, for different reasons, willingly shifted responsibility to the private sphere. 
USAID did not have enough oficials to pursue its own projects, or the time to ind 
and train suitable domestic companies. Alternatively, the State Department and 
military encouraged their oficials and soldiers to focus on what were perceived to 
be their more important interests: politics/diplomacy and war-ighting.
The poor performance of contractors contributed to the counter-bureaucracy’s 
involvement in Afghanistan. The counter-bureaucracy is a loose association of 
regulatory bodies, which are interested in monitoring, regulation oversight and 
accountability. The military establishment, State Department and USAID were 
unwelcoming of its encroachment. Mutual opprobrium united them in a way that 
no formal mechanism for collaboration could. The OMB in particular was per-
ceived to be a signiicant obstruction due to its power to withhold funds. There is 
no doubt that its involvement in Afghanistan was harmful, as it circumscribed the 
development of the ANP and hampered reconstruction projects. But the OMB was 
not the reason for nation-building failure, despite what oficials such as Natsios, 
Neumann and Zakheim would sometimes imply.
The GAO and SIGAR, meanwhile, were tolerated as a nuisance that could be 
ignored. Their recommendations were often accepted by the agencies involved in 
nation-building, more to placate their powerful but unpredictable ally, Congress, 
than because of a genuine belief that the GAO and SIGAR’s suggestions were 
helpful. Hence, year after year, GAO and SIGAR reports highlighted the same 
problems and mistakes. The two agencies became increasingly frustrated by the 
lack of progress they witnessed from the State Department, USAID and the mili-
tary establishment.
The rational actor model also overlooks the extent to which individuals can 
inluence foreign policy, for better or worse. Senior oficials can promote or 
impede cooperation, when set rules for intragovernmental engagement are not 
readily apparent. The evidence in this study, however, would suggest that more 
often than not individuals reinforce cleavages between agencies.
Donald Rumsfeld stands irst among the senior US oficials who had a detri-
mental impact on nation-building. His perception of the military’s role in Afghan-
istan left no room for anything besides eliminating the remnants of Al Qaeda. He 
ignored or derided the civilian agencies and anyone in the military establishment 
who thought differently from him. For Rumsfeld, nation-building was merely a 
nuisance that compromised the Global War on Terror. Channelling this spirit was 
General Tommy Franks, who observed that he would ‘pay any price, bear any 
burden . . . support any friend, oppose any foe . . . [and] shaken hands with the 
devil if it had furthered our goals in the War on Terrorism’.5
Prominent igures such as William Wood and Karl Eikenberry failed to detach 
themselves from their agency’s values. Wood’s loyalties lay with the INL. The 
5 Franks, American Soldier, 374.
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Bureau’s culture fed his obsession with counter-narcotics, which provoked con-
lict within the State Department and between it and the military establishment. 
Eikenberry, who perceived road-building to be a panacea for insecurity, could not 
unshackle himself from the interests, perception and culture of the military, even 
when he was employed as US Ambassador to Afghanistan. Other agency oficials 
may not have actively stiled intragovernmental cooperation, but they still rallied 
under the banner of their agency when battle lines were drawn.
It is all the more surprising, therefore, that David Barno and Zalmay Khalilzad 
overcame bureaucratic problems to steer their respective ships toward the same 
shore. Yet their relationship represented but a temporary and exceptional calm 
within a storm of disunity. The storm intensiied when their predecessors took 
ofice, with the one-upmanship that went back and forth between McChrystal and 
Eikenberry being unsettlingly reminiscent of a soap opera.
Nation-building in Afghanistan also revealed a substantial gap between Wash-
ington and the ield. A lack of understanding or empathy from factions in the US 
capital left oficials and soldiers – from the US ambassador and the Commander 
of the Combined forces to regular infantrymen and State Department representa-
tives – demoralized and unappreciated. Those who challenged agency interests 
and cultures to agitate for a balanced approach to security, infrastructure develop-
ment and legal reform were usually ignored or resented. The rigid and hierarchical 
military establishment, especially, ignored the perspectives of soldiers who were 
interested in more than just counter-insurgency.
Additionally, the shortness of staff terms was unsuited to the long-term nature 
of the nation-building enterprise. The shortness of deployments prevented a learn-
ing curve and institutional memory, which widened bureaucratic rifts between and 
within agencies. When personnel arrived and departed, progress toward shared 
goals and common objectives was lost. Meanwhile, dominant agency interests and 
customary cultural narratives reasserted themselves. The issue was not restricted 
to any single agency. Steps were not taken to overcome this entrenched phenom-
enon and it is destined to compromise any foreign policy issue that puts US boots 
(and suits) on the ground.
Collaborative Mechanisms
Although no steps were taken to change the lengths of US deployments, a range 
of collaborative mechanisms were proposed in pursuit of a more effective whole-
of-government approach. These had mixed results but on balance proved to be 
relatively ineffective in combating entrenched agency interests, perception and 
culture, and differential power. Indeed, in some ways these mechanisms sim-
ply reproduced the very problems that they were designed to overcome. Conse-
quently, inter-agency collaboration remained elusive.
The prospect that a new and alien institution could be grafted onto the State 
Department without opposition from its turf-conscious bureaucracy, for exam-
ple, was always utopian. Alternatively, military-based solutions did not look 
beyond its interest in counter-insurgency. As a result, initiatives from the military 
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establishment aimed to replace rather than work with civilian agencies. The 
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams epitomized the military’s tendency to dominate 
proceedings, rather than cooperate with the civilian branches. Other government-
based enterprises initiated by counter-bureaucracy, Congress and the National 
Security Council, became conduits for the pursuit of narrow sectional interests, 
thus undermining whatever improvements in inter-agency coherence they may 
have irst promised.
Individuals who extolled the beneits of cooperation were often insincere. Those 
who genuinely believed in the necessity of intra-agency collaboration were treated 
as pariahs. Meanwhile, solutions for intragovernmental discord that were devised 
in academia and think-tanks underestimated the complex and entrenched barriers 
the US bureaucracy erected against an integrated approach to nation-building.
These barriers continue to be felt today. While this study has only covered the 
period up until 2010, there is little evidence to suggest that much has changed over 
the intervening four years. President Barrack Obama implemented the surge in 
2009, which resulted in an increase in resources, funding and manpower for what 
he called ‘the good war’. But the surge did not lead to a more concerted whole-of-
government approach. Criticism of US nation-building in Afghanistan continued 
unabated in the media and academia, and no feasible plan has been devised for its 
continuation in the wake of the US withdrawal.6 In fact, it is no exaggeration to 
say that the US public, and by extension its politicians, bureaucrats and soldiers, 
would rather forget the iasco of Afghanistan than learn from it. Nowhere is this 
more salient than in the foreign policy bureaucracy itself. The same fractured 
interests, conlicting perceptions, incompatible cultures and differential powers 
that made effective nation-building all but impossible in Afghanistan, now make 
understanding the experience even more conlicted and opaque than it otherwise 
would be, as bureaucratic factions try to pass the blame for collective failings.
Bureaucratic politics was not the cause of nation-building failure and it must 
be considered within the context of the broader range of problems that were men-
tioned at the beginning of this study. Up till now, much of the scholarly and media 
attention has been focused on the role of the Bush Administration, strategic ambi-
guity, the fragmented policies of the international community and Afghanistan’s 
historical, cultural and political nuances as factors in US shortcomings there. By 
contrast, this study has sought to provide an account of the Afghanistan nation-
building experience that highlights the divisions within the US state itself. It can 
be concluded that bureaucratic conlict signiicantly hampered the capability of 
the US to engage in effective nation-building. The lessons of this experience, 
unfortunately, are likely to be applicable in other foreign policy situations. 
6 Habib Khan Totakhil and Maria Abi-Habib, “US Winds Down Afghanistan Aid Program”, Wall 
Street Journal, October 10, 2012.
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